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Abstract
This thesis is devoted to eﬃcient and secure implementations of lightweight symmetric
cryptographic primitives for resource-constrained devices such as wireless sensors
and actuators that are typically deployed in remote locations. In this setting,
cryptographic algorithms must consume few computational resources and withstand
a large variety of attacks, including side-channel attacks.
The ﬁrst part of this thesis is concerned with eﬃcient software implementations
of lightweight symmetric algorithms on 8, 16, and 32-bit microcontrollers. A ﬁrst
contribution of this part is the development of FELICS, an open-source benchmarking
framework that facilitates the extraction of comparative performance ﬁgures from
implementations of lightweight ciphers. Using FELICS, we conducted a fair evaluation
of the implementation properties of 19 lightweight block ciphers in the context of
two diﬀerent usage scenarios, which are representatives for common security services
in the Internet of Things (IoT). This study gives new insights into the link between
the structure of a cryptographic algorithm and the performance it can achieve on
embedded microcontrollers. Then, we present the Sparx family of lightweight ciphers
and describe the impact of software eﬃciency in the process of shaping three instances
of the family. Finally, we evaluate the cost of the main building blocks of symmetric
algorithms to determine which are the most eﬃcient ones. The contributions of
this part are particularly valuable for designers of lightweight ciphers, software and
security engineers, as well as standardization organizations.
In the second part of this work, we focus on side-channel attacks that exploit the
power consumption or the electromagnetic emanations of embedded devices executing
unprotected implementations of lightweight algorithms. First, we evaluate diﬀerent
selection functions in the context of Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) to infer
which operations are easy to attack. Second, we show that most implementations
of the AES present in popular open-source cryptographic libraries are vulnerable
to side-channel attacks such as CPA, even in a network protocol scenario where
the attacker has limited control of the input. Moreover, we describe an optimal
algorithm for recovery of the master key using CPA attacks. Third, we perform the
ﬁrst electromagnetic vulnerability analysis of Thread, a networking stack designed
to facilitate secure communication between IoT devices.
The third part of this thesis lies in the area of side-channel countermeasures
against power and electromagnetic analysis attacks. We study eﬃcient and secure
expressions that compute simple bitwise functions on Boolean shares. To this end,
we describe an algorithm for eﬃcient search of expressions that have an optimal cost
in number of elementary operations. Then, we introduce optimal expressions for
ﬁrst-order Boolean masking of bitwise AND and OR operations. Finally, we analyze
the performance of three lightweight block ciphers protected using the optimal
expressions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Latin expression “sapientia est potentia”1, which is often translated as “knowledge
is power”, captures the great importance of knowledge for humankind. At the same
time, it shows why people became interested in protecting information 2, which is
one of the main ingredients of knowledge.
Cryptology (from Greek kryptós – hidden and lógos – word) is the science that
studies communication and storage of data in secure and usually secret form [324]. It
encompasses two highly related areas: cryptography (from the Greek gráphein – to
write) and cryptanalysis (from Greek analýein – to loosen or to untie). Cryptography
uses mathematical techniques to provide information security, such as conﬁdentiality,
data integrity, entity authentication, and data origin authentication. The large
ﬁeld of cryptography also includes algorithms and protocols designed for electronic
transactions and elections or cryptocurrencies. On the other hand, cryptanalysis
aims at ﬁnding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms.
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1.1 From Classical to Modern Cryptography
Historically, cryptography was more of an art than science. The ﬁrst forms of secret
writing date to ancient Egypt about 4000 years B.C. [181, 385]. At that time, scribes
were communicating by written messages using hieroglyphs. The art of secret writing
using hieroglyphs was transmitted from father to son and was broken only several
millenia later by Champollion [371].
The ancient Greeks used a cylinder with a strip of parchment wound around it to
write secret messages. This tool (the scytale), invented around 500 B.C. by Spartans,
represents the ﬁrst transposition cipher. To recover the original message, one had
to wrap the parchment around a rod of the same diameter and read along the axis.
This cipher was used to communicate during military campaigns.
Later, the Roman emperor Julius Caesar used another technique (the Caesar
cipher) to protect his private correspondence. It consists in replacing every letter of
a message by the letter which comes three positions later in the alphabet. The initial
message can be recovered by performing the inverse transformation. The Caesar
cipher is regarded as the ﬁrst recorded use of a substitution cipher [325].
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The ROT13 substitution is a special case of the Caesar cipher that is typically
used to hide oﬀensive jokes or to obscure an answer to a puzzle [310]. It replaces
a letter of the basic Latin alphabet, which consists of 26 letters, with the letter
situated 13 positions after it in the alphabet and thus it is its own inverse.
Modern cryptography started to develop in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century [183].
A famous example from that time is the Enigma machine invented by the German
engineer Arthur Scherbius at the end of World War I and patented in 1928 [19].
Several diﬀerent Enigma models were produced. Enigma I, also known as the
Wehrmacht, was extensively used by German military services before and during
World War II. Under the leadership of mathematician Marian Rejewski, the Poles
reverse-engineered Enigma and found the ﬁrst attack against it. Their eﬀorts were
continued by a British team led by mathematician Alan Turing who created the
bombe, an electromechanical device designed to discover the daily settings of the
Enigma machines used by the German troops.
In the years immediately following World War II, both cryptography and crypt-
analysis continued to develop at a rapid pace, driven by several signiﬁcant technical
innovations such as the invention of the von Neumann architecture in 1945 [374]
and of the transistor in 1947 [66]. Some other notable milestones in the history
of modern cryptography are the seminal work of Claude Shannon that established
the mathematical basis of information theory in 1948 [319, 320], the ﬁrst public
description of public-key cryptography by Diﬃe and Hellman in 1976 [101], and the
publication of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in 1977 [360], which is based on
a slightly modiﬁed version of an earlier design of cryptographer Horst Feistel. As a
consequence of all breakthroughs and ﬁndings in this area, a rich theory emerged
that enabled a rigorous study of cryptology (cryptography and cryptanalysis) as a
science.
The advent of the ﬁrst personal computer in 1981 [257] and the rise of the
Internet in the early 1990s set the stage for mass usage of cryptography. Nowadays,
cryptography plays a crucial role in our lives since it is at the heart of computer and
communication security. Without doubt, the expansion of the Internet of Things
(IoT) envisioned for the coming years will augment even more the importance of
cryptography.
While the ﬁrst decades of modern cryptography were dominated by military
applications, in the last decades cryptography permeated numerous domains such
as commerce, banking, industry, and health care to become an essential component
of many secure systems. The history of cryptology is a fascinating story in itself,
but not the scope of this thesis. A good reading on the history of cryptology is the
monograph of Kahn [181].
1.2 Modern Cryptography
1.2.1 Security Services
Cryptography uses a set of techniques to provide information security. A security
service is a speciﬁc security goal that can be achieved by using cryptography. The
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primary objective of using cryptography is to provide the following four fundamental
information security services: confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and
non-repudiation. They form a framework upon which other security services, such as
access control, anonymity, or digital signatures, can be derived [238].
• Confidentiality. This security service ensures that only those authorized have
access to the content of the information. Hence, it prevents an unauthorized
user to access the content of the protected information. It is sometimes referred
to as secrecy.
• Data integrity. Data integrity provides a mean to detect whether data has
been manipulated by an unauthorized party since the last time an authorized
user created, stored or transmitted it. Data manipulation refers to operations
such as insertion, deletion, or substitution.
• Authentication. Authentication is related to identiﬁcation and it is often
divided into two classes: data origin authentication and entity authentication.
– Data origin authentication. It gives assurance that an entity is the
original source of a message. Data origin authentication implicitly provides
data integrity. Sometimes, it is referred to as message authentication.
– Entity authentication. Entity authentication assures one entity about
the identity of a second entity with which it is interacting. Usually, entity
authentication implies data origin authentication.
• Non-repudiation. Non-repudiation is a security service that prevents an
entity from denying a previous action or commitment. It is very useful in
situations that can lead to disputes. When a dispute arises, a trusted third
party is able to provide the evidence required to settle it.
1.2.2 Kerckhoffs’ Principle
The Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoﬀs formulated six design principles that
a cipher has to satisfy [185]. The second principle is the most famous of them and
states the following:
The security of a cryptographic system must depend only on the secrecy
of the key, and not on the secrecy of the algorithm.
There are many good arguments in favour of Kerchhoﬀs’ principle [125, 183].
The ﬁrst two arguments stem from the fact that algorithms are built in hardware or
software which makes them susceptible to reverse-engineering and hard to replace.
First, it is more diﬃcult to keep the secrecy of an algorithm than to maintain the
secrecy of a simple key. Second, it is more straightforward to replace an exposed key
than a leaked algorithm. Third, it is much easier to share the same algorithm and use
diﬀerent keys to securely communicate with various entities than to use a diﬀerent
algorithm for each party. Finally, there are good reasons why algorithms should be
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published. While it is very diﬃcult to design a good cryptographic algorithm, it is
very easy to make a mistake that weakens it. Therefore, an algorithm is likely to be
stronger if it has been extensively studied and no weaknesses have been found.
However, the simple fact that an algorithm is public does not imply that it is
secure. It can be the case that the algorithm was not studied enough or it was
already broken. The ﬁrst case can be exempliﬁed by the PC1 stream cipher published
in 1997 and broken in 2012 [52] when it was already part of the DRM system of
the MOBI e-book format, which was supported by the Amazon Kindle and by the
free software MobiPocket. An expressive example of the latter case is the surprising
use of the ROT13 substitution, described in Section 1.1, by the eBook vendor New
Paradigm Research Group to protect its documents (at least) until 2001 when this
ﬁnding was presented at a hacking conference [326]. Windows XP used the same
algorithm on some of its registry keys [339].
Some famous examples of proprietary algorithms that were ﬁrstly leaked or reverse-
engineered and then broken are RC4 [254, 10], DST [61], KeeLoq [70, 171, 120, 4], and
Megamos [372]. The last three algorithms were used for car immobilizer transponders.
A detailed list of such algorithms can be found in [53].
1.2.3 Adversarial Models
In the context of encryption algorithms, the primary goal of a cryptanalyst is to
break an algorithm using an attack. By attack we understand any technique that
provides some information about the decryption key (key recovery attack) or the
plaintext (decryption attack). There are many types of attacks, each with its own
strengths and weaknesses. Depending on the information a cryptanalyst has in
addition to the description of the cipher under analysis, we distinguish between four
main categories of attacks [183, 371].
• Ciphertext-only attack. The only piece of information the attacker has is
a set of ciphertexts produced using the same encryption key. This is the most
diﬃcult type of attack since the attacker has the least amount of information.
• Known-plaintext attack. In this setting, the attacker knows some plain-
text-ciphertext pairs. In practice, there are many situations in which the
attacker gets to know the plaintext associated to a ciphertext (e.g. after a
conﬁdential document is made public).
• Chosen-plaintext attack. The attacker can choose the plaintext to be
encrypted and therefore she gets the corresponding ciphertext. This is a more
powerful type of attack than a known-plaintext attack.
• Chosen-ciphertext attack. In addition to a chosen-plaintext attack, the
adversary can choose arbitrary ciphertexts and she gets the corresponding
plaintexts decrypted from it. Hence, this attack is more powerful than a
chosen-plaintext attack.
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The above-mentioned attacks belong to the class of cryptanalytic attacks. Another
important class of attacks is represented by the so-called generic attacks. A generic
attack is an attack that can be applied to a wide range of cryptographic algorithms
without knowing the details of the attacked primitive. Examples of generic attacks
are brute-force attacks and dictionary attacks. A brute-force attack consists in an
exhaustive search of the correct key. The attacker encrypts a plaintext under a
guessed key and checks if the resulting ciphertext matches the known ciphertext. The
process is repeated until the correct key is found. Brute-force attacks are impractical
given suﬃciently large key sizes. A third class of attacks covers physical attacks
that exploit implementation aspects of cryptographic algorithms. These attacks are
described in detail in Section 1.5.
1.3 Cryptographic Toolkit
Cryptography can be divided into two main branches: symmetric cryptography
and asymmetric cryptography. The diﬀerence between the two branches hinges on
the relationship between the keys used to perform diﬀerent operations. In general,
symmetric cryptosystems use the same key or closely related keys for encryption and
decryption. Symmetric cryptography also studies algorithms that do not require any
key at all, such as hash functions. On the contrary, in asymmetric cryptosystems
the encryption key is fundamentally diﬀerent from the decryption key [226].
Symmetric and asymmetric algorithms have various advantages and disadvan-
tages, but they complement each other well. Cryptographic systems commonly
use algorithms from both branches to provide various security services such as
those described in Section 1.2.1. A brief comparison of symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography is given in Section 1.3.3.
1.3.1 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric cryptography is also referred to as secret key cryptography because the
same key is used to both encrypt and decrypt the data. Secret key cryptography is the
oldest form of cryptography. The algorithms studied by this branch of cryptography
can be divided into ﬁve categories: block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions,
message authentication codes, and authenticated ciphers.
1.3.1.1 Block Ciphers
A block cipher is a bijective function that maps a plaintext block of n bits to a
ciphertext block of n bits using a key of k bits. Usually a block cipher is built
by iterating a round function that depends on the secret key using a well-known
structure such as a Substitution-Permutation network (SPN), a Feistel network (FN),
or a Lai-Massey structure.
In practice, a block cipher is used in a mode of operation to encrypt plaintexts of
arbitrary size. The most important modes of operation are brieﬂy described next.
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• Cipher Block Chaining (CBC). In this mode of operation, each plaintext
block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block and then it is encrypted.
Consequently, each cipher block depends on all plaintext blocks previously
processed [117]. The ﬁrst plaintext block is XORed with an initialization vector
(IV). Although CBC is sequential and requires padding of the message to a
multiple of the cipher block size, it is one of the most widely used modes of
operation.
• Counter (CTR). This mode of operation turns a block cipher into a stream
cipher. A counter is encrypted by the block cipher and the result is XORed
with the plaintext block to obtain the ciphertext block [102]. The counter can
be any function which produces a sequence that is guaranteed not to repeat for
a long time. A simple and popular method is to increment the counter value
by one for each new block.
• Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM). Designed to provide both authenti-
cation and conﬁdentiality, CCM supports only block ciphers with a block
length of 128 bits [380, 362]. It combines the CBC-MAC (i.e. CBC mode used
to generate a message authentication code) with CTR mode of encryption:
CBC-MAC is ﬁrst computed on the message to obtain a tag which is then
encrypted together with the message using counter mode. A minor variation of
the CCM, called CCM*, includes all of the features of CCM and additionally
oﬀers encryption-only and integrity-only capabilities.
• Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). GCM is an authenticated encryption algo-
rithm that combines the counter mode of encryption with the Galois mode of
authentication [363, 234]. It can reach high throughput thanks to its structure
that allows parallel processing and eﬃcient use of pipelining. Namely, the CTR
mode and the Galois ﬁeld multiplication used for authentication can be easily
computed in parallel.
Block ciphers are versatile primitives and thus they can be used to build a large
variety of cryptographic algorithms such as stream ciphers, hash functions, message
authentication codes, authenticated ciphers, or pseudo-random number generators.
The most widely used block cipher is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [361],
which is based on the Rijndael algorithm [98].
1.3.1.2 Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are inspired by the one-time pad (OTP) cipher, which encrypts every
plaintext with a diﬀerent key. OTP provides perfect secrecy if the keys used are
fully random [320]. However, in practice it is diﬃcult to share large key streams. To
overcome this issue, a stream cipher generates a pseudo-random stream of bits from a
short secret key. There are two types of stream ciphers: synchronous stream ciphers
and self-synchronizing stream ciphers. A self-synchronizing stream cipher generates
a key stream that depends on some previous ciphertext digits, while a synchronous
stream cipher generates a key stream that is independent of the plaintext and
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ciphertext messages. Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher selected as part of the
portfolio for low area hardware ciphers by the eSTREAM project and standardized
by ISO/IEC [173].
1.3.1.3 Hash Functions
A hash function transforms an arbitrarily long input into a ﬁxed length digest. This
construction is secure if it satisﬁes three conditions: collision resistance, preimage
resistance, and second preimage resistance. Collision resistance is achieved if it is
computationally impossible to build two messages that hash to the same value.
Preimage resistance means that it is computationally infeasible to reverse a hash
function (i.e. to ﬁnd a message that hashes to a given digest). Finally, second preimage
resistance requires that given an input and its digest it is hard to ﬁnd a diﬀerent
input with the same digest. Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA-2) [364] and Secure
Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3) [366] are members of the Secure Hash Algorithm family
of standards, released by NIST. SHA-2 was designed by the United States National
Security Agency (NSA), while SHA-3 is a subset of the broader cryptographic
primitive family Keccak [46].
1.3.1.4 Message Authentication Codes
A message authentication code (MAC) or a keyed hash function is an algorithm that
takes a key and an arbitrarily long message and produces a ﬁxed size tag whose
purpose is to provide message authentication. A MAC should have the forgery
resistance property, namely, that it is computationally infeasible for an attacker to
ﬁnd a message and tag pair without knowing the secret key. A common mechanism
for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions is HMAC [204].
1.3.1.5 Authenticated Ciphers
Authenticated ciphers are designed to simultaneously provide conﬁdentiality, integrity,
and authenticity of data. The process of using an authenticated cipher is sometimes
called authenticated encryption (AE) or authenticated encryption with associated
data (AEAD). Authenticated ciphers are motivated by the fact that combining a
conﬁdentiality mode with an authentication mode in a secure way can be diﬃcult
and error prone. Examples of authenticated encryption modes based on block ciphers
include CCM and GCM, which are standardized by ISO/IEC [172].
1.3.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography or public-key cryptography studies any cryptographic
system that involves a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. In order to use
a public-key cryptosystem one needs to generate a pair of mathematically-related
keys such that it is computationally infeasible to determine the private key from
the public key. The private key is kept secret, while the public key is distributed to
other entities.
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Public-key cryptosystems are based on mathematical problems that currently
admit no eﬃcient solution: integer factorization (RSA [297]), discrete logarithms
(ElGamal [134], digital signature algorithm – DSA [365]), or discrete logarithms
on elliptic curves (elliptic curve cryptography – ECC [365]). Three well-known
applications of asymmetric cryptography are public-key encryption, digital signatures,
and public-key infrastructure (PKI).
1.3.2.1 Public-Key Encryption
Public-key encryption is realized using the public key of the recipient. Anyone can
encrypt a message using this public key and the corresponding public-key encryption
algorithm. Only the owner of the matching private key can decrypt the ciphertext.
Public-key algorithms are typically used to encrypt small messages due to the their
computational complexity. To protect a long message, one can use a public-key
cryptosystem to encrypt only a secret key which is then used to encrypt the long
message using a symmetric cipher.
1.3.2.2 Digital Signatures
A digital signature can be obtained by encrypting a message under the sender’s
private key. Typically, the message is hashed before being signed. Anyone who has
the sender’s public key can verify if the signature is valid or not. Besides the sender’s
public key, the veriﬁcation function takes a signature and a message. It checks if the
signature was generated from the given message using the private key of the sender.
The veriﬁcation function ensures that the message was not tampered with.
1.3.2.3 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
A public key infrastructure is a system in which the ownership of a key pair is certiﬁed
by a trusted third party through a public-key certificate. A public-key certiﬁcate
includes information about the public key, the identity of its owner, and the validity
period. This information is signed by a certification authority (CA), which issues,
stores and revokes public-key certiﬁcates. Each participant in a PKI has to get a
public-key certiﬁcate from the CA. Moreover, each participant has to know the CA’s
public key to be able to verify the certiﬁcates of other participants.
1.3.3 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptography
Current cryptographic systems exploit the strengths of both symmetric-key and
public-key cryptography. Symmetric encryption is preferred when conﬁdentiality
is required because it is faster than public-key encryption. Moreover, symmetric
algorithms usually use smaller keys than public-key algorithms. On the other hand,
public-key cryptography is used to establish secure communication channels and to
provide non-repudiation.
To preserve the security of a symmetric system, the key must be kept secret at
both ends. Furthermore, a diﬀerent key must be shared between each two entities.
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Consequently, the key management might become cumbersome when communicating
with a large number of entities. In contrast, in public-key cryptosystems only the
private key must be secret.
Sound cryptographic practice requires that symmetric keys have to be changed
more frequently than the key pairs used for public-key cryptography, which can
remain unchanged for considerable periods of time. While symmetric keys can be
randomly generated, keys used in a public-key system have a special structure and
are usually more expensive to generate.
An overview of the main security services (see Section 1.2.1) that can be achieved
using symmetric and asymmetric cryptography is given in Table 1.1. Sometimes
a primitive can not provide a security service on its own, but when it is used in a
mode of operation or in combination with another primitive.
Primitive
Security service
Confidentiality Integrity Authentication Non-repudiation
Block cipher
Stream cipher
Hash function
MAC
Authenticated cipher
Public-key encryption
Digital signature
– using only the primitive
– using the primitive in a mode of operation or combined with other primitives
– not possible
Table 1.1: Security services provided by diﬀerent symmetric and asymmetric crypto-
graphic primitives.
1.4 Implementations
Modern cryptographic algorithms are designed to work on a binary representation of
information and thus they are fairly useless on their own. They have to be imple-
mented in actual devices that process information in the same binary representation.
Usually, the implementations of cryptographic algorithms are divided into hardware
implementations and software implementations. Though, a cryptographic algorithm
can also be implemented using a hardware/software codesign which tries to exploit
the synergy of hardware and software. The goal of such an implementation is to
satisfy stringent design constraints such as cost or performance, while reducing the
time to market [346, 306].
Any cryptographic algorithm can be implemented in software or can be built
directly in hardware. The choice between hardware and software is determined
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by various factors such as the requirements and constraints of speciﬁc use cases,
ﬂexibility, cost, or time to market. The same criteria are considered when selecting
the chip technology for hardware implementations or the programming language for
software implementations.
1.4.1 Hardware Implementations
A hardware implementation describes the structure of an integrated circuit. An inte-
grated circuit is the result of a hardware design flow that starts with the speciﬁcation
of the circuit in a hardware description language (HDL) such as VHDL or Verilog.
A digital circuit can be implemented on a chip using a Field Programmable Array
(FPGA) or an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). A detailed comparison
between the two technologies is given in [207].
• Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). An FPGA is an integrated
circuit designed to be conﬁgured using a HDL. It consists of an array of
programmable logic blocks, memory elements, and routing channels. The logic
blocks can be used as simple logic gates or conﬁgured to perform complex
combinational functions [69].
• Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs). An ASIC is an in-
tegrated circuit customized for a speciﬁc use or application. Usually ASIC
implementations are faster and smaller than FPGA implementations, but they
are more expensive to design. However, the ﬁnal cost of an ASIC decreases as
more units are manufactured [329].
1.4.2 Software Implementations
A software implementation is a program that can be executed on a general-purpose
processor. Nowadays, software engineers can choose the most suitable programming
language from a rich variety of languages to create programs that implement speciﬁc
algorithms. However, there are few programming languages that can be used to write
code for embedded devices. Typically, the development toolchains for microcontrollers
support several languages, of which the most common are C (high-level language)
and assembly (low-level language).
• C language. C is a language that supports cross-platform programming. It
is used to write various software for devices ranging from supercomputers
to embedded systems. Code written in C beneﬁts from low-level access to
memory through pointers and, in general, it is eﬃciently mapped to machine
instructions.
• Assembly language. An assembly (or assembler) language is strongly tied
to the machine instructions of a particular architecture. Hence, an assembly
language is speciﬁc to a particular architecture. Assembly code has niche uses
such as for operations that can not be easily implemented or are not well
optimized by a compiler.
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1.4.3 Hardware vs. Software Implementations
There are some major diﬀerences between hardware and software implementations.
While the development cost of software implementations is almost ﬂat and relatively
low, the development cost of hardware implementations tends to increase towards
the end of the development cycle. Hence, hardware implementations, especially
ASICs, are cost-eﬀective in large volumes. Hardware has to be well implemented and
debugged before being shipped to the customer. In other words, it has to be free of
errors or bugs because it is diﬃcult and expensive to change deployed hardware. In
contrast, software is more ﬂexible and usually can be updated after shipment to the
customer. Unlike hardware implementations, software implementations can evolve
through multiple releases and new features can be added at any time. However,
hardware implementations can be faster than software implementations.
1.4.4 Implementation Efficiency
A ﬁrst step towards building secure systems is to implement a set of cryptographic
algorithms that provide the main security services (see Section 1.2.1) necessary to
achieve the desired security properties. Typically, implementations of cryptographic
algorithms need to meet some speciﬁc requirements imposed by the applications
of the system. For example, an implementation for a real-time system must be
able to encrypt data within a clearly deﬁned time frame. Such application-speciﬁc
requirements are precisely formulated and assessed using the appropriate metrics.
The term efficiency characterizes a process done well with minimum resources.
Hence, we say an implementation is eﬃcient when it does not waste the resources
of the system on which it is executed. Writing an eﬃcient implementation of a
cryptographic algorithm is not straightforward. It requires a good understanding of
the algorithm to be implemented as well as of the hardware or software architecture
which will run the implementation. Therefore, the skills required for an eﬃcient
implementation of a cryptographic algorithm fall into the area of cryptographic
engineering.
A description of meaningful metrics for eﬃciency of hardware implementations is
given in Section 1.4.5. Similarly, Section 1.4.6 presents metrics used to assess the
eﬃciency of software implementations.
1.4.5 Metrics for Hardware Implementations
There are various metrics that can be used to assess the eﬃciency of a hardware
implementation. These metrics usually depend on the fabrication technology and
the standard cell library. The most common ones are:
• Area. Area measures the size of an integrated circuit in µm2 or gate equivalents
(GEs). A GE is a unit of measure that allows one to quantify the area complexity
of a circuit independently of the manufacturing technology. Usually a GE is
equal to the area of a two-input NAND gate.
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• Latency. Latency (or execution time) gives the time required to perform an
operation. It is measured in clock cycles or seconds (often ms). The amount of
time is obtained by dividing the number of cycles by the operating frequency.
• Throughput. Throughput is the maximum rate at which an operation is
performed. It is usually expressed in bits per second (bps), that is, the number
of output bits divided by the time required to generate those output bits.
• Power consumption. This metric quantiﬁes the electric power, usually in
mW , consumed by an integrated circuit to perform an operation. Typically,
power consumption values can be based on estimations or simulations at the
gate or transistor level provided by the hardware design tools.
• Energy consumption. Energy consumption of an integrated circuit, typically
expressed in mJ , is equal to the product of the electric charge transferred
through the circuit and the supply voltage. It can be determined experimentally
by integrating the current across a shunt resistor inserted between the Vdd
pin and the power supply. Energy per bit is obtained by dividing the energy
consumption by the number of output bits.
• Figure of merit. There are various ways to compare the performance or eﬃ-
ciency of implementations using metrics such as hardware efficiency deﬁned as
throughput to area ratio [59, 277], figure of merit (FOM) deﬁned as throughput
divided by the area squared [24], or figure of adversarial merit (FOAM) [186]
which combines the inherent security provided by cryptographic structures and
components with their hardware implementation properties.
1.4.6 Metrics for Software Implementations
A metric is a way to determine the degree to which an implementation possesses
some property. Hence, there is a considerable overlap between the metrics used
to measure hardware and software implementations since both have some similar
characteristics. The metrics used to weight software implementations depend on the
target architecture or the compiler/assembler used to generate the binary code.
• Code size. While the size of a hardware implementation is determined by
its area, the size of a software implementation is quantiﬁed by its code size.
Hence, the code size measures the amount of bytes required to store the binary
code in the non-volatile memory (e.g. ﬂash memory, ROM) of a device.
• Execution time. This metric has exactly the same essence as execution time
of a hardware implementation. While number of clock cycles is independent of
the operating frequency, the actual time in seconds depends on the frequency
of the clock signal.
• RAM consumption. RAM consumption gives the amount of run-time
memory (in bytes) required for the execution of a software implementation on
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a processor. RAM is a form of volatile memory that can be used to store the
data of a program and its execution stack.
• Throughput. Throughput is a common metric for both hardware and software
implementations. Typically, an algorithm can reach higher throughput rates
when implemented in hardware than when it is implemented software.
• Power consumption. This metric gives the power consumed for an operation.
Modern processors and microcontrollers have several power modes that can be
used to optimize the power consumption. In contrast to some hardware design
tools that can provide power consumption estimations, software toolchains
usually do not have this feature.
• Energy consumption. Although there is a direct link between energy and
power, namely power is the energy consumed per unit time, energy is a primary
concern for battery operated devices since it directly inﬂuences the lifetime of
the battery [114, 31].
• Figure of merit. The authors of [118] used a combined metric deﬁned as
the product of code size and execution time normalized by the block size to
asses the performance of block ciphers on an 8-bit microcontroller. Two similar
metrics were used to summarize the eﬃciency of several hash functions: the
product of code size and execution time and the product of RAM consumption
and execution time [26].
1.4.7 Optimization Strategies
An implementation can be optimized to make more eﬃcient use of available resources
(e.g. energy) or to achieve better results for a certain metric (e.g. throughput).
Typically, an optimization requires a trade-oﬀ between diﬀerent objectives of an
implementation. Two common optimization techniques that can be applied to both
hardware and software implementations of symmetric cryptographic algorithms are
loop unrolling and pipelining.
• Loop unrolling. Loop unrolling is an optimization technique that can be used
to reduce the execution time of an implementation at the expense of an increase
in area (hardware implementation) or code size (software implementation). It
replicates the loop body and adjusts the loop iteration counter accordingly.
• Pipelining. Pipelining consists in overlapping the execution of diﬀerent
operations with the aim of increasing the throughput. The circuitry is usually
divided into stages and each stage performs a particular operation. Hence,
pipelining takes advantage of those operations that can be executed concurrently
at distinct stages of a pipeline.
There are many other optimization strategies besides the above-mentioned ones.
Therefore, eﬃcient implementations demand skilled cryptographic engineers that
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are able to leverage the appropriate optimization techniques necessary to meet the
requirements of diﬀerent use cases. Typical trade-oﬀs for hardware implementations
of symmetric cryptography are discussed in [194]. A good description of common
optimization techniques for software implementations can be found in [269].
1.5 Implementation Attacks
In general, a straightforward implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is vul-
nerable to various types of attacks referred to as implementation attacks or physical
attacks. In contrast to cryptanalytic attacks that focus on breaking a cryptographic
algorithm in a black box model, implementation attacks work in the so-called gray box
model. In the black box model, the attacker uses the speciﬁcations of a cryptographic
algorithm (see Section 1.2.2) and some pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts to recover
the key. The gray box model assumes a more powerful attacker that has access
to some information about the internal state of the algorithm in addition to the
knowledge of an attacker in the black box model.
Essentially, an attack against an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm
takes advantage of the physical characteristics of the device that executes the
implementation. Attackers can simply observe some physical phenomena or they can
manipulate some physical parameters to cause a response from the device. Physical
attacks are usually much more powerful than classical cryptanalytic attacks (see
Section 1.2.3). A graphical representation of the two attack models is shown in
Figure 1.1.
input output
implementation
input output
implementation
modiﬁcation leakage
Figure 1.1: Comparison between the black box (left) and gray box (right) security
models.
1.5.1 Short History
An early example of an attack that exploited the emanations of a communication
equipment occurred in 1914, during World War I. At that time, the German army
successfully eavesdropped on the voice communication of its enemy using the ground
current of the phone lines. To reduce the weight of cable drums that the troops
had to carry, the ﬁeld phones were connected with a single insulated wire and the
ground was used for the return circuit. This allowed the Germans to pick up the
resulting voltage drop from the other side of the trenches with valve ampliﬁers
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connected to so-called search electrodes inserted into the ground. To prevent this
attack, the combatants introduced various countermeasures such as placing the
ground connections far behind the front trenches, using twisted-pair cables, reducing
the line currents, and limiting the sensitivity of information communicated via ﬁeld
phones [34, 13, 206].
This attack does not target a cryptographic implementation. It is merely an
eavesdropping attack on an insecure communication channel. Nevertheless, it is
a good example of how an attacker can exploit some compromising emanations
that were not that obvious in the ﬁrst place. Moreover, it uses the same principle
employed in power analysis attacks to measure the power consumption of a device
that executes cryptographic algorithms.
According to a paper declassiﬁed by NSA in 2007 [131], attributed to Jeﬀrey
Friedman [311], the United States of America learned about the existence of compro-
mising emanations during World War II. The problem of compromising emanations,
which was given the code name TEMPEST, is also mentioned in another document
recently declassiﬁed by NSA [57]. It is clearly described by the following excerpt
from the declassiﬁed paper:
Any time a machine is used to process classified information electrically,
the various switches, contacts, relays, and other components in that
machine may emit radio frequency or acoustic energy. These emissions,
like tiny radio broadcasts, may radiate through free space for considerable
distances – a half mile or more in some cases. Or they may be induced
on nearby conductors like signal lines, power lines, telephone lines, or
water pipes and be conducted along those paths for some distance – and
here we may be talking of a mile or more.
The problem of compromising emanations was discovered in 1943 by a researcher
from Bell Labs. While he was testing the Bell-telephone mixing device 131-B2, which
was used for encryption in the backbone systems of the U.S. Army and Navy, he
observed a spike on an oscilloscope situated in a distant corner of the lab. After a
careful examination of the spikes, he was able to recover the plaintext encrypted
by the device. In a demonstration under ﬁeld conditions for the skeptical military
leaders who did not believe that the phenomenon can be exploited, some engineers
from Bell Telephone recovered 75% of the plaintext processed by a device situated
at a distance of about 25 meters.
Bell Labs was appointed to study the phenomenon in depth and propose modi-
ﬁcations to secure the Bell-telephone mixing device 131-B2. They identiﬁed three
separate phenomena and suggested three basic suppression measures: shielding (for
radiation through space and magnetic ﬁelds), filtering (for conducted signals on
power lines), and masking (for space-radiated or conducted signals). However, the
application of shielding and ﬁltering countermeasures was challenging. The modiﬁed
mixer was heavy, had issues with heat dissipation and limited the access to various
controls. As a result, it was never used in the ﬁeld. Instead, commanders were
advised to keep a control zone of about 30 meters in diameter around the their
communication centers.
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After World War II, the problem was forgotten and rediscovered by the CIA in
1951. At that time, a considerable eﬀort was put into understanding the phenomena
of compromising emanations and determining suppression techniques. In the next
years, the progress in developing and improving new attack techniques was faster
than in building countermeasures. A disturbing discovery was the threat of acoustic
emanations since it was immediately linked to the microphones found in various
strategic locations. Ordinary microphones could detect machine sounds with enough
ﬁdelity to permit exploitation.
The NSA did not declassify the entire paper [131], leaving the description of
two separate, but apparently related, topics enticingly redacted. One topic is called
seismic and the other flooding.
Peter Wright, a former MI5 oﬃcer, describes in his book [384] two missions that
exploited compromising emanations. The ﬁrst mission took place in 1956, during
the Suez Crisis, when a joint operation of MI5 and GCHQ determined the initial
position of several wheels of the Hagelin cipher machine installed in the Egyptian
Embassy in London using a phone bug and an oscilloscope. The second espionage
campaign targeted the communications of the French Embassy in London between
1960 and 1963. A broadband radio frequency tap installed on the telex cable carried
a secondary faint signal that facilitated the recovery of the plaintext.
For a long time, the topic of emission security was exclusively studied by military
and intelligence agencies, which treated it as a highly classiﬁed case. According to
Markus Kuhn, the security risks of electromagnetic radiation were ﬁrst mentioned in
the open literature only in 1966 [206]. However, the broader public became aware of
the problem of compromising emanations in 1985 when Wim van Eck published a
paper that shows how to reconstruct the image of a cathode ray tube (CRT) display
by picking up and decoding the electromagnetic interference produced by this type
of equipment [369]. He made a practical demonstration of the attack using just
a dipole antenna, a television receiver, and an external synchronization oscillator.
Wim van Eck proposed three ways to mitigate the attack: decrease radiation level,
increase noise level, and randomize the sequence in which the image is displayed on
the screen. The countermeasures proposed by van Eck can be used to protect an
implementation against other types of emissions as well.
The cryptographic research community started to intensively study and publish
papers on various implementation attacks in the late 1990s. Firstly, Paul Kocher
developed timing attacks in 1996 [198]. The core idea of his attacks is that one can
exploit the variations in the execution time of cryptographic software to recover the
secret data involved in the computations. His paper is considered to be one of the
foundation bricks for research in the ﬁeld of side-channel attacks. The following
quote illustrates his view about side-channel attacks at that time:
In general, any channel which can carry information from a secure area
to the outside should be studied as a potential risk.
In 1997, Boneh et al. [60] published a theoretical model for breaking cryptographic
systems by taking advantage of random hardware faults. It was followed by a related
attack, called differential fault attack, proposed by Biham and Shamir [49]. Then,
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Kocher et al. described two power analysis attacks, namely simple power analysis
(SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA), in a technical report released in
1998 [199] and then in a paper published in 1999 [200].
The threat of optical compromising emanations was demonstrated in 2002. Kuhn
was able to reconstruct the information displayed on a CRT computer monitor in a
dark environment using a photomultimeter and a computer with a fast analog-to-
digital converter [205]. In the same year, Loughry and Umphress showed that LED
status indicators found in various electronic devices can carry a modulated optical
signal that is correlated with the handled information [221].
In 2004, Asonov and Agrawal found that keyboards of computers, notebooks,
telephones, and ATM pads are vulnerable to attacks that diﬀerentiate the sound
emanated by diﬀerent keys [20]. The attack was improved by Zhuang et al. in
2005 [392]. Their work was followed by an acoustic attack on matrix printers in
2010 [23] and an RSA key extraction via acoustic cryptanalysis in 2014 [138].
Murdoch showed, in 2006, that many computers reveal their CPU load via thermal
leakage and that the inﬂuence of the temperature on clock skew can be remotely
detected [245]. Masti et al. demonstrated that the processor core temperature can
be used both as side-channel and covert communication channel [228].
For more details on the history of implementation attacks, we refer the reader
to [206, 13, 313, 390, 389]. Numerous implementation attacks were published in the
proceedings of various conferences and workshops on security or cryptography. Some
good books about power analysis attacks are [223, 272, 11].
1.5.2 Classification
There are many criteria one can use to categorize implementation attacks since they
use various techniques that diﬀer in cost, time, equipment, or expertise needed. In
the cryptographic engineering literature, it is common to categorize physical attacks
according to two criteria [334, 223]. The ﬁrst criterion classiﬁes physical attacks into
passive and active attacks depending on whether the attacker directly interacts with
the target or not.
• Passive attacks. In a passive attack, the attacker gathers information by
simply observing executions of a cryptographic algorithm on the target device
which operates according to its functional speciﬁcations. Side-channel attacks
fall into this category since the attacker has to observe a physical phenomenon
such as electromagnetic emissions, power consumption, or acoustic emanations.
• Active attacks. An active attack exploits an erroneous or unexpected behavior
of the target device in response to a manipulation done by the attacker to
aﬀect the execution environment or the underlying hardware. Fault attacks
are active implementation attacks that induce faults into a device by means of
supply voltage, external clock, temperature, light, X-rays, or ion beams [32].
A complex attack can consist of a sequence of active and passive attacks. For
example, an active attack can be a preparation step for a passive attack. Examples
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of attacks that combine active and passive techniques are [12, 83, 299]. Compared
to active attacks, passive attacks are harder to detect and do not leave any damage
to the attacked device.
The second criterion distinguishes between three types of attacks based on the
level of intrusion into the target device: non-invasive, semi-invasive, and invasive
attacks. Any passive or active attack can fall into one of these three types of
attacks [223].
• Non-invasive attacks. In a non-invasive attack, the target device is attacked
only through directly accessible interfaces and thus it is not permanently altered.
In other words, the attacker observes or manipulates only the environmental
parameters, but not the device itself. These attacks are relatively inexpensive
and thus they constitute a real threat to the security of cryptographic devices.
• Semi-invasive attacks. Semi-invasive attacks are characterized by a moder-
ate level of physical intrusion. For example, the casing of a device is removed or
the microchip is decapsulated to get better access to its inner components, but
no direct electrical contact to the chip surface is made because the passivation
layer is not damaged. All methods of decapsulation such as eroding the chip
surface by mechanical or chemical means fall into this category.
• Invasive attacks. An invasive attack is the strongest type of attack against a
device since the attacker has full control of the target device and no boundaries.
The adversary can establish electrical contact with the chip and even modify
the circuit. Invasive attacks are very powerful, but they require expensive
equipment, which can be usually found only in specialized laboratories.
A visual representation of the classiﬁcation of implementation attacks along the
two dimensions, namely interaction with the target device and intrusion level, is
shown in Figure 1.2. When the degree of interaction with the target device increases,
the attacker is more exposed to the risk of being detected. However, this comparison
has its limitations. For example, a passive attacker measuring the power consumption
of a device in a certain physical location is typically more exposed than an active
attacker who mounts a remote timing attack from the comfort of his home. On the
other dimension, the cost of the equipment necessary to mount the attack increases
proportionally with the intrusion level. The more invasive an attack is, the higher
are the chances that it permanently damages a device and consequently the attack
will be detected. Hence, in a broad sense, one axis quantiﬁes the risks to which an
attacker is exposed to and the other the cost of an attack.
Although, the classiﬁcation of implementation attacks along the two dimensions is
not perfect or complete, it serves the purpose of grouping diﬀerent types of attacks by
their main characteristics. Side-channel attacks are usually passive and non-invasive
attacks, while fault attacks fall into the category of active attacks. Depending on the
fault injection mechanism, fault attacks can be non-invasive or semi-invasive . Most
of the semi-invasive and invasive attacks are active attacks (e.g. probing attacks [160],
reverse engineering attacks [255], data remanence attacks [158, 327]). Consequently,
there are few semi-invasive or invasive attacks that are passive attacks.
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Figure 1.2: A classiﬁcation of implementation attacks.
1.6 Side-Channel Attacks
Side-channel analysis attacks belong to the genre of physical attacks and exploit
some auxiliary information (e.g. the power consumption of a device that executes a
cryptographic algorithm) to recover the secret key [178]. Their main advantage is
that they are hard to detect because usually a side-channel attacker does not interact
with the target device. Hence, they fall into the class of passive and non-invasive
implementation attacks. Consequently, a second advantage of side-channel attacks is
that they can be mounted with relatively cheap equipment.
There are many sources of side-channel information that an attacker can exploit
to break a system. The most popular ones are: timing [198], power consumption [199,
200], and electromagnetic emanations [286, 5]. These three physical eﬀects caused by
the execution of a cryptographic algorithm on a device are very popular because they
are easy to observe and record. Moreover, they usually carry enough information
about the secret used during the computation such that it can be recovered after a
relatively low number of measurements. Less popular sources of side-channel leakage
are: acoustic [138, 139], optical [128, 328], and thermal [169].
The study of the side-channel emanations from a cryptographic device with
the aim of recovering the secret used during the observed computations is referred
to as side-channel analysis (SCA). In this work we focus only on side-channel
analysis attacks that exploit power and electromagnetic emanations, which are brieﬂy
described next.
1.6.1 Power Analysis Attacks
Every electronic device needs electric power to operate. More concretely, a digital
circuit needs power to transfer and process data. The power is supplied at diﬀerent
voltages and current intensities (currents) depending on the circuit design. At any
point in time, the power consumption of a CMOS circuit consists of several com-
ponents: Poperation – an operation-dependent component, Pdata – a data-dependent
component, Pelectronic noise – electronic noise component, and Pconstant – a constant
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component.
Ptotal = Poperation + Pdata + Pelectronic noise + Pconstant (1.1)
The two interesting components for a side-channel attack are Poperation and Pdata.
Power analysis attacks exploit the small variations in the power consumption of a
device determined by diﬀerent operations being executed and/or diﬀerent data being
processed.
The total power consumption of a single CMOS cell is the sum of its static and
dynamic power consumption. The dynamic power consumption depends on the data
being processed and usually is the dominant component of the power consumption
of a cell. For example, when there is a signal transition between the input and
output of a cell (i.e. 0 7→ 1 or 1 7→ 0), the dynamic power consumption is higher than
when there is no transition (i.e. 0 7→ 0 or 1 7→ 1). The static power consumption is
increasing in modern technologies that have very small size [223].
1.6.2 Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks
These attacks are based on the information gained from the electromagnetic radia-
tion of the electromagnetic ﬁeld generated by a device. Electromagnetic radiation
propagates through space and consists of waves which are synchronized oscillations
of electric and magnetic ﬁelds. In other words, the electromagnetic ﬁeld is the
combination of the electric ﬁeld (E) and its dual, the magnetic ﬁeld (H). Hence, the
electromagnetic ﬁeld typically carries similar information about the processed data
and executed instruction as the power consumption does.
A major advantage of electromagnetic analysis attacks over power analysis attacks
is that they do not require insertion of a shunt resistor in the ground or current path
of the target device to perform the measurements. Moreover, an attacker can use
diﬀerent spots for the acquisition of the electromagnetic emanations such as chip
surface [219] or decoupling capacitors [258, 29]. However, the process of identifying
the best spot can be very time consuming since it depends on a combination of
factors such as a careful selection of the EM probe and ﬁnding a good orientation
for it. Sometimes, the electromagnetic signal has to be ampliﬁed and preprocessed,
but it can give better results than power consumption measurements in the sense
that the number of observations necessary to recover a secret may be lower [265].
1.6.3 Attack Toolkit
The toolkit of a side-channel attacker depends on the type of information that is
exploited in an attack. In general, the attacker needs some equipment to record
the side-channel information, which is usually referred to as side-channel leakage
or simply leakage. She also needs some tools to process the side-channel leakage in
order to break the cryptographic system.
Typically, a side-channel attack is performed in two phases: an online phase
and an oﬄine phase. In addition to these two phases, some attacks (e.g. template
attacks [79, 290]) require a prior profiling phase in which the attacker uses a device
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similar to the one to be attacked to characterize its leakage. This phase yields the
so-called templates which proﬁle the power consumption or the electromagnetic
emanations of the target device. In the online phase, the attacker measures and
records the side-channel information while the target device performs cryptographic
operations. For each input or output of the cryptographic algorithm, the attacker
captures a set of leakage samples referred to as a side-channel trace. At the end of
this phase, the attacker has a set of traces and, usually, the corresponding input or
output values of the algorithm. The data collected in the online phase is fed into an
attack algorithm in the oﬄine phase to recover the key used during the observed
computations. The outcome of the attack algorithm is one or several key candidates.
The time spent in the online phase of an attack is determined by the number
of measurements recorded, which in turn depends on the measurement setup. An
attacker aims to break a system using as few measurements as possible in order
to reduce the risk of being detected. Typically, the oﬄine phase of an attack is
constrained by the technical resources of the attacker and by the number and quality
(i.e. signal-to-noise ration) of the traces acquired in the previous phase.
This is a rather compact description of a side-channel attack, similar to the one
in [191]. The ﬁrst mention of DPA attacks [199] outlines two phases: data collection
and data analysis. Other works present a more ﬁne-grained ﬂow for side-channel
attacks. For example, the attack strategy described in [223] consists of ﬁve steps,
while the one presented in [201] involves six stages.
In the following, we describe the equipment and tools required to exploit the
power or electromagnetic leakage of a device. Then, we introduce some metrics which
are frequently used to quantify diﬀerent aspects of a side-channel attack and some
tools designed for side-channel attacks.
1.6.3.1 Measurement Setup
The online phase of a side-channel attack requires a measurement setup, which
typically consists of a digital sampling oscilloscope (DSO), a target device (sometimes
referred to as device under test – DUT), and a computer (PC), as shown in Figure 1.3.
In addition to these components, a measurement setup may include: a regulated
power supply, a clock generator, an ampliﬁer, and diﬀerent types of probes.
The entire process is controlled by the PC, which sends inputs to the DUT and
gets the corresponding leakage traces from the DSO. Typically, the PC communicates
with the target board through a serial connection via USB. To reduce the noise
generated by the communication channel, the USB connection can be replaced by an
optical ﬁber link. The oscilloscope is connected to the computer using an Ethernet
cable or an USB cable.
In a controlled environment such as a research laboratory, the attacker sets a
trigger signal that is used by the oscilloscope to record the side-channel leakage.
In real world settings, most of the time, there is no trigger signal available for the
attacker. In such situations, she has to use other means of detecting the relevant
part of the acquired emanations such as a pattern-based trigger [41]. Consequently,
the traces are not aligned and thus they have to be preprocessed before they can be
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Figure 1.3: Diagram of a measurement setup used for power and EM attacks.
used in the next phase of the attack.
The attacker uses a power measurement circuit or an electromagnetic probe
to measure the leakage signal [223]. Typically, the attacker inserts a resistor in
the power or ground line of the target device in order to be able to measure the
power consumption of the device. If the resistor is inserted in the power line, then
a diﬀerential probe is used to measure the voltage drop across the resistor. When
the resistor is connected in series to the device’s ground line, a normal probe can be
used. The electromagnetic emanations can be measured using an E-ﬁeld probe, an
H-ﬁeld probe, or a simple coil placed in a carefully chosen spot.
A key component of the measurement setup is the digital sampling oscilloscope,
which takes an analog voltage or electromagnetic signal and converts it into a digital
signal. This analog-to-digital conversion is characterized by three main parameters:
input bandwidth, sampling rate, and resolution [223]. The bandwidth of an oscilloscope
gives the maximum frequency at which a signal is processed without distortion. The
sampling rate is equal to the number of points of the input analog signal that are
recorded in a second. The resolution of an oscilloscope is the number of possible
values a sample in the digitized signal can take. Beside these three parameters, there
are other important parameters such as memory size or the smallest input range
that can be measured [334]. All these parameters determine the speciﬁcations of an
digital sampling oscilloscope.
Typically, an attacker is interested in reducing the inﬂuence of noise on the
performed measurements such that the acquired signal is very clear. There are
various ways to reduce the noise level of a measurement setup that range from
disabling unused features of the target device, such as a blinking LED, to using a
Faraday cage to isolate the target device from the environmental noise. An important
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Figure 1.4: A power trace of the AES-128 sampled at 1 GS/s from an Arduino Uno.
source of noise is the power supply. Therefore, an attacker usually prefers to use a
battery or a regulated power supply instead of powering a target device from an
USB cable which is directly connected to a computer.
More detailed descriptions of various measurement setups can be found in [223,
334, 335]. In this work, we used diﬀerent measurement setups to record the power
consumption or the electromagnetic emanations of several target devices. In each
chapter where we present experimental results, we brieﬂy describe the measurement
setup used.
A power consumption trace measured during the execution of the AES-128 on
an Arduino Board is exemplary shown in Figure 1.4. One can easily identify the ten
rounds of the AES-128 in the leakage trace acquired at a sampling rate of 1 GS/s.
1.6.3.2 Signal Processing
In practice, signal processing techniques can be applied in both phases of an attack to
improve the signal-to-noise ratio of the measured side-channel information or to align
the collected traces. Typically, signal processing improves the attack outcome by
reducing the number of traces required to recover the secret key. The time complexity
of the oﬄine and online phases of the attack scales down accordingly. Some of the
most suitable signal processing techniques for side-channel analysis attacks are: signal
filtering, signal alignment, signal compression, and signal averaging.
• Signal filtering. The main purpose of ﬁltering the side-channel leakage is
to isolate those components of the signal that carry information about the
processed data or the executed instruction. To this end, low-pass and band-
pass ﬁlters are typically applied to the measured signal in order to control the
frequency range and remove noise.
• Signal alignment. The measured leakage traces may be misaligned due to
the absence of a reliable trigger signal or as the result of hiding countermeasures
such as dummy operations, random delays [86], and shuﬄing [373]. Some of the
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waveform matching algorithms proposed in the literature for signal alignment
are: correlation coeﬃcient, cross-correlation, sign comparison, sum of absolute
diﬀerences (SAD), least square, and interval matching [41, 223].
• Signal compression. Compression algorithms combine multiple samples of
a single trace to reduce the size of the trace. Signal compression can help to
reduce high-frequency noise and amplify signal resolution while reducing the
amount of data that requires processing in subsequent steps [201]. Compression
methods range from extracting the mean or maximum from a set of consecutive
samples to more complex resampling techniques.
• Signal averaging. The main purpose of signal averaging is to reduce the noise
by performing the same measurement several times. It can be done directly
on the digital oscilloscope used for measurements or on a computer during or
after the data collection process. Conditional averaging [218] computes in the
oﬄine phase an average trace from all traces whose associated intermediate
input or output used in an attack is the same.
Signal processing techniques may combine some of the above-mentioned methods.
For example, a signal compression algorithm may include a low pass ﬁlter.
1.6.3.3 Attack Algorithms
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) Attacks. Simple power analysis (SPA) [199, 200]
encompasses a collection of analysis techniques that can be used to extract a secret
key from one or few traces. Essentially, the attacker inspects the patterns within the
power consumption traces and maps them to the structure of the executed algorithm.
Typically, the attacker targets instructions that use or depend on the value of the
secret key. Despite their name, SPA attacks on symmetric cryptosystems are very
challenging in practice due to noise and because they require a detailed knowledge
of the executed algorithm.
SPA attacks are typically applied in the context of public-key cryptography. For
example, the modular exponentiation used in the RSA algorithm can reveal the private
key because multiplications consume more power than squarings. Consequently,
multiplications appear as higher peaks in power traces. They are performed only when
the corresponding bit of the exponent is set to 1. Yet, SPA can also be used to attack
insecure implementations of symmetric key algorithms. See for example the SPA
attacks against insecure implementations of the key schedule of the AES [222, 370].
SPA attacks can exploit leakages that stem from both data and instructions.
When the electromagnetic emanations of a target device are the source of the side-
channel leakage, the corresponding attack is referred to as a simple electromagnetic
analysis (SEMA) attack.
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Attacks. Diﬀerential power analysis (DPA)
[199, 200] uses statistical techniques to exploit the dependency between the power
consumption of a device and the processed data. In contrast to SPA attacks, DPA
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attacks require more power traces, but they do not need a detailed knowledge of the
attacked algorithm. While SPA attacks analyze the power consumption along the
time axis, DPA attacks focus on the variations of the power consumption at a ﬁxed
moment of time that result from handling diﬀerent data values. Usual targets for
DPA attacks are symmetric-key algorithms, especially block ciphers.
Based on a divide and conquer paradigm, DPA attacks recover individual chunks
of a secret key. Afterwards, these chunks are used to reconstruct the full secret key.
The general idea is to choose an intermediate value (also called a sensitive value)
of the attacked algorithm that combines a chunk of the key with a known variable
input (e.g. a part of the plaintext) and to estimate its power consumption using a
power model for all possible values of the key chunk. The resulting set of predicted
leakages is compared with the traces collected from the target device to determine
the most likely key chunk used during the observed computations. The statistical
test used to infer the most likely key candidates is referred to as a distinguisher in
the side-channel literature.
When it was initially proposed, DPA was merely a side-channel attack method that
combined the information contained in several power consumption traces measured
from a cryptographic device to recover the secret key used during the observed
computations. Nowadays, in addition to the original deﬁnition, DPA encompasses
a rich class of techniques for side-channel attacks. In general, a DPA attack is
characterized by two key features: the power model that describes the hypothetical
power consumption of a target device and the distinguisher used to determine the
secret key.
The original DPA attack uses a single-bit power model and the difference of means
(DoM) test as distinguisher. The power traces are divided into two sets depending
on the value of the intermediate bit. Then, a differential trace is computed for each
key candidate. A spike in a diﬀerential trace indicates that the corresponding key is
a candidate for the correct key. The analogous attack technique that exploits the
electromagnetic emanations of a device instead of its power consumption is referred
to differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA) attack.
Subsequent developments of DPA attacks concentrated on the two key features
of DPA. Consequently, new power models were proposed to better capture the
instantaneous power consumption of a target device. At the same time, the relation
between the estimated and the measured power consumption was better exploited
by new distinguishers.
Messerges et al. [240] exploited the leakage of all bits of an intermediate variable
to get a better signal-to-noise ratio in the diﬀerential traces by using a multiple-bit
DPA. The leakage traces are separated in two sets according to whether all bits in
an intermediate variable are set to zero or to one. All traces that do not ﬁt into
the two sets used to compute the diﬀerential trace are discarded. Therefore, this
power model requires a large number of traces. The same authors [241] exploited the
relation between the power consumption of an intermediate variable and its binary
representation, which was already mentioned before in several works [200, 240, 232,
87, 8]. The Hamming weight of an intermediate variable (i.e. the number of bits set
to one in that variable) or the Hamming distance between two consecutive values of
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the same variable (i.e. the number of bits that changed between the two states of
the variable) are good power models for side-channel attacks. They proposed a new
technique, generalized multiple-bit DPA, which splits the traces used to compute the
diﬀerential trace into two sets depending on whether the modeled power consumption
is lower or greater than a threshold.
Various statistical tests were proposed to improve the recovery of the correct key.
Coron et al. [87, 88] studied several leakage detection tests to check the existence of
secret-correlated emanations from cryptographic devices. Mayer-Sommer evaluated
the changes in power dissipation due to writing diﬀerent data values into a certain
memory location or register [232]. The Pearson’s correlation factor was used to
determine the exact instant during the execution at which the dependency between
power dissipation and data is maximal. Bevan and Knudsen [47] proposed the
maximum-likelihood test. Agrawal et al. [6] used a generalized maximum-likelihood
test in the context of multi-channel attacks to identify the correct key hypothesis.
Brier et al. [68] combined the advantages of the previous power models and
statistical techniques in a new method – correlation power analysis (CPA). Their
approach is based on the Hamming distance model, which encloses the particular
case of Hamming weight leakages. The Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcient is used as
statistical distinguisher to optimally exploit the estimated relation between the power
model and actual traces [67].
Depending on the number of time samples exploited in an attack, one distinguishes
between univariate and multivariate attacks. Most attacks proposed in the literature
are univariate because they focus only on atomic leakages at single points in time.
In contrast, multivariate attacks exploit joint statistical properties of several time
samples. Unlike multivariate attacks, univariate attacks do not work on intermediate
variables of a masked algorithm (see Section 1.7.1). Typically, univariate attacks
require a preprocessing step which combines several atomic leakages at diﬀerent
points in time using a combining function. Multivariate attacks, such as mutual
information analysis (MIA) [141], can be used to attack masked implementations
without a preprocessing step that combines the leakeages [282]. Therefore, they are
not aﬀected by the information loss induced by the preprocessing step [78].
Mutual information analysis (MIA) uses a distinguisher based on mutual informa-
tion to measure the statistical dependence between the predicted power consumption
and the recorded traces. It works even if each intermediate variable leaks in a distinct
manner. Hence, MIA allows the application of the most generic power model possible,
namely the identity function. However, correlation-based attacks are typically more
eﬃcient than MIA in simple attack scenarios [282]. A comprehensive evaluation of
MIA was conducted in [381].
Profiled Attacks. This category of attacks comprises all techniques that require
a proﬁling phase to gain additional information about the leakage of a target device.
The core idea of proﬁled attacks is that the outcome of a side-channel attack improves
with a more precise leakage model of the target device. Indeed, proﬁled attacks are
among the most powerful side-channel techniques.
Template attacks, introduced by Chari et al. [79], seek to make maximal use of a
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small number of traces from a target device. Although template attacks may require
a large amount of initial eﬀort to accurately model the leakage of a target, they are
the strongest side-channel attack possible from an information-theoretic point of
view if the noise follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution. However, experimental
results show that in practice template attacks suﬀer from the variability caused
by diﬀerent devices or diﬀerent acquisition campaigns [81]. Template attacks are
particularly useful when few measurements can be obtained from the target device
and a clone device is available for training. Template attacks have a strong advantage
over non-proﬁled attacks when applied against masked implementations [7, 266].
Linear Regression Analysis (LRA) attacks, or stochastic attacks, were introduced
by Schindler et al. [307] as an eﬃcient alternative to template attacks in situations
where the adversary already has a parameterized model for the leakage of a target
device. As ﬁrst observed in the original paper [307] and later conﬁrmed by Doget et
al. [112], LRA attacks can work without a proﬁling phase. Lemke and Paar [213]
applied proﬁled LRA attacks against masked implementations, while Dabosville et
al. [96] mounted non-proﬁled LRA attacks against masked implementations. An
experimental comparison between template and stochastic attacks under identical
conditions can be found in [142].
Other Attacks. Besides the above-mentioned attacks, there are many other attack
algorithms described in the literature. For example, collision attacks [312] use the
side-channel leakage of an implementation to detect internal collisions, which provide
some information about the secret key. Nevertheless, an exhaustive study of all
existing attack techniques is outside the scope of this work.
1.6.3.4 Metrics
Standaert et al. [336] described a framework for fair evaluation and comparison of
side-channel attacks. Their framework includes two types of metrics: information-
theoretic metrics and actual security metrics. The information-theoretic metrics
are used to gauge the amount of information leaked by an implementation, while
the actual security metrics show to what extent the leaked information can be
used by an attacker. They proposed the following metrics: conditional entropy
(information-theoretic metric), success rate and guessing entropy (actual security
metrics).
Next, we brieﬂy describe three metrics widely used in the literature for experi-
mental evaluations of side-channel attacks, namely success rate, guessing entropy,
and number of traces.
Success Rate. The success rate of a side-channel attack is computed as the ratio
between the number of experiments in which the correct key was recovered and
the total number of experiments carried out. The success rate of an order o is the
probability that the key is in the ﬁrst o key candidates.
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Guessing Entropy. The guessing entropy gives the average number of key candi-
dates that have to be tested to recover the correct key after a side-channel attack was
performed. Hence, it measures the remaining workload of a side-channel adversary.
Guessing entropy was deﬁned by Massey [227] and then used by Köpf and Basin [203]
to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of side-channel attacks.
Number of Traces. This metric assesses the number of measurements an attacker
has to perform in the online phase of an attack in order to achieve the desired
outcome (e.g. a guessing entropy below a ﬁxed threshold). Mangard et al. [223]
provided a way to estimate the number of traces required to mount a successful DPA
attack.
1.6.3.5 Tools
In this section, we present some tools designed for side-channel attacks, especially
for power and electromagnetic analysis attacks. The list includes a wide range of
tools from professional frameworks designed for security evaluations in accordance to
various security standards such as Common Criteria [89] to software libraries written
for hobbyists. The industry-grade solutions comprise everything an attacker or a
security evaluator needs, from a specialized hardware measurement apparatus to
highly ﬂexible software tools. In contrast to tools designed by side-channel researchers
and enthusiasts, which are typically free and open-source, the professional tools are
usually very expensive.
Inspector SCA. Designed by Riscure, Inspector SCA [294] is a modular platform
that combines features for acquisition, alignment, and signal processing of leakage
traces. It integrates with a variety of hardware equipment and provides a set of
statistical tools that can be used in side-channel attacks against major cryptographic
algorithms. Customers get access to the source code of the tool and can extend its
functionalities.
DPA Workstation Analysis Platform. DPA Workstation Analysis Platform
[287] is designed by Rambus for security chip vendors, product companies, testing
labs, and government organizations. The collected leakage traces can be examined
using Simple Power and Electromagnetic Analysis (SPA/SEMA) or more powerful
Diﬀerential Power and Electromagnetic Analysis (DPA/DEMA) to identify exposure
of secret keys.
ChipWhisperer. ChipWhisperer [252] is a toolchain for embedded hardware
security research, including side-channel and glitching attacks. It is a combination
of open-source software and hardware sold at a low price. The hardware uses a
synchronous capturing method, which greatly reduces the sampling rate and the
data storage. This is possible because the sampling clock is synchronized to the
target clock [260].
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Daredevil. Daredevil [323] is a tool for (higher-order) correlation power analysis
(CPA) attacks. Its distinctive feature is that it can perform CPA attacks very fast
on multiple cores given a speciﬁed amount of memory. The algorithm used by the
tool is selected after a careful evaluation of the computational aspects of calculating
the Pearson product-moment correlation coeﬃcient and is based on an incremental
approach which extends already completed computations [64].
pysca. pysca [189] is a side-channel analysis toolbox written in Python that aims
to be simple and ﬂexible, while using a language suitable for scientiﬁc computing. It
implements state-of-the-art DPA techniques and achieves good performance. Another
key feature is that it facilitates visualization of various metrics for security evaluation
purpose.
Jlsca. Jlsca [76] is a tool for side-channel analysis written in Julia, a dynamic
programming language for numerical computing. It can be executed as a stand-alone
tool or as a module inside Inspector SCA. Some of the features implemented in Jlsca
are: conditional averaging, non-proﬁled linear regression analysis (LRA) [307, 218],
incremental correlation statistics [43], and mutual information analysis (MIA) [141].
1.7 Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks
The discovery of side-channel attacks triggered a continuous arms race between
attackers and designers of countermeasures against side-channel attacks. As a result
of this race, both attack and defense techniques evolved. On the one hand, new and
improved attack techniques have been proposed. On the other hand, countermeasures
have been devised and improved to prevent such attacks.
The goal of side-channel countermeasures is to make the physically observable
leakage of a device independent of the intermediate values of the executed crypto-
graphic algorithm or at least to reduce the dependencies between the two.
There are various countermeasures against side-channel attacks, which can be
applied at diﬀerent levels: gate/circuit, architecture, system, implementation, or
protocol. While some countermeasures focus on the root cause of the problem
and try to prevent it, others try to increase the diﬃculty of attacks or to simply
slow down attackers. In practice, several countermeasures are usually combined
following a defense in depth approach to achieve better security against side-channel
attacks [161, 295, 309].
The most widely used countermeasures against DPA attacks can be classiﬁed
into two categories: hiding and masking. Hiding changes the leakage of a device with
the aim of making it random or equal for all operations and data values. Although
reaching perfectly random or equal leakages is an elusive goal, there are several
techniques that achieve good results by introducing changes in the time dimension or
the amplitude dimension of the leakage. Hiding in the time dimension can be done
by randomly inserting dummy operations (e.g. random delays [86]) or by shuﬄing
(i.e. randomly changing the sequence of operations of a cryptographic algorithm
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that can be performed in arbitrary order [373]). Hiding in the amplitude domain
modiﬁes the signal-to-noise ratio by either increasing the noise (e.g. performing
several operations in parallel, using noise generators [202]) or by lowering the signal
(e.g. ﬁltering [317]). Masking randomizes the intermediate values that are processed
by a cryptographic device. Therefore, it can be applied at the algorithmic level
without changing the power consumption characteristics of the device. Firstly used
as a side-channel countermeasure by Chari et al. [78] and Goubin and Patarin [151],
masking is based on the principle of secret sharing introduced independently by
Blakley [55] and Shamir [316].
Masking and hiding are implemented at circuit level using secure logic styles
such as Sense Ampliﬁer Based Logic (SABL) [354] and Wave Dynamic Diﬀerential
Logic (WDDL) [355]. However, logic styles can be easily defeated when the circuit
is not perfectly symmetric or the input signals of a gate do not arrive at the same
time [345].
Other types of side-channel countermeasures are protocol level countermeasures
and leakage-resilient cryptography. A simple approach to prevent side-channel attacks
at the protocol level is to reduce the number of cryptographic operations performed
using the same key [200]. For example, one can use a re-keying mechanism [236, 111]
to change the secret keys frequently. The focus of leakage-resilient cryptography
is to build primitives that can be proven to be secure against side-channel attacks
under certain assumptions on the leakage model [116, 338].
1.7.1 Masking
A ﬁrst step towards a masked implementation of an algorithm is to convert each
sensitive intermediate value of the algorithm into a shared representation. A sensitive
value x is split into n values (or shares) x1, x2, . . . , xn such that x = x1 ⋆x2 ⋆ . . . ⋆ xn,
with n ≥ 2. Among these shares, n − 1 are generated uniformly at random and
the last one is computed such that the sensitive value is revealed when combining
all shares. Depending on the operations used in the algorithm to be masked,
the operator ⋆ can be replaced by ⊕ (exclusive-OR), ⊞ (modular addition), or
× (modular multiplication). Consequently, the masking is referred to as Boolean
masking, arithmetic masking, or multiplicative masking. Then, each operation of
the algorithm is performed on the shared representation by carefully manipulating
the shares independently to ensure that no information about the sensitive value is
leaked.
The number of random values in the shared representation of a sensitive value
determines the order of a masking scheme. For example, a masking scheme that
splits a sensitive value into two shares is referred to as first-order masking, or simply
masking. In general, an n-th order masking scheme resists attacks of order n (i.e.
attacks that combine the leakages of up to n points). Chari et al. [78] showed that
the number of measurements required to attack a masked implementation increases
exponentially with the number of shares in simpliﬁed, but realistic, settings.
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1.7.1.1 Boolean Masking
Boolean masking is probably the most deployed side-channel countermeasure for
symmetric algorithms. When protecting a symmetric algorithm that consists of a
combination of linear and nonlinear operations, Boolean masking must be applied to
all operations. In contrast to linear operations, which are easy to compute directly
on Boolean shares, nonlinear operations are diﬃcult to mask.
The approach to mask a nonlinear operation is speciﬁc to each operation. When
the nonlinear operation is represented as a lookup table, the table can be random-
ized [239, 161]. In case of modular addition/subtraction, a ﬁrst approach consists of
three steps: convert the Boolean masks to arithmetic masks, perform the operation
on arithmetic masks, and then convert the arithmetic masks to Boolean masks. This
approach is costly because it requires conversions between masks [149]. A second
approach is to perform the nonlinear operation directly on Boolean shares [182, 85].
Trichina [358] proposed a ﬁrst-order masked AND gate, while Ishai et al. [174]
proposed several techniques for building private circuits and described a way to com-
pute a secure AND gate at any order. Then, Nikova et al. [253] introduced threshold
implementations and a masked AND gate using three shares. Finally, Reparaz et
al. [292] studied the similarities and diﬀerences between the three aforementioned
schemes to propose a generalized masking scheme.
1.7.1.2 Provable Security
An important characteristic of masking schemes is that their security can be proven
in certain theoretical models such as the probing model [174] or the strong non-
interference (t-SNI) model [33]. These models make realistic assumptions on the
leakage model of a device and the capabilities of an adversary.
The security of ﬁrst-order masking schemes can be proven by showing that all
the intermediate variables of an algorithm are independent of the sensitive input
values. This approach can also be used for high-order masking schemes, but its
complexity grows exponentially with the masking order and thus it quickly becomes
too complicated. One has to show that any combination of n intermediate variables
is independent from the sensitive inputs in order to prove n-th order security.
Sometimes, security proofs are very complex and hard to comprehend even for
experts in the ﬁeld. Hence, a minor slip in the argumentation can yield to a security
ﬂaw. Moreover, the models in which security proofs are built do not perfectly
match the physical characteristics of a device nor the details of an implementation.
Although provable security provides powerful tools to assess the security of masking
schemes, it should be exercised with care, especially when implementing masking
schemes [28]. Finally, provable security should not be the sole criterion used to
determine the strength of a masking scheme. A provably secure masking scheme
should not leak when correctly implemented in a device, while its implementation
should be eﬃcient and suitable for real-world applications.
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1.7.2 Leakage Detection Tests
The goal of a leakage detection test is to determine whether a particular implemen-
tation is leaking or not. This is a more eﬃcient and reliable strategy to decide if a
protected implementation achieves its security objective rather than performing a
battery of known key-recovery attacks against that implementation.
Even when an implementation withstands a set of known attacks, the signiﬁcance
of the outcome is limited since there is no guaranty that a slightly modiﬁed attack
will not succeed. Certainly, it is diﬃcult to get a good coverage of all known attacks
in a battery of tests. On the other hand, leakage detection tests have the beneﬁt
of exhibiting leakages that might not yet be exploitable with the known attack
techniques.
Coron et al. [87, 88] presented several leakage detection tests to verify the existence
of secret-correlated emanations. Then, Goodwill et al. [148] proposed a methodology
for side-channel resistance validation based on statistical hypothesis testing. The
core statistical technique for their methodology is Welch’s t-test [377], which is an
extension of Student’s t-test [343] for unequal sample sizes and unequal variances.
Becker et al. [40] proposed an enhanced and optimized methodology which was
named Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA).
There are several types of tests that can be performed to evaluate an implemen-
tation. A specific test targets certain intermediate values (e.g. S-box output) of the
assessed implementation. The evaluator knows the secret key and carefully chooses
the inputs to activate the targeted intermediates. On the other hand, a non-specific
test assesses the leakage of all intermediate variables of an algorithm. A random-vs.-
random test is performed using only random inputs, while a fixed-vs.-random test is
performed on a data set that uses ﬁxed inputs and a data set of random inputs.
All t-test evaluations are one or two orders of magnitude faster than key-extraction
attacks [40]. Moreover, t-test leakage assessments are suitable for real-time com-
putation: the statistics can be computed as measurements are being collected.
In particular, the non-speciﬁc, ﬁxed-vs.-random t-test can identify leakages in an
implementation very fast.
1.8 Internet of Things (IoT)
The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the words that is on everyone’s lips nowadays.
The salient feature behind this buzzword is that the IoT brings Internet connectivity
to a plethora of devices, also called things, to create new ubiquitous ecosystems. A
thing can refer to a variety of devices that communicate to each other to make our
lives easier. Unlike the classical Internet where all devices use the same protocol
suite (i.e. TCP/IP) to exchange data, there is no standard way of communication in
the IoT, the only common ground being the Internet layer (i.e. IP/IPv6) connectivity.
Thus, the IoT is a highly heterogeneous environment with devices clustered in small
networks. The communication between these networks and the Internet is currently
facilitated by special-purpose hubs or gateways able to transfer the traﬃc between
various IoT technologies and the Internet. Still in its incipient stages, the IoT is
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believed to fundamentally change our daily lives in the way we will interact with the
surrounding environment.
1.8.1 Constraints
A distinguishing characteristic of IoT devices is that they are customized for speciﬁc
applications. Typically, they are designed to operate autonomously using a limited
amount of resources (e.g. energy). Therefore, these devices have to meet various
constraints that are imposed by a combination of factors such as the ﬁnal price of a
product or the desired features.
In this context, the amount of resources that can be allocated for security
services (see Section 1.2.1) is just a small fraction of the total available resources.
Consequently, the cryptographic primitives used to provide the required security
services must meet stringent constraints without sacriﬁcing security. The constraints
that an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm has to satisfy are usually
expressed using metrics such as those deﬁned in Section 1.4.4. Typical constraints
for hardware implementations are silicon area, latency, and power consumption.
Exemplary constraints for software implementations are code size, execution time,
and energy consumption.
The problem of optimizing an algorithm for diﬀerent criteria spans across multiple
axes, with one axis for each goal that has to be achieved. While it is relatively easy
to optimize along one axis, it is very hard to optimize for more than one design
goal at the same time. In general, designers of cryptographic algorithms focused
on optimizing along two diﬀerent axes (e.g. security vs. speed, area vs. latency).
For example, diﬀerent trade-oﬀs speciﬁc to hardware implementations were explored
in [277, 193].
1.8.2 Lightweight Cryptography
Lightweight cryptography emerged as a new research direction that aims to address
the constraints that conventional cryptography faces in the IoT context. It is
widely accepted that cryptosystems play a major role in the security arena of the
IoT, but they need to be designed and implemented eﬃciently enough so as to
comply with the scarce resources of typical IoT devices. Gligor deﬁned in [145]
lightweight cryptography as cryptographic primitives, schemes and protocols tailored
to (extremely) constrained environments.
The eﬃcient implementation of cryptographic primitives so that they are applica-
ble in the highly constrained regimes of various IoT devices is a challenging task since,
for example, performance is conﬂicting with other metrics of interest such as memory
footprint and code size. In addition, implementations of lightweight cryptography
should withstand all known forms of attacks since lightweight cryptography is not
meant to be the weakest link in the security of a system.
1.8 Internet of Things (IoT) 35
1.8.3 Device Types
It is important to perceive the similarities and diﬀerences between the technologies
present in the IoT landscape, especially of those situated at the low-end spectrum
of computational power and capabilities: RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification),
NFC (Near Field Communication), and contactless smart cards. These terms are
used interchangeably by many people mainly because in today’s digital landscape,
keeping track of the technical jargon can be overwhelming. A clear understanding of
these technologies reveals to what extent devices using them can connect to the IoT
and where lightweight cryptography might be useful.
1.8.3.1 Lower Bound for the Computational Power of IoT Devices
A classical RFID tag, which consists of an integrated circuit for storing and processing
information and an antenna for receiving and transmitting signals, can communicate
only with tag readers. The main characteristic of an RFID tag is its unique serial
number that facilitates inventory and package tracking. Active RFID tags contain
their own power source, giving them the ability to broadcast signals with a read range
of up to 100 meters. Passive RFID tags are powered by the electromagnetic energy
transmitted from the RFID reader and have a read range of up to 25 meters [350].
An RFID tag has minimal built-in support for security and privacy [137].
NFC technology is a newer, more ﬁnely honed version of RFID. It takes advantage
of the short read range limitations (no more than a few centimeters) of its operating
radio frequency (13.56 MHz). An NFC device can work in three modes: reader/writer,
card emulation, and peer-to-peer. NFC tags contain data which can be read, and
under some circumstances can be writable by an NFC device. The card emulation
mode enables a phone to behave like a contactless card, allowing users to perform
various transactions. Peer-to-peer communication is a feature that sets NFC apart
from typical RFID devices [350], enabling devices to exchange information in an
adhoc fashion.
A contactless smart card contains a small but sophisticated computer (micro-
controller) that can perform certain on-card operations to provide a high level of
security [137]. The multi-layer security mechanism might include tamper-resistance
techniques, a dedicated cryptoprocessor, or a secure ﬁle system. Contactless smart
cards have a very limited read range of up to 10 cm to prevent tracking or eaves-
dropping. They are powered by external devices to which they exchange data using
communications technologies such as NFC.
As the cost of contactless smart cards decreases to reach soon the cost of RFID
tags set at a few cents per unit, classical RFID tags may get phased out due to
their drawbacks and limitations. At the same time, NFC technology progressively
becomes more popular thanks to NFC-capable smartphones able to accommodate
a considerable number of applications without additional costs. Currently, there
are two noticeable trends for secure payments operated under ﬁnancial regulations.
Firstly, classical smart cards are evolving into contactless smart cards. Secondly,
mobile transactions done through smartphones are growing fast.
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1.8.3.2 Upper Bound for the Computational Power of IoT Devices
There are numerous IoT devices (i.e. smartphones, tablets) capable to communicate
directly through the Internet. Their role in the IoT is merely to augment the user
experience by facilitating interaction with diﬀerent sensors and actuators. Since
these are powerful devices, they do not need to satisfy any additional requirements
to be able to communicate with other IoT devices.
1.8.3.3 Middle Range IoT Devices
A multitude of devices lay in between the previous two categories of IoT devices. This
category includes a wide range of microcontrollers that can be used for various appli-
cations such as wireless sensors, smart homes, building management, telemedicine
and healthcare. Microcontrollers are particularly interesting because they have
several advantages compared to FPGAs and ASICs. First of all, they are very
versatile in the sense that they can accommodate various software implementations.
Moreover, the software can be updated (relatively easy if such a mechanism is in
place) after the deployment the device. In the second place, the cost of writing
software applications is well below the one of hardware implementations. In addition,
there are more skilled software engineers than hardware engineers ready to write
custom applications and thus to support the fast growth of software applications for
the IoT. A third argument in favour of microcontrollers is that software applications
written in high-level programming languages such as ANSI C can be ported to
diﬀerent microcontrollers with minor changes using the appropriate toolchain.
1.8.4 Threat Model
Designing and implementing eﬀective security mechanisms requires a good under-
standing of the system to be protected. In addition to the defender’s perspective, a
security professional must also embrace an attacker’s mindset. Often, an attacker
targets those components of a system where the security is not strong enough. For
example, many attack vectors in the IoT context stem from the lack of proper
physical security, which exposes devices to a wide range of implementation attacks.
Therefore, the attack surface of IoT systems is considerably larger than the attack
surface of classical Internet-connected computers, which are typically deployed in a
secure perimeter. In light of the predicted growth of the IoT to billions of connected
devices in the coming years [122, 136], IoT devices must be designed to withstand a
variety of attacks in order to avoid large scale security incidents.
A threat model is the result of an iterative process leading to the identiﬁcation
and classiﬁcation of attack vectors that can be used to compromise an asset. Three
of the eight classes of attack vectors described in the thread model for the IoT
of Atamli and Martin [21] are essentially diﬀerent implementation attacks: device
tampering, signal injection, and side-channel analysis. While proﬁling the attackers,
they identiﬁed three entities that can pose risks to the security and privacy of IoT
systems: legitimate user, device maker, and malicious adversary. In an earlier work,
Abraham et al. [2] described three classes of attackers: clever outsider, knowledgeable
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insider, and funded organization. For a more detailed treatment of the subject, we
refer the reader to the work of Atamli and Martin [21].
1.9 Motivation
The driving force of lightweight cryptography stems mainly from its direct applications
in the real world since it provides solutions to actual problems faced by designers of
IoT systems. Broadly speaking, lightweight cryptographic algorithms are designed to
achieve two main goals. The ﬁrst goal of a cryptographic algorithm is to withstand all
known cryptanalytic attacks and thus to be secure in the black box model. The second
goal is to build the cryptographic primitive in such a way that its implementations
satisfy a clearly speciﬁed set of constraints which depend on a case-by-case basis.
The major challenge is to address both design goals at the same time since they
require expertise in diﬀerent domains.
Embedded IoT devices are deployed in various locations, including places with
limited or no physical security. In such insecure or even hostile environments, they are
an enticing target for implementation attacks. Consequently, the implementations
of lightweight cryptographic algorithms that are embedded in these constrained
devices have to be protected against very powerful adversaries, while retaining their
eﬃciency.
Major standardization organizations are closely following the evolution of light-
weight cryptography. The International Organization for Standards (ISO) and the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have already standardized several
lightweight primitives and they currently consider other algorithms for inclusion in
their standards. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
organized two workshops on lightweight cryptography [248, 249] and has recently
announced the requirements for their portfolio of lightweight algorithms [247].
Enforcing security of IoT systems is very challenging task. Due to the resource
constraints imposed by the use cases for which the IoT devices are built for, system
architects are often left with few to no resources for securing these systems after
all desired futures have been added. Solutions to many of these security problems
converge to cryptographic engineering, a ﬁeld at the intersection of cryptography,
computer science, and electronic engineering. This work seeks to conciliate these
contradicting requirements in order to provide secure, yet usable, embedded IoT
systems.
1.10 Research Contributions
This thesis focuses on eﬃcient and secure implementations of lightweight symmetric
cryptographic algorithms for resource-constrained microcontrollers that are typically
used in the IoT. It is organized in three parts that are brieﬂy described next.
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1.10.1 Part I – Efficient Implementations
The four chapters of this part are centered around FELICS (Fair Evaluation of
Lightweight Cryptographic Systems), an open-source benchmarking framework for
software implementations of lightweight cryptographic primitives on embedded
devices.
Chapter 2. We introduce FELICS, a free and open-source benchmarking frame-
work designed for fair and consistent evaluation of software implementations of
lightweight cryptographic primitives for embedded devices. The framework is very
ﬂexible thanks to its modular structure, which allows for an easy integration of new
metrics, target devices and evaluation scenarios. It consists of four modules that
can currently assess the performance of lightweight block ciphers, stream ciphers,
authenticated ciphers, and hash functions on three widely used microcontrollers:
8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP and 32-bit ARM. The extracted metrics are execution time,
RAM consumption and binary code size. FELICS has a simple user interface and is
intended to be used by cipher designers to compare new primitives with the state
of the art. The extracted metrics are very detailed and assist embedded software
engineers in selecting the best cipher to match the requirements of a particular
application. The tool aims to increase the transparency and trust in benchmarking
results of lightweight primitives and facilitates a fair comparison between diﬀerent
primitives using the same evaluation conditions.
Chapter 3. We use FELICS to benchmark various implementations of 19 light-
weight block ciphers, namely AES, Chaskey, Fantomas, HIGHT, LBlock, LEA, LED,
Piccolo, PRESENT, PRIDE, PRINCE, RC5, RECTANGLE, RoadRunneR, Robin,
Simon, Sparx, Speck, and TWINE. Then, we propose a figure of merit according
to which all evaluated candidates can be ranked. Our results give new insights to
the question of how well these lightweight block ciphers are suited to secure the IoT.
We also draw conclusions about which design strategies are the most promising ones
for the IoT.
Chapter 4. We introduce the Sparx family of lightweight block ciphers. Sparx
is the ﬁrst ARX design that has provable security arguments and competitive
performance on resource-constrained devices. In this chapter, we elaborate on
the implementation-related characteristics of Sparx and how software eﬃciency
inﬂuenced the ﬁnal design. Then, we provide implementation details and results for
two instances of Sparx that use a 128-bit key and two diﬀerent block sizes, namely
Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128.
Chapter 5. We evaluate the cost of the main building blocks of a symmetric
cryptographic algorithm to determine the most eﬃcient ones. This chapter provides
a detailed insight into the eﬃciency of software implementations of lightweight
symmetric cryptography. The contribution of this chapter is particularly valuable for
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designers of new lightweight ciphers because they can make design decisions based
on both security and eﬃciency using our results.
Impact. FELICS already has impact in the research community. Many people
contributed optimized implementations and several designers of new algorithms used
FELICS for the evaluation of their software implementations, while the evaluation
results are becoming a common reference in the literature. Moreover, NIST is
interested in using FELICS for a fair comparison of candidates for their recommended
portfolio of lightweight algorithms for the IoT.
1.10.2 Part II – Side-Channel Attacks
Chapter 6 An important criterion to assess the suitability of a lightweight cipher
with respect to SCA is the amount of leakage available to an adversary. In this
chapter, we analyze the eﬃciency of diﬀerent selection functions that are commonly
used in Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks on symmetric primitives. To this
end, we attacked implementations of the lightweight block ciphers AES, Fantomas,
LBlock, Piccolo, PRINCE, RC5, Simon, and Speck on an 8-bit AVR processor. By
exploring the relation between the nonlinearity of the studied selection functions and
the measured leakages, we discovered some imperfections when using nonlinearity
to quantify the resilience against CPA. Then, we applied these ﬁndings in an
evaluation of the “intrinsic” CPA-resistance of unprotected implementations of the
eight mentioned ciphers. We show that certain implementation aspects can inﬂuence
the leakage level and try to explain why. Our results shed new light on the resilience
of basic operations executed by these ciphers against CPA and help to bridge the
gap between theory and practice.
Chapter 7 We show that most implementations of the AES present in popular
open-source cryptographic libraries are vulnerable to side-channel attacks, even in
a network protocol scenario when the attacker has limited control of the input.
We present an algorithm for symbolic processing of the AES state for any input
conﬁguration where several input bytes are variable and known, while the rest are
ﬁxed and unknown as is the case in most secure network protocols. Then, we describe
an optimal algorithm that can be used to recover the master key using Correlation
Power Analysis (CPA) attacks. Our experimental results raise awareness of the
insecurity of unprotected implementations of the AES used in network protocol
stacks.
Chapter 8 We perform the ﬁrst side-channel vulnerability analysis of the Thread
networking stack. We leverage various network mechanisms to trigger manipulations
of the security material (i.e. cryptographic keys) or to get access to the network
credentials. Then, we choose the most feasible attack vector to build a complete
attack that combines network speciﬁc mechanisms and Diﬀerential Electromagnetic
Analysis. When successfully applied on a Thread network, the attack gives full
network access to the adversary. We evaluate the feasibility of our attack in a TI
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CC2538 setup running OpenThread, a certiﬁed open-source implementation of the
stack. The full attack does not succeed due to a fortunate side-eﬀect that is not
related to security. Finally, we summarize the problems we found in the protocol
with respect to side-channel analysis, and suggest a range of countermeasures to
prevent our attack and the other attack vectors we identiﬁed during the vulnerability
analysis. This chapter provides a useful lesson to designers of IoT protocols and
devices.
1.10.3 Part III – Side-Channel Countermeasures
Chapter 9 The best known expressions for Boolean masking of bitwise operations
are relatively compact, but even a small improvement of these expressions can
signiﬁcantly reduce the performance penalty of more complex masked operations such
as modular addition on Boolean shares. Consequently, protected implementations of
ciphers that use better expressions get more eﬃcient. We present and evaluate new
secure expressions for performing bitwise operations on Boolean shares. To this end,
we describe an algorithm for eﬃcient search of expressions that have an optimal cost
in number of elementary operations. We show that bitwise AND on Boolean shares
can be performed using less instructions than the best known expressions, while the
best known expression for bitwise OR is optimal. More importantly, our expressions
do no require fresh random values.
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2.1 Introduction
The imminent expansion of the Internet of Things is creating a new world of smart
devices in which security implications are very important. If we consider that brain
stimulator circuits and heart pacemakers may be directly connected to a network
to provide physicians with useful information in establishing and adjusting the
therapy without physical examination of the patient, security plays a crucial role
since unauthorized access to these critical devices can be life-threatening. The health
sector is just one of the domains where the number of IoT devices is expected to
grow signiﬁcantly. Other IoT applications include supply chain management, smart
homes, green cities and many more.
Besides the security aspects, the IoT introduces new challenges in terms of
energy and power consumption. Thus the lightweight cryptographic primitives
designed for IoT-enabled devices must consume few resources, while providing the
claimed level of security. In the recent past, the research community’s interest for
lightweight cryptography increased and as a result many lightweight algorithms were
designed and analyzed from the security perspective. The implementation eﬀort
focused on selecting the best design constructions in order to reduce the resource
consumption, evaluating the performance ﬁgures achieved by hardware and software
implementations on diﬀerent platforms, and analyzing and improving the protection
against side-channel attacks.
Looking back at NIST contests for the selection of new cryptographic stan-
dards [250, 246], we can see that weak designs from a security perspective were
disqualiﬁed after the ﬁrst evaluation phase. In the following stages, the remaining
algorithms had similar security margins and thus new evaluation criteria were neces-
sary. This is the moment where hardware and software evaluation of the candidates
plays a very important role. As is pointed in [132], the ﬁnal ranking of candidates is
closely related to the hardware and software performance ﬁgures. Since benchmark-
ing frameworks allow for consistent evaluation, they are important not only in the
selection process of new cryptographic standards, but also for a fair comparison of
ciphers’ performance in given usage scenarios.
NIST organized two workshops [248, 249] on lightweight cryptography to discuss
the security and resource requirements of applications in constrained environments
and potential future standardization of lightweight primitives. Considering the
increasing market of IoT devices and the industry’s need for a standard to secure
IoT applications, tools designed to extract the performance ﬁgures of lightweight
primitives on diﬀerent platforms under the same conditions are required. These tools
help cryptographers to evaluate proposed designs with respect to previous ones and
can be used to break the tie between the candidates in the subsequent phases of
the selection process. Based on the feedback following the two workshops, NIST
decided to create a portfolio of lightweight ciphers that ﬁt into clearly deﬁned use
cases speciﬁc to the IoT. Moreover, they already announced a call for cryptographic
primitives suitable for two diﬀerent proﬁles [247].
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2.1.1 Research Contribution
Firstly, we analyze previous benchmarking frameworks to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of each one. We formulate a set of design goals that are required for a fair
evaluation of lightweight primitives on diﬀerent platforms under the same conditions.
Then, we describe the structure of our benchmarking framework, extracted metrics
and target devices. For each of the extracted metrics and for each supported device
we describe the methodology and tools used.
FELICS (Fair Evaluation of Lightweight Cryptographic Systems) [93] is a free,
open-source and ﬂexible framework that assesses the performance of C and assembly
software implementations of lightweight primitives on embedded devices. Thanks
to the modular design, the framework can easily accommodate new metrics, usage
scenarios, or target devices. It is the core of an eﬀort to increase transparency in
lightweight algorithms’ performance and aims to facilitate fair comparison of the
assessed algorithms. In the past three years we maintained a web page [93] where
the tool can be downloaded and up-to-date results of the assessed primitives can
be found. Soon after its initial publication, the framework has become a valuable
resource and reference point for comparing the eﬃciency of lightweight ciphers.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only free and open-source benchmarking
framework designed for fair and consistent evaluation of software implementations of
lightweight primitives on various IoT embedded devices in the same usage scenarios.
As the IoT ﬁeld is expected to have a major growth in following years, FELICS
will help to provide the research community and industry with fair and detailed
performance ﬁgures of lightweight primitives.
2.2 Related Work
Over time, several benchmarking frameworks have been designed to ease the eval-
uation of cryptographic primitives on diﬀerent hardware or software platforms.
In addition to these benchmarking frameworks, survey and benchmarking pa-
pers [209, 121, 194, 184, 231] were published. In this section we describe the
previous work that helped us in designing the proposed framework. For each project
analyzed we present the design requirements and constraints, the extracted metrics
and the methodology used to ensure a fair and consistent evaluation.
2.2.1 BLOC Project
The BLOC project [74] aims to study the design of block ciphers dedicated to
constrained environments. During the project, a paper [75] about the performance
evaluation of lightweight block ciphers for wireless sensor nodes was published.
The C implementations of the studied ciphers along with the source code used to
extract the analyzed metrics are available for free. The target device is the 16-bit
MSP430F1611 [348] microcontroller, commonly used in sensor nodes.
The three metrics considered (execution time, RAM requirement and code size)
are extracted for a set of 17 ciphers. The cycle count is measured using the cycle
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accurate simulator MSPDebug. The RAM requirement is given by the stack usage for
running the encryption key schedule, encryption and decryption operations. The
stack consumption is computed by debugging the program execution on the MSPDebug
simulator using msp430-gdb. Breakpoints are inserted at the beginning and at the
end of the program execution and afterward the number of modiﬁed words in memory
is computed. The data required to store the cipher state, the master key and round
keys are not included in the RAM requirement. The code size is given by the text
section of the binary ﬁle and is extracted using the msp430-size tool. The metric
extraction is done automatically through Bash scripts and the results are exported
into LaTeX tables similar to those used in the paper [75].
Analyzing the project source code, we inferred that the framework has some
major drawbacks. Firstly, the RAM requirement given in the paper and on the
project website is wrongly computed because the framework implementers assume
that the unsigned int data type requires one byte instead of two on a 16-bit
MSP430F1611 [348] microcontroller. Thus the RAM requirement provided in the
paper is half of the actual value. Secondly, the library is not ﬂexible at all and it does
not allow easy addition of new devices or metrics. The provided library does not
have a set of requirements that each implementation should follow and there is no
common interface for assessing the performance of the implemented ciphers. Without
a clear evaluation methodology, reference implementations that process one block at
a time are compared with bit-sliced implementations that process several blocks in
parallel. Thirdly, some implementations of the studied ciphers do not verify the test
vectors (e.g. LBlock). We wrote a patch that ﬁxes the identiﬁed issues and sent it to
the authors of the project. The patch was applied to the public repository [192].
The project has the merit of being one of the ﬁrst attempts to evaluate a set of
lightweight block ciphers on an embedded device. It also contains a large collection
of implementations of lightweight ciphers available for free.
2.2.2 eBACS Project
The eBACS (ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Systems) [45] project aims
at measuring the speed of a wide variety of cryptographic primitives on personal
computers and servers. The developed framework, SUPERCOP (System for Uniﬁed
Performance Evaluation Related to Cryptographic Operations and Primitives), inte-
grates features for measuring the execution time of hash functions (eBASH), stream
ciphers (eSTREAM), authenticated ciphers (eBAEAD), and public-key systems
(eBATS). It provides a large collection of cryptographic implementations. The open
and free source code of the framework is written in C with inline assembly, Bash
and Python.
The project web page provides information on how to submit new implementations
as well as how to collect data for existing implementations using the framework.
The requirements that the implementation of a cryptographic primitive has to fulﬁll
in order to be evaluated using the framework are very well described and ensure a
consistent evaluation of all implementations across all considered target platforms.
The framework allows benchmarking of C, C++, and assembly implementations.
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It automatically compiles the source code using diﬀerent compilers and compiler
options. The cycle count metric is computed using inline assembly instructions
for each of the supported platforms. Because execution time is the only metric
extracted, the submitted implementations are optimized only for speed. The results
are extracted for diﬀerent input data lengths across all compilers and compiler options
and saved in a database, which is merely a text ﬁle that contains a line for each
implementation evaluated. A line consists of a set of entries, separated by spaces,
that allows to identify the measurement conditions and the corresponding results.
The framework represents a ﬁrst step towards consistent evaluation of crypto-
graphic primitives. Thanks to the fair and clear evaluation methodology, it has
been used as source of inspiration for other similar projects. One of the framework’s
strengths is given by the large number of computers with diﬀerent architectures and
characteristics used for the result collection process, while the main shortcoming is
that it is able to extract only the execution time. The framework is used to measure
the performance of authenticated encryption schemes in the context of the CAESAR
competition [71].
2.2.3 XBX Project
The XBX (eXternal Benchmarking eXtension) project [378] is an extension of SU-
PERCOP that allows benchmarking of hash functions on diﬀerent microncontrollers.
The XBX framework is written in C, Perl and Bash and uses the same interfaces for
the implemented algorithms and generated results as SUPERCOP. The hardware
layer consists of XBD (eXternal Benchmarking Device) and XBH (eXternal Bench-
marking Harness) that communicate with each other using either I2C or UART and
digital I/O lines. The XBH is connected to the PC running the XBS (eXternal Bench-
marking Software) using the Ethernet port. Where more compilers are available,
XBX retains the SUPERCOP capability to benchmark the same implementation
using diﬀerent compilers and compiler options.
Besides extending the eBASH capabilities to microcontrollers, XBX extracts two
more metrics for the analyzed hash implementations: binary code size and RAM
consumption. The code size is obtained through static analysis of the generated
binary ﬁle. The RAM requirement is the sum of stack consumption and static
RAM requirement obtained from the application binary. The cycle count values
are subject to measurement errors because they are not extracted directly from the
target devices, but from the XBH [379]. Most of the benchmarked algorithms are
taken from SUPERCOP.
The XBX is the ﬁrst project to uniformly measure the performance of software
implementations of cryptographic primitives built for diﬀerent embedded devices
using the same evaluation methodology. The results given in the report [379] are
gathered for eight diﬀerent devices with 8-bit, 16-bit and 32-bit CPUs from all major
vendors and they were used in the second round of the SHA-3 competition [246].
The project is not active anymore, but its source code is public [208].
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2.2.4 ATHENa Project
The ATHENa (Automated Tool for Hardware EvaluatioN) project [359] aims at
fair, comprehensive and automated evaluation of cryptographic cores developed
using hardware description languages such as VHDL or Verilog. The goal of the
framework is to spread knowledge and awareness about good performance evaluation
practices in order to make the comparison of competing algorithms fairer and more
comprehensive.
The open-source benchmarking environment is described in [133]. It is inspired
from the eBACS project [45] and consists of a set of scripts written in Perl and Bash
aimed at automated generation of optimized results for multiple hardware platforms.
The metrics considered are area, throughput, and execution time, while the primary
optimization target is throughput to area ratio.
The framework can be used under Windows or Linux operating systems and
supports diﬀerent target FPGA families from Xilinx, Altera, and Actel. It allows
running all steps of synthesis, implementation, and timing analysis in batch mode and
performs automated optimization of results aimed at one of the three optimization
criteria: speed, area, and throughput to area ratio. The generated results can be
exported in CSV, Excel and LaTeX formats.
During the SHA-3 contest [246] the tool played an important role due to the com-
prehensive results generated and published [165]. Besides having been used during
the SHA-3 competition, the framework is ready for the evaluation of authenticated
encryption candidates from the CAESAR competition [71] and preliminary results
are available on the project website [359]. We note that although it provides com-
prehensive performance ﬁgures, it does not require revealing the source code. While
this decision is meant to protect intellectual property, it narrows the transparency of
the results.
2.2.5 ECRYPT II Project – Performance Evaluation on ATtiny45
During the ECRYPT II project, two papers [118, 26] presenting the performance eval-
uation of block ciphers and hash functions with applications in ubiquitous computing
on an Atmel AVR ATtiny45 8-bit microcontroller were published. The implemen-
tations written in assembly language are available for free [119, 27]. Although the
authors of the two papers formulate a list of common constraints to be able to
compare the performance, some of the guidelines were not always followed.
The papers consider the following metrics: code size, RAM usage and execution
time. A combined metric is computed as the product of code size and execution
time divided by the block size for block ciphers. For hash functions the combined
metrics are given by the product of code size and execution time and the product of
RAM usage and execution time. For block ciphers the average energy consumption is
computed by integrating the measured current consumption. The energy consumption
for all studied ciphers is strongly correlated with the cycle count values.
The tools and methodology used to extract the main metrics are not described.
Although the common interfaces used for the evaluation of the implementations are
provided, no scripts to help with the metric collection process are provided. The use
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eBACS ECRYPT II BLOC XBX FELICS
Code size ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RAM ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Execution time ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AVR ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
MSP ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
ARM ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
PC ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Evaluation scenarios ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Actively maintained ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Table 2.1: Comparison of software benchmarking frameworks.
of assembly language for the implementations of algorithms has the advantage of illus-
trating the lightweight aspects of the studied ciphers better than C implementations,
but at the same time it limits the code portability.
2.3 Motivation
The lightweight designs published in the literature give diﬀerent performance ﬁgures
on diﬀerent platforms and diﬀerent evaluation conditions. The exact methodology
used to extract the ﬁgures is often unclear. Considering that the performance ﬁgures
are usually reported for diﬀerent devices and that the measured operations and
measurement conditions diﬀer from paper to paper, it is very hard to use the given
values to compare diﬀerent designs.
The lack of comparative performance ﬁgures creates the need for a fair and
consistent way of extracting performance ﬁgures for lightweight ciphers. The results
obtained using the same assessment methodology can be used to compare diﬀerent
algorithms. Using the performance values, cipher designers can infer which design
constructions are better on diﬀerent architectures. At the same time, the results can
help engineers to select the best cipher for a given use case.
While the ﬁrst proposed lightweight ciphers were mainly geared for hardware
eﬃciency, in the last years, we notice that the focus is moving to lightweight ciphers
designed for eﬃciency in software (see Section 3.3). This new design direction for
lightweight ciphers reinforces the need of reliable and accurate performance ﬁgures.
Table 2.1 summarizes the main characteristics of the software benchmarking
frameworks described in Section 2.2 and FELICS. While many frameworks extract
the three metrics considered (code size, RAM, and execution time), few frameworks
support IoT devices such as the 8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP, or the 32-bit ARM. Except
for FELICS, none of those frameworks is actively maintained. A distinguishing
feature of FELICS is that it uses the concept of evaluation scenario to benchmark
an implementation in various use cases inspired from the real world.
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2.4 Goals
FELICS was created to allow the comparison of software implementations of lightweight
ciphers on diﬀerent embedded devices commonly used in the IoT. Its key character-
istics are:
Fair Evaluation. To ensure a fair evaluation a clear assessment methodology was
formulated. The methodology indicates the requirements that each implementation
should follow and how each metric is extracted for each supported device. Although
sometimes the methodology can be considered restrictive, it has been formulated to
ensure a fair evaluation for every implementation.
Consistent Evaluation. The same methodology is used to assess the performance
of all implementations of a primitive type. Thus the evaluation is consistent across all
the target embedded devices for all studied usage scenarios. The consistent evaluation
allows easy comparison of the performance ﬁgures between similar implementations
of ciphers. It also facilitates the correct ranking of the ciphers’ implementations
using diﬀerent criteria.
Accurate Measurements. The framework provides accurate measurements. To
achieve this goal, the tools used to extract the metrics and the measurement conditions
are precise. The simulators are cycle accurate and the tools used for measurements
on development boards are carefully calibrated.
Open Source. To increase the trust in the measurements, the framework source
code is open. Anyone can analyze the source code, can detect and ﬁx coding bugs,
or even contribute to the tool development with new modules and features.
Comprehensive Results. The extracted metrics are very detailed and aim to
help understanding how diﬀerent parts of an algorithm’s implementation are aﬀecting
the performance. Embedded software engineers can use the comprehensive results to
select the best trade-oﬀs for a speciﬁc use case.
Flexible. The framework uses a modular architecture that facilitates further
development. FELICS is designed to allow future development of new modules for
assessing other types of cryptographic primitives. It also allows integration of new
target devices and metrics. The process of integrating a new cipher implementation
is very easy and can be done following the methodology and requirements of the
framework.
Automatic Evaluation. The framework is able to verify if an implementation
follows the formulated requirements. It can automatically check if an implementation
veriﬁes the test vectors provided by an implementer for all target devices. The process
of collecting the performance ﬁgures is suitable for batch processing. The user can
extract the results for a given list of ciphers and for a given list of architectures.
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AVR MSP ARM
avr-gcc 4.8.2 msp430-gcc 4.6.3 arm-none-eabi-gcc 4.8.2
Table 2.2: Compilers used to build the implementations for each target device.
2.5 Benchmarking Framework
2.5.1 Structure
FELICS is written in C with inline assembly, Bash and Python and is designed
to work on Linux operating systems. It allows benchmarking of C and assembly
implementations that follow a given set of requirements. The C programming
language was selected because of its widespread adoption and portability. If we
consider that usually the reference implementations of ciphers are provided in C
language, then it is the natural choice to reach a wide group of users. Moreover, the
framework can target multiple embedded devices used in the IoT context with a
single implementation, which limits the development eﬀort. FELICS also facilitates
the benchmarking of highly optimized assembly implementations, which are platform
dependent.
The usage scenarios are written in C, while the cipher implementations can be
written in C or assembly. Each module has a makeﬁle that can build an implementa-
tion for a given architecture and scenario using a given compiler optimization level.
The framework contains a collection of Bash scripts that allow to fully automate
the metric extraction process. Python scripts were used to perform operations
that were too complicated or impossible to be done in Bash. FELICS is able to
automatically generate the binary code, to check the implementation’s correctness
using the provided test vectors, and to extract the implementation metrics for the
supported devices.
The current version of the framework includes a core module and four specialized
modules for evaluating lightweight block ciphers, stream ciphers, authenticated
encryption algorithms, and hash functions. Thanks to the modular structure depicted
in Figure 2.1, FELICS can be easily extended with new modules capable to measure
other primitives. Each module uses the services of the core module and provides it
with scripts for batch processing.
2.5.1.1 Core Module
The core module is the heart of the framework and provides the tools necessary to
collect the metrics for each of the supported devices. Each implementation is built
automatically using diﬀerent compiler optimization levels (-O3, -O2, -O1 and -Os)
and the metrics for each compiler optimization level are reported. The compilers
used for each target device and the compiler versions are given in Table 2.2.
The complete list of used tools and tool versions organized by extracted metric
for each supported device is given in Table 2.3. Since the framework is subject to
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Figure 2.1: Modular structure of FELICS.
changes and improvements, we refer the reader to the FELICS web page [93] for
updated information on compilers and tools.
The role of the core module is to facilitate a smooth integration of new target
devices and extracted metrics. It allows the user to collect the results for one or
more of the modules that are integrated in the framework.
In addition to the supported embedded devices, the module gives the possibility to
debug and evaluate cipher implementations built for personal computers. This feature
is mainly added to reduce the complexity of the implementation and integration
process and to ease the task of users.
In order to achieve the described design goals, each module formulates a speciﬁc
set of requirements that every implementation should follow. Even though the
requirements create additional constraints and limit the possibility to benchmark
highly optimized implementations (e.g. bit-sliced implementations), they ensure a
fair and consistent evaluation across all implementations.
The core module has a conﬁguration ﬁle, conf.sh, that provides the other
modules with information about the tools used to extract the analyzed metrics for
each target device. At the same time, each module implements the get_results.sh
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AVR MSP ARM
Code size
avr-size 2.23.1 msp430-size 2.21.1 arm-none-eabi-size 2.24
RAM
simavr 1.5 MSPDebug 0.25 J-Link GDB Server V5.00l
avr-gdb 7.6.50 msp430-gdb 7.2 arm-none-eabi-gdb 7.6.50
Execution time
Avrora 1.7.117 MSPDebug 0.23 Arduino Due board
Table 2.3: Tools used to extract the metrics for each target device.
script that can be called from the core module to extract the performance ﬁgures in
batch mode.
2.5.1.2 Block Ciphers Module
The module allows the evaluation of software implementations of lightweight block
ciphers. Each implementation of a block cipher has to use the function prototypes
from Listing 2.1 for the basic operations. In order to enable the framework to extract
the metrics for each of the four operations, each operation has to be implemented
in a separate C ﬁle. If the decryption key schedule is the same as the encryption
key schedule, the decryption key schedule function has to be deﬁned as an empty
function. In the case the cipher does not have a key schedule, the encryption key
schedule must be deﬁned as a function that copies the master key into the round keys.
The encryption and decryption operations are done in place to reduce the RAM
consumption and the key should not be modiﬁed after running the key schedule.
void RunEncryptionKeySchedule(uint8_t ∗key, uint8_t ∗roundKeys);
void Encrypt(uint8_t ∗block, uint8_t ∗roundKeys);
void RunDecryptionKeySchedule(uint8_t ∗key, uint8_t ∗roundKeys);
void Decrypt(uint8_t ∗block, uint8_t ∗roundKeys);
Listing 2.1: Required function signatures for block ciphers.
The block size, key size, round keys size and the number of rounds of the
cipher have to be deﬁned in the constants.h ﬁle. Other constants used by the
implementation should be declared in the same header ﬁle, while the deﬁnitions can
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be added to constants.c or any other *.c ﬁle, except for the predeﬁned C ﬁles.
The constants can be stored in ﬂash or RAM memory of the device and should be
read with the macros provided by the framework. FELICS automatically checks if
each implementation veriﬁes the test vectors given in the test_vectors.c ﬁle.
The implementation information ﬁle, implementation.info, provides imple-
mentation details to the framework such that the common code and data to be
considered just once when extracting the metrics. One can split an implementation
into as many ﬁles as wanted if each implementation ﬁle is correctly listed in the
implementation.info ﬁle. The implementation information ﬁle indicates if a key
schedule is used for encryption and decryption.
A template cipher implementation and a ﬁle describing the module requirements
is provided with the module to help users to integrate new implementations. The
process of integrating an existing C or assembly implementation is thus very easy
and consists in ﬁlling the functions of the template cipher with the implementation
of an actual cipher as described in the README ﬁle.
The module contains three evaluation scenarios, but can be easily extended with
new evaluation scenarios. The cipher operation (Scenario 0) evaluates the basic
operations performed by a block cipher. In this scenario a block of data is encrypted
and then decrypted using the provided test vectors. The communication protocol
(Scenario 1) assumes the encryption and decryption of 128 bytes of data using the
CBC mode of operation. This scenario is suitable for secure communication in the
IoT context and considers the limitations of IEEE 802.15.4 [170] and ZigBee [393]
protocols used in sensor networks. The challenge-response authentication protocol
(Scenario 2) is created to evaluate the cost of authentication in the IoT context by
using a block cipher in CTR mode to encrypt 128 bits of data. No key schedule is
required because the cipher round keys are precomputed and stored in the device’s
ﬂash memory.
Because the communication protocol and challenge-response scenarios assume
the encryption of 128 bytes and 128 bits of unpadded data, respectively, the block
size of the cipher in bits has to be equal to or a submultiple of 128.
2.5.1.3 Stream Ciphers Module
The performance ﬁgures of stream ciphers can be extracted for each stream cipher
implementation that deﬁnes the functions described in Listing 2.2. The deﬁnition
of each function has to be placed in a separate C ﬁle. The implementation of the
encryption function must be able to process at least one byte. The encryption process
is done in place to reduce RAM consumption. The cipher master key should not be
modiﬁed after running the setup.
void Setup(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗key, uint8_t ∗iv);
void Encrypt(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗stream, uint16_t length);
Listing 2.2: Required function signatures for stream ciphers.
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The cipher state size, key size and initialization vector size have to be deﬁned in
the constants.h ﬁle. The constants used by the stream cipher must be declared in
constants.h ﬁle and deﬁned in the constants.c or any other *.c ﬁle, except for
the predeﬁned *.c ﬁles. The implementer can choose to store the constants in ﬂash
or RAM and has to use the corresponding macro to read the constants. The test
vectors used by FELICS to check the correctness of the implementation should be
deﬁned in the test_vectors.c ﬁle.
Integrating a new stream cipher implementation is very easy because the user
is provided with a template implementation of a stream cipher and a ﬁle with
implementation instructions. The implementer has just to ﬁll the functions from the
template cipher with the source code of the cipher according to the requirements
described in the README ﬁle.
FELICS parses the implementation.info ﬁle to ensure the common source code
and constants are counted only once in the extracted metrics. The implementation
of each of the required functions can be split into several ﬁles provided that the
implementation information is correctly given in the implementation.info ﬁle.
Two evaluation scenarios are implemented for this module, but new scenarios
can be added at any time with minimal eﬀort. The cipher operation (Scenario 0) is
evaluated using the provided test vectors. The communication protocol (Scenario 1)
is designed to secure the communication between wireless sensor nodes and consists
in encryption of 128 bytes of data. Because the evaluation conditions are similar
to the one used for block ciphers, these scenarios can also be used to compare the
performance ﬁgures of block and stream ciphers.
2.5.1.4 Authenticated Ciphers Module
This module assesses the performance of authenticated ciphers that implement the
functions speciﬁed in Listing 2.3. Each of the six functions must be implemented in a
separate C ﬁle. This application programming interface (API) is designed to facilitate
detailed measurements of the main structural components of an authenticated cipher.
It was inspired by the lightweight submissions to the CAESAR competition [71].
Since the call for submissions did not impose strict requirements on the structure
of authenticated ciphers, designers used various structures. Consequently, it was
challenging to design an API that can easily accommodate implementations of
algorithms that do not have exactly the same structure.
void Initialize(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗key, uint8_t ∗nonce);
void ProcessAssociatedData(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗associatedData, uint8_t lenght);
void ProcessPlaintext(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗message, uint8_t length);
void ProcessCiphertext(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗message, uint8_t length);
void Finalize(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗key);
void TagGeneration(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗tag);
Listing 2.3: Required function signatures for authenticated ciphers.
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An implementer has to specify the structural properties of the algorithm in the
implementation.info ﬁle such that the module can address the diﬀerences in the
structure of various authenticated ciphers. One must indicate the common code and
data in the implementation ﬁle to allow the module to add them a single time to the
computed metrics.
The encryption and decryption are done in place to reduce the memory require-
ment. Most of the algorithms proposed in the CAESAR competition [71] can not
process the input message in chunks of diﬀerent sizes. Therefore, they impose that
the same message lengths are used for both encryption and decryption. One can
implement an authenticated cipher or port an existing implementation by following
the steps described in the README ﬁle.
This module supports ﬁve usage scenarios. Scenario 0 is used to automatically
test the correctness of an implementation using the provided test vectors. Diﬀerent
use cases speciﬁc to IoT communication protocols such as ZigBee [393] are evaluated
in three scenarios. Scenario 1 describes a use case where a cipher encrypts and
authenticates 128 bytes of data. In addition to the message, the cipher authenticates
128 bits of associated data (e.g. an IPv6 address). Scenario 2 assumes only encryption
and authentication 128 bytes of data. In Scenario 3, the cipher is used only to encrypt
128 bytes of data. Finally, Scenario 4 describes a challenge-response protocol where
128 bits of associated data are authenticated.
2.5.1.5 Hash Functions Module
This module benchmarks implementations of hash functions that deﬁne the three
functions described in Listing 2.4. Each of the three functions must be implemented
in its own C ﬁle. The constants and code shared between these functions must be
listed in the implementation.info ﬁle. The README ﬁle provides details on how to
implement a hash function for this module starting from a template implementation.
The update function must be implemented such that the resulting hash is the same
regardless of how the input message is split into chunks.
void Initialize(uint8_t ∗state);
void Update(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗message, uint16_t length);
void Finalize(uint8_t ∗state, uint8_t ∗digest);
Listing 2.4: Required function signatures for hash functions.
The hash function module supports three evaluation scenarios and new scenarios
can be easily added. The correctness of an implementation is veriﬁed in Scenario 0
using the given test vectors. Scenario 1 assesses the performance of an implementation
that hashes messages of 16, 128, and 1024 bytes. The short message (i.e. 16 bytes)
corresponds to a challenge-response protocol, while the long message (i.e. 1024 bytes)
represents the maximum block size of a ﬁrmware update [63]. The common amount
of data exchanged in an IoT communication protocol inﬂuenced the choice of the
medium-sized message (i.e. 128 bytes). In Scenario 2, a hash function is used to
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Characteristic AVR MSP ARM
Model ATmega128 MSP430F1611 Cortex-M3
CPU 8-bit RISC 16-bit RISC 32-bit RISC
Frequency (MHz) 16 8 84
Registers 32 16 21
Architecture Harvard von Neumann Harvard
Flash (KB) 128 48 512
SRAM (KB) 4 10 96
EEPROM (KB) 4 – –
Supply voltage (V) 4.5 – 5.5 1.8 – 3.6 1.6 – 3.6
Table 2.4: Key characteristics of the three microcontrollers used by FELICS.
generate a 16-byte message authentication code (MAC) using a 16-byte key.
2.5.2 Export Formats
The framework can export the extracted results for each scenario and target archi-
tecture in several formats in order to allow the user to analyze and post process the
results. The supported formats are: raw data table, CSV ﬁle, XML ﬁle compatible
with Microsoft Oﬃce Excel and LibreOﬃce Calc, MediaWiki table and LaTeX table.
New formats can be easily added should the need arise. An archive with latest results
in all mentioned formats is available for download on the FELICS web page [93].
On the same web page, a Python script for processing the CSV results can also be
found. It allows the ranking of existing ciphers’ implementations using the Figure of
Merit (FOM) deﬁned in Section 3.4, but it can be easily modiﬁed to compute other
values of interest.
2.6 Target Devices
The IoT is populated by billions of devices that are equipped with a highly diverse
and largely incompatible range of hardware platforms. In fact, the microcontroller
population of the IoT is much more heterogeneous than the processor population of
commodity computers, where the Intel architecture enjoys a market share of over
90%. Since there is no single dominating platform in the IoT, it is essential that a
lightweight block cipher achieves consistently good performance on a variety of 8,
16, and 32-bit microcontrollers. It is also essential that a benchmarking framework
is capable to collect implementation results from a wide range of platforms. Our
framework supports the AVR ATmega128 [22] as example of an 8-bit architecture,
the TI MSP430F1611 [348] as representative of a 16-bit platform, as well as the ARM
Cortex-M3 [17] as example of a 32-bit RISC machine. However, the benchmarking
framework can be easily extended to support further platforms. Table 2.4 gives the
main characteristics of each target device.
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2.6.1 8-bit AVR ATmega128 Microcontroller
The AVR ATmega128 [22] microcontroller manufactured by Atmel uses a CPU
with a RISC architecture and an on-chip two-cycle multiplier. Most of the 133
instructions require a single cycle to execute. The rich instruction set is combined
with the 32 8-bit general purpose registers (R0 - R31) with single clock access time.
Six of the 32 8-bit registers can be used as three 16-bit indirect address register
pointers (X, Y and Z) for addressing the data space. The instructions are executed
within a two-stage, single-issue pipeline: while one instruction is executed, the next
instruction is pre-fetched from the program memory. Therefore, one instruction is
executed every clock cycle. The Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) operations are divided
into three main categories: arithmetic, logic and bit manipulation functions. All
8-bit registers are directly connected to the ALU, allowing two independent registers
to be accessed in one instruction executed in one clock cycle.
It has a modiﬁed Harvard architecture where program and data are stored
in separate physical memory regions located at diﬀerent physical addresses. The
separate memories and buses for program and data maximize the performance and
parallelism. The memory includes 128 KB of ﬂash, 4 KB of SRAM and 4 KB of
EEPROM. The data memory can be addressed using ﬁve diﬀerent modes: direct,
indirect, indirect with displacement, indirect with pre-decrement and indirect with
post-decrement. An access to SRAM is performed in 2 CPU cycles.
Being among the best 8-bit microcontrollers in terms of power consumption when
it entered the market, the Atmel ATmega128 provides a highly ﬂexible and cost
eﬀective solution to many embedded control applications from building and home
automation to medical and healthcare systems. It is working at supply voltages
between 4.5 V and 5.5 V and has six diﬀerent software-selectable power modes of
operation.
2.6.2 16-bit MSP430F1611 Microcontroller
The MSP430F1611 [348] microcontroler produced by Texas Instruments has a CPU
with RISC architecture and 16 16-bit registers. Four of the registers are dedicated
to program counter, stack pointer, status register and constant generator, while the
remaining 12 registers (R4 - R15) are general-purpose registers. The 52 instructions
with three formats (dual operand, single operand, jump) and seven addressing modes
(register, indexed, symbolic, absolute, indirect, indirect auto-increment, immediate)
can operate on byte and word data. The register to register operations take one
clock cycle. The number of clock cycles required to perform an instruction depends
on the instruction format and addressing mode used.
The von Neumann memory of MSP430 has one shared address space for special
function registers, peripherals, RAM and ﬂash memory. It includes 48 KB of ﬂash
and 10 KB of SRAM. The ﬂash memory is bit, byte and word addressable and
programmable.
Designed for low-cost and low-power embedded applications, it requires a supply
voltage between 1.8 V and 3.6 V and can reach a frequency of 8 MHz. It has one
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active mode and ﬁve software selectable low-power modes of operation. Typical
applications include industrial control, sensor systems, and hand-held meters.
2.6.3 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 Microcontroller
The Arduino Due board [15] uses the 32-bit Atmel SAM3X8 Cortex-M3 [129] RISC
CPU that executes Thumb-2 instructions. The instruction set allows high code
density and reduced program memory requirements. The processor has a three-level
pipeline (instruction fetch, instruction decode and instruction execute) and 13 general
purpose registers (R0 - R12).
The Harvard memory architecture includes 512 KB of ﬂash organized in two
blocks of 256 KB and 96 KB of SRAM divided into two banks of 64 KB and 32
KB. The processor enables direct access to single bits of data in simple systems
by implementing a technique called bit-banding. It supports two operating modes
(thread and handler) and two levels of access to the code (privileged and unprivileged)
enabling the implementation of complex systems without sacriﬁcing security.
Speciﬁcally designed to achieve high system performance in power sensitive
embedded applications, such as automotive systems, industrial control systems and
wireless networking, the processor operates at a maximum frequency of 84 MHz.
The recommended supply voltage ranges between 1.6 V and 3.6 V.
2.7 Metrics
The tree metrics considered can be extracted in batch mode for a list of implemen-
tations, usage scenarios and target devices using the collect_cipher_metrics.sh
script. We added support for these metrics because they outline the lightweight
characteristics of the evaluated implementations. Derived or secondary metrics such
as power and energy consumption were not included in the initial release, mainly
because they are closely related to the basic metrics.
Detailed and accurate results are generated for each operation required by
the corresponding module separately and for the all operations together. The
comprehensive results can be used by embedded software engineers to decide what
cipher operations should be implemented for a particular device and application.
Where cycle accurate and free software simulators of the target embedded devices
exist, they are preferred to development boards because of usability reasons. While
a software simulator can be downloaded and installed easily, a development board
involves an acquisition and conﬁguration cost. Next we describe how each metric is
extracted for the considered target devices.
2.7.1 Code Size
The code size is measured in bytes and quantiﬁes the amount of storage an operation
occupies in the non-volatile memory (e.g. ﬂash memory) of the target device. To
extract the code size for each target device, the frameworks uses the GNU size tool,
which lists the section sizes and the total size in bytes for a given binary ﬁle. The
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binary code size is given by the sum of the text and data sections. The text section
of the binary ﬁle contains the code, while the data section stores global initialized
variables, which are loaded from ﬂash into RAM at run time. The bss section of
the binary ﬁle is not considered since the framework forbids the utilization of global
uninitialized variables. The code size of the main function, where all operations are
put together, is not considered because it is the same for all studied ciphers.
The framework is able to determine the common parts using the implementation
information ﬁle and considers them just once in the extracted code size value. Hence,
FELICS encourages code reuse and the computed program footprint is accurate.
FELICS uses avr-size, msp430-size and arm-none-eabi-size to extract the
code size for AVR, MSP and ARM, respectively. The exact version of each tool is
given in Table 2.3. The code size extraction process is completely automated and can
be done using the cipher_code_size.sh script for a given cipher implementation
and a given evaluation scenario.
2.7.2 RAM
The RAM consumption is split into stack requirement and data requirement. The
stack consumption gives the maximum value of the RAM used to store local variables
and return address after interrupts and subroutine calls. The data requirement
represents the static RAM and is given by the size of the constants stored in the
target device’s RAM. It includes the data speciﬁc to each scenario such as data to
encrypt, master key, round keys or initialization vectors. The heap is not used at all
because the framework does not permit any dynamically-allocated variables.
The static RAM consumption is computed from the data section of the binary ﬁle
using GNU size. As in the case of code size, using the implementation information
ﬁle, FELICS considers the global initialized variables just once when they are used
in several operations. The stack consumption is measured using the appropriate gdb
client and the target device simulator or development board. Before the function
call for the measured operation, the stack is ﬁlled with a memory pattern. Then, at
the end of the function’s execution, the values in the stack area are compared with
the memory pattern and the number of modiﬁed bytes gives the stack consumption.
Hence, the measurement method takes into account the function arguments that are
passed on the stack. The measured operation’s return address is not considered since
it is insigniﬁcant and the same for all ciphers on a given target device. The client
and server tools used for computing the stack requirement are given in Table 2.3.
The cipher_ram.sh script is able to extract the RAM requirement for a given cipher
in a given usage scenario.
Another way to compute the stack requirement is to statically analyze the
assembly instructions generated by the compiler and build the call graph for the
measured function. For each entry in the call graph the maximum stack consumption
is computed and stored. The stack usage of the measured function is given by the
call path with the maximum stack requirements. This method is not able to solve
recursive function calls and calls to functions from the standard C library. On the
other hand, using the gdb client with a well tested simulator is less error prone than
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a tool developed from scratch.
2.7.3 Execution Time
The execution time measures the number of CPU clock cycles spent on executing
a given operation. The metric is extracted using either cycle accurate software
simulators of the target microcontrollers or development boards.
The execution time is computed as the absolute diﬀerence between the system
timer’s number of cycles at the end of the measured operation and at the beginning
of the measured operation. To extract the number of cycles spent to execute the
measured operations, FELICS simulates the cipher operation using the cycle accurate
simulator Avrora [357, 356] for AVR and the cycle accurate simulator MSPDebug [108]
for MSP. For ARM, the framework inserts additional C and assembly code to read
the system timer’s number of ticks at the beginning and at the end of each measured
operation and then executes the program on an Arduino Due [15] board. The
measurement process on the ARM board was carefully adjusted to obtain accurate
and precise results. We draw attention to the fact that extracted values for ARM
may vary depending how the C code is translated into assembly instructions and
how data is aligned in memory for diﬀerent usage scenarios. Information about the
used simulators is provided in Table 2.3. The cipher_execution_time.sh script
extracts the execution time for a given cipher implementation and scenario.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced FELICS, a free and open-source benchmarking
framework for fair and consistent evaluation of cryptographic primitives. It is
primarily motivated by the lack of comparative performance ﬁgures for lightweight
cryptographic algorithms measured from diﬀerent embedded devices. Our aim is to
increase the trust and transparency of results obtained by diﬀerent algorithms and
to ensure an independent environment for assessing the performance of new designs.
FELICS facilitates the comparison of performance ﬁgures between diﬀerent ciphers
due to the consistent evaluation methodology.
Currently the framework is able to benchmark lightweight block ciphers, stream
ciphers, authenticated encryption functions, and hash functions on three diﬀerent
embedded devices. The extracted metrics for each device and evaluation scenario are:
binary code size, RAM consumption, and execution time. Thanks to its modular
design, FELICS is very ﬂexible and can be easily extended to benchmark new
lightweight primitives, to extract new metrics, to collect the performance ﬁgures for
other target devices, or to evaluate the implemented algorithms in new usage scenarios.
The framework source code together with the source code of the implemented ciphers
and the corresponding performance ﬁgures are available on a website [93].
FELICS borrows and improves concepts from previous frameworks and, at the
same time, adds new ideas and features. The result is a better framework for fair
and consistent evaluation of cryptographic primitives. To the best of our knowledge,
FELICS is the ﬁrst benchmarking framework to evaluate lightweight primitives for
62 Fair Evaluation of Lightweight Cryptographic Systems
the IoT context in diﬀerent usage scenarios. It also provides full transparency in the
performance ﬁgures of assessed implementations by publishing the results and the
corresponding source code on the project website [93].
Possible additional features include: addition of new modules to allow bench-
marking of other cryptographic primitives (e.g. public-key algorithms), extraction
of new metrics (e.g. energy consumption), or support for other embedded devices.
Another direction for further development is to add support for development boards
where software simulators are currently used. Since the framework is free and its
source code is available, anyone interested can contribute to the tool development by
implementing new features, reporting issues, and ﬁxing bugs.
Since its initial release in March 2015, the framework has been constantly updated
and improved. The feedback and comments received from the users of FELICS
helped us to improve the framework as well as its online documentation. FELICS
attracted implementers from around the world, which contributed more than 60
implementations of lightweight ciphers.
Chapter 3
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a survey of lightweight block ciphers along with software
benchmarking results obtained on embedded 8, 16, and 32-bit microcontrollers. We
consider three metrics of interest: execution time, memory (i.e. RAM) requirements,
and binary code size.
To ensure a fair and consistent evaluation, we used the FELICS framework
introduced in Chapter 2. Following the spirit of the well-known and widely-used
eBACS system [45], we made FELICS available to the cryptographic research
community. Our benchmarking tool is “open” in various aspects. First, it is possible to
upload implementations of new ciphers as well as new (i.e. improved) implementations
of ciphers that are already included. Second, the tool was developed from the ground
up with the goal of supporting a wide range of embedded platforms through both
cycle-accurate instruction set simulation and actual measurements on development
boards. Currently, our tool includes cycle-accurate instruction set simulators for
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AVR ATmega and TI MSP430, as well as an ARM development board equipped with
a Cortex-M3 processor. We use GCC for all these platforms, but other compilers
could be supported as well. Third, our tool is also open with respect to the evaluation
metrics. Currently, it can evaluate three basic metrics, namely execution time, RAM
footprint, and binary code size. Other metrics can be derived thereof or are, at least,
closely related. For example, the energy consumption of a block cipher executed on
an embedded processor operating in a certain power mode can be estimated by the
product of execution time, supply voltage, and average power dissipation. However,
since our framework supports development boards, it could be extended to acquire
more accurate energy ﬁgures by simply measuring the processor’s power dissipation
while it executes a cryptographic algorithm.
Our benchmarking toolsuite accepts source codes written either in “pure” ANSI C
or in C with inlined assembly sections for the three processor architectures mentioned
above. In this way, the toolsuite supports various trade-oﬀs between performance
and portability. At one end of the spectrum are highly-optimized implementations
for which the complete encryption/decryption function consists of hand-crafted
assembly code. Assembly programming allows one to fully exploit the architectural
features of a processor and, in this way, reach peak performance. The speed-up
due to the integration of hand-crafted assembly code is especially pronounced if a
cipher performs a large number of operations that are signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient in C
than in assembly language (e.g. multi-word arithmetic, certain bit manipulations).
Benchmarking results obtained from carefully-optimized assembly implementations
played an important role in the evaluation of candidates for cryptographic standards
like the AES [250] and SHA-3 [246], and this will also be the case for future
standardization activities in the area of lightweight cryptography for the IoT [247].
However, an implementation of a cipher written in assembly language is architecture-
dependent and, consequently, not portable. At the opposite end of the performance-
portability spectrum are “pure” C implementations, which are highly portable but,
in general, less eﬃcient than their hand-crafted assembly counterparts.
While the importance of benchmarking hand-optimized assembly implementations
is out of dispute, we argue that it makes also sense to benchmark portable C
implementations of lightweight ciphers. Our argument is twofold and based on the
speciﬁc properties and constraints of the IoT. First, it has to be noticed that there is
no single dominating hardware platform in the IoT, in contrast to the “conventional”
Internet of commodity computers, where the Intel architecture has a market share
of over 90%. In fact, the IoT is populated by billions of heterogenous devices with
largely incompatible processors and diﬀerent operating systems. Supporting a large
number of platforms with optimized assembly code is tedious and error-prone since,
for each processor architecture, a separate code base needs to be written, tested,
debugged, and then maintained. In the light of ever-increasing time-to-market
pressure, cryptographic engineers may value the portability of C code more than
the performance of assembly code. Our second argument is related to the steadily
increasing research interest in lightweight ciphers with new designs being published
(almost) every month. Implementations written in C often serve as proof-of-concept
in the design phase of a new primitive to explore e.g. diﬀerent candidates for a round
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function. Benchmarks generated from C implementations allow cipher designers to
quickly evaluate the impact of various design options (e.g. round function, number
of rounds) on execution time, RAM footprint and code size. In this way, designers
can already assess in an early phase of the design cycle how a new primitive may
compare with the state of the art.
We report detailed benchmarking results for a total of 19 lightweight block
ciphers, namely the AES [250], Chaskey [244], Fantomas [153], HIGHT [167], LBlock
[386], LEA [166], LED [157], Piccolo [321], PRESENT [58], PRIDE [9], PRINCE
[62], RC5 [296], RECTANGLE [391], RoadRunneR [35], Robin [153], Simon [36],
Sparx [106], Speck [36], and TWINE [344]. Our rationale for selecting exactly
the mentioned 19 ciphers is twofold; ﬁrst, each of these candidates has some special
property or feature that makes it interesting for applications in the IoT. Second,
they cover a wide range of diﬀerent design strategies and approaches. Our evaluation
considers two application scenarios or use cases; the ﬁrst relates to the encryption
of messages transmitted in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) and the second is a
simple challenge-response authentication protocol with applications in e.g. object
identiﬁcation or access control. To accommodate the diﬀerent requirements of these
application scenarios, we evaluated at least two versions of most of the 19 ciphers,
including a low-memory variant and a speed-optimized variant. The former can be
seen as a “minimalist” implementation that favors low memory footprint and small
code size over performance. On the other hand, the second implementation includes
certain optimizations that increase code size and/or memory footprint (e.g. partial
loop unrolling, use of small lookup tables) with the goal of improving performance.
Roughly half of the implementations were written from scratch by us, whereby we
put a comparable eﬀort into optimizing each cipher to ensure a consistent and fair
evaluation. The other half was either taken from other open-source projects or
contributed by the designers of the algorithms or by volunteers; in all these cases we
carefully reviewed the source codes and further optimized them whenever possible.
In this way, we tried to minimize the impact of varying programming skills and
experience. Most of our implementations are faster or on par with the best execution
times reported in the literature on the three platforms we consider. Therefore, the
implementations form a solid code base for the benchmarking of lightweight block
ciphers.
3.1.1 Our Contributions
We survey a total of 19 lightweight block ciphers and study, in particular, their
suitability for software implementation on resource-restricted devices. This set of
ciphers covers a wide range of diﬀerent design principles and includes a number of
recent proposals with interesting properties, e.g. Simon/Speck [36], Robin/Fantomas
[153] and Sparx [106]. We collected between two and up to 24 implementations of
each cipher to account for diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between execution time, RAM footprint,
and code size. For nine out of the 19 ciphers we have not only C implementations,
but also optimized assembly code for the three platforms we consider. In total, our
repository includes over 250 implementations, of which we developed roughly half
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from scratch. The source code of all our implementations is available under GPL
and can be downloaded from the CryptoLUX wiki using the given link1.
Third, we report detailed performance, RAM footprint, and code size ﬁgures of
the 19 ciphers, which we generated with the help of our benchmarking toolsuite. In
addition, we deﬁne two typical usage scenarios that aim to resemble security-related
operations commonly performed by real-world IoT devices. The results we obtained
shed a new light on the relative eﬃciency of lightweight block ciphers because:
1. some of our implementations are signiﬁcantly faster or smaller than that of
other survey and benchmarking eﬀorts, and
2. we include a few designs that have been published only very recently.
Since lightweight cryptography is a rapidly progressing area of research, we also
maintain a web page [93] with the most recent results, which gets automatically
updated when users provide new implementations. Our framework allows the user
to deﬁne a custom Figure of Merit (FOM) according to which an overall ranking of
ciphers can be assembled. The FOM metric can assign diﬀerent weights to execution
time, RAM footprint, and code size, and may even consider (cryptanalytic) security
aspects.
Our results allow one to infer some interesting relations between cipher de-
sign principles and performance ﬁgures, and, in this way, contribute to a better
understanding of how to design and implement lightweight block ciphers.
3.2 Benchmarking Framework
Most papers introducing a new block cipher report some kind of results of some kind of
performance evaluation on some kind of platform using some kind of implementation.
These results are then used by the authors to claim that the proposed cipher has
some kind of “advantage” over existing ciphers or compares “favorably” with the
state of the art. However, such comparisons are little meaningful in the real world
since it is not easily possible to take diﬀerences in the characteristics of the target
platforms or diﬀerences in the simulation/measurement conditions into account.
Consequently, it is diﬃcult to assess the relative eﬃciency of the numerous proposals
for lightweight ciphers in a fair and consistent fashion. This motivated us to develop
FELICS (see Chapter 2), which allows for a uniﬁed evaluation of a large number
of candidates by collecting accurate and comprehensive results for execution time,
RAM footprint, and code size. The toolsuite is currently able to extract these metrics
from implementations for 8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP430, and 32-bit ARM Cortex-M
processors, but other platforms could be supported as well. We make the full source
code of the benchmarking framework available under GPL to facilitate its acceptance
in the cryptographic research community and to maximize transparency in the
evaluation of lightweight block ciphers.
1All results reported in this chapter are based on version 1.1.20 of the FELICS framework, which
can be downloaded from https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/File:FELICS.zip
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As stated in the previous section, we consider benchmarking results obtained with
C implementations to be useful for cipher designers and for cryptographic engineers
who prefer portable C code over platform-optimized assembly code. Since cipher
designers tend to write reference implementations in ANSI C, the eﬀort of evaluating
a new cipher boils down to adapting the C source code to meet the requirements of
the framework. However, benchmarks generated with C implementations do often
not reﬂect the full potential of a lightweight cipher because ANSI C can not eﬃciently
express multi-word arithmetic operations and certain bit manipulations. In addition,
the quality of the C compiler (i.e. its ability to apply sophisticated optimizations)
may impact the relative performance of lightweight ciphers. To mitigate these
issues, and to serve cryptographic engineers who are primarily interested in high
speed rather than high portability, the toolsuite supports the benchmarking of hand-
optimized assembly implementations for the three considered platforms. We had
both C and assembly implementations available for nine of the 19 lightweight ciphers
we benchmarked; the remaining 10 ciphers were evaluated using C source codes only.
In total, we analyzed more than 250 diﬀerent C and assembly implementations of
19 lightweight block ciphers. We make the full source code of all implementations
available under GPL to ensure the reproducibility of our results and, in this way,
increase the transparency and trustability of our evaluation process.
3.2.1 Usage Scenarios
Besides the evaluation of the four basic operations of a block cipher (i.e. encryption,
decryption, encryption key schedule, and decryption key schedule), the benchmarking
framework also supports more advanced forms of assessment based on usage scenarios.
A usage scenario should implement some common security service with practical
relevance for the IoT and utilize the basic cipher operations. In this way, it is possible
to obtain realistic benchmarking results that are meaningful in the real world. The
results reported in Section 3.4 are based on two simple usage scenarios, which we
describe below. Further usage scenarios can be easily added thanks to the modular
design of the benchmarking framework.
3.2.1.1 Scenario 1: Communication Protocol
This scenario covers the need for secure communication between two IoT devices such
as two sensor nodes in a WSN. It is assumeed that the sensitive data is encrypted
and decrypted using a lightweight block cipher in CBC mode of operation. Since
standard communication protocols for the IoT, such as IEEE 802.15.4 [170] and
ZigBee [393], are characterized by low transmission rates and small packet sizes, we
assume the plaintext to have a length of 128 bytes (i.e. 1024 bits) in this scenario.
There is no need for a padding scheme because the length of the plaintext is a
multiple of both 64 and 128 bits, which are the two block sizes we consider in this
chapter. Furthermore, we assume that the master key resides in RAM and that
the round keys (obtained through the operation for key schedule) are also kept in
RAM for later use by the encryption or decryption operation. The plaintext and
initialization vector for CBC mode shall also be in the device’s RAM at the beginning
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of the scenario. In order to reduce the RAM footprint, the encryption is performed
in place, which means the plaintext gets overwritten by the ciphertext (and vice
versa for decryption). However, the key schedule does not modify the master key.
3.2.1.2 Scenario 2: Challenge-Response Authentication
This scenario is inspired by a simple authentication protocol where an IoT device
proves that it is in possession of a secret key by encrypting a challenge using a block
cipher. In real-world settings, the IoT device can, for example, be an RFID tag (see
e.g. [123]) or a smart card. In this scenario we assume that a lighteight block cipher
is used in CTR mode to encrypt 128 bits of data. The device has the full round
key stored in ﬂash memory, which means there is no need to store the master key
and also no key schedule operation has to be performed. Both the 128-bit plaintext
to be encrypted and the counter value are held in RAM at the beginning of the
execution. In order to reduce the RAM footprint, the encryption is done in place,
i.e. the plaintext gets overwritten by the ciphertext.
3.3 Analyzed Ciphers
Since our aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the relation between basic
design methodologies for lightweight ciphers and the resulting software performance
on resource-limited IoT devices, we selected 19 ciphers that represent a wide variety
of design approaches based on Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPNs) and Feistel
Networks (FNs). A classical example of an SPN is the AES [250, 98], but other
designs for the S-box and the linear layer are possible, as demonstrated by PRESENT
[58], Robin, and Fantomas [153]. The overall structure of an SPN-based cipher can
also vary while still maintaining a round function consisting of an S-box layer and
a linear layer: LED [157] adds key material every four rounds only, while PRINCE
[62] implements a property called α-reﬂection, which minimizes the overhead for
decryption on top of encryption. Furthermore, it is also possible to build an SPN
using only modular Addition, Rotation, and XOR (ARX), as was done by the
designers of Sparx [106]. An FN, on the other hand, can be designed by utilizing
a small SPN as the Feistel function, as in LBlock [386] and Piccolo [321], or with
simple arithmetic and logical operations, as in Simon [36] and ARX designs like
HIGHT [167], RC5 [296], and Speck [36]. These operations may be data-dependent
like in RC5. A variant of the FN is the Generalized FN, which uses more than two
branches. The way the branches are mixed at the end of each round can consist of a
simple rotation (HIGHT) or a dedicated permutation optimizing diﬀusion (TWINE
[344], Piccolo). A high number of branches allows the use of very simple Feistel
functions like in TWINE and HIGHT.
Besides representing a wide variety of diﬀerent design approaches, most of the 19
lightweight ciphers we selected for our evaluation have a certain property or feature
that makes them particularly interesting for use in the IoT. We intentionally did not
restrict our selection to software-oriented ciphers and included some designs that
were developed for eﬃciency in hardware, e.g. Piccolo, PRESENT, and PRINCE.
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Cipher Year
Block Key Round Rounds Security
Type Target
size size key size level
AES 1998 128 128 1408 10 0.70 SPN SW, HW
Chaskey 2014 128 128 0 8/16 0.87/0.43 Feistel SW
Fantomas 2014 128 128 0 12 NA SPN SW
HIGHT 2006 64 128 1088 32 0.81 Feistel HW
LBlock 2011 64 80 1024 32 0.72 Feistel HW, SW
LEA 2013 128 128 3072 24 0.63 Feistel SW, HW
LED 2011 64 80 0 48 NA SPN HW, SW
Piccolo 2011 64 80 864 25 0.56 Feistel HW
PRESENT 2007 64 80 2048 31 0.84 SPN HW
PRIDE 2014 64 128 0 20 NA SPN SW
PRINCE 2012 64 128 192 12 0.83 SPN HW
RC5∗ 1994 64 128 1344 20 0.80 Feistel SW
RECTANGLE 2015 64 80/128 1664 25 0.72 SPN HW, SW
RoadRunneR 2015 64 80/128 0 10/12 0.5/0.58 Feistel SW
Robin/Robin⋆ 2014 128 128 0 16 1/NA SPN SW
Simon 2013 64 96/128 1344/1408 42/44 0.71/0.70 Feistel HW, SW
Sparx 2016 64/128 128 1600/4224 24/32 0.62/0.68 Feistel SW
Speck 2013 64 96/128 832/864 26/27 0.73/0.74 Feistel SW, HW
TWINE 2011 64 80 1152 36 0.64 Feistel HW, SW
∗ We use RC5 with increased number of rounds, RC5-20.
Table 3.1: Overview of the 19 lightweight block ciphers considered in this evaluation.
Block, key and round key sizes are expressed in bits. Security level is the ratio of
the number of rounds broken in a single key setting to the total number of rounds.
The device population of the IoT is very heterogenous and shows extreme diﬀerences
in terms of computational capabilities and resources. Some devices are so constrained
that cryptographic operations can only be implemented in hardware (e.g. RFID
tags), while other devices are powerful enough to run cryptographic software at
acceptable speed. Since all these devices should be able to interact and communicate
securely with each other, they have to use one and the same cipher. In order to
be suitable for the IoT, a lightweight block cipher needs to be eﬃcient in both
hardware and software. Thus, it makes sense to evaluate the software performance
of hardware-oriented ciphers and vice versa. In the following, we give an overview
of the 19 lightweight ciphers we selected for benchmarking and describe how they
can be implemented in software. The main characteristics of the candidates are
summarized in Table 3.1.
AES. The AES is standardized by NIST and the by far most-widely used block
cipher today. It has an SPN structure with an internal state of 128 bits represented
in the form of a (4× 4)-byte matrix. The SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and
AddRoundKey functions operate on the cipher’s state [250, 98]. To date, the best
single-key cryptanalysis of AES-128 is a meet-in-the-middle attack on seven rounds
out of ten [100]. Size-optimized implementations of the AES put the S-box and
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the round constants in lookup tables since they occupy just slightly more than 256
bytes. The source code of our size-optimized implementation mostly follows the
cipher pseudocode on all three considered architectures. Since T-tables are very large
(4 KB for either encryption or decryption), we did not include such implementations.
Chaskey. The Chaskey cipher is based on the π permutation of the Chaskey MAC
algorithm [244] that is currently considered for standardization by ISO/IEC. Said
π permutation is a generalized FN and uses ARX operations on 32-bit words. The
cipher has an Even-Mansour structure, which means there is no key schedule but
the master key is simply XORed to the internal state before and after π is applied.
Chaskey-LTS (Long Term Security) has twice as many rounds as Chaskey and is
recommended as a fallback in the case of cryptanalytic breakthroughs. Currently,
the best attack against Chaskey is a diﬀerential-linear attack on seven out of eight
rounds [214]. We benchmarked the C implementation provided by the designers,
which is straightforward thanks to the simple structure of the cipher. In addition, we
developed implementations in assembly language from scratch. The execution times
of both can be improved by unrolling several rounds at the cost of larger code size.
Fantomas. Fantomas is a 128-bit cipher belonging to the family of LS-designs [153].
Its linear layer consists in the parallel application of so-called “L-boxes,” while the
S-box is designed to simplify the implementation of masking, a countermeasure
against Diﬀerential Power Analysis (DPA). There is no key-schedule; the master
key is simply added in every round. At the time of writing this chapter, there
was to our knowledge no attack against Fantomas. A software implementation of
Fantomas usually combines lookup-table based L-boxes with bit-sliced S-boxes, which
are computed using a Feistel structure. Storing the four 512 B L-boxes in RAM
instead of ﬂash improves the execution time by a quarter on AVR and ARM. Our
implementations are based on the C source code provided by the designers.
HIGHT. The lightweight cipher HIGHT is a generalized FN with an ARX struc-
ture. More precisely, the Feistel functions perform only logical XOR and bitwise
rotations. The output of the Feistel functions is combined with the other branches
using either XOR or addition modulo 28 [167]. An impossible diﬀerential attack
breaks 26 out of 32 rounds of HIGHT [268]. All implementations we benchmarked
follow closely the speciﬁcation from [159], which modiﬁes the design of the original
paper [167]. The 128 7-bit δ constants are either computed when the key-schedule
function is called or precomputed and stored in ﬂash or RAM. An entirely unrolled
version with inlined auxiliary round functions F0 and F1 requires only half of the
cycles of the reference implementation. When implemented in assembly language,
the execution time decreases by 50% on MSP and by 10% on AVR and ARM,
respectively.
LBlock. LBlock is an FN with 32 rounds. The Feistel function consists of a logical
XOR with the round subkey, a substitution layer of eight diﬀerent S-boxes, and a
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permutation of eight nibbles. Furthermore, the content of one of the branches is
rotated by eight bits in each round. The chosen design trade-oﬀs between security
and performance led not only to hardware eﬃciency but also software eﬃciency [386].
To date, the best cryptanalytic result is obtained through an impossible diﬀerential
attack against 23 out of 32 rounds [65]. The benchmarked LBlock implementations
follow the speciﬁcation from [386]. Optimization strategies include performing
operations on 8, 16 or 32 bits when possible, storing the S-boxes in ﬂash or RAM,
and unrolling the loops. The best execution time on ARM is achieved by the
fully-unrolled implementation using 32-bit operations, with the S-boxes stored in
RAM.
LEA. The block cipher LEA uses a generalized FN with four 32-bit branches [166].
Designed for high-speed software encryption on 32-bit platforms, the cipher can be
eﬃciently implemented in hardware as well. The designers mention a boomerang
attack against 15 rounds, which is, to our knowledge, the best cryptanalytic result
to date. The benchmarked assembly implementations are based on three diﬀerent
optimization strategies: fast execution time, small code size, and a trade-oﬀ between
speed and size. These optimizations are facilitated by LEA’s simple structure
requiring only 32-bit operations.
LED. The AES-based cipher LED is aimed at very compact hardware implementa-
tion while maintaining reasonable performance in software. It represents the state by
a (4× 4)-nibble matrix and uses similar round transformations as the AES, except
that they are nibble-oriented. A distinguishing characteristic of LED is the absence of
a key schedule; the round keys are simply replaced by a part of the master key [157].
To the best of our knowledge, there are no attacks on LED-80. However, there
is a diﬀerential attack that covers 16/32 rounds of LED-64 and 24/48 rounds of
LED-128 [237]. The structural attack breaking 32/48 rounds of LED-128 proposed
in [107] is unlikely to be adaptable to LED-80. Our LED implementation combines
the SubCells, ShiftRows, and MixColumnsSerial operations into a table lookup to
reduce execution time.
Piccolo. Piccolo has a generalized FN structure with four 16-bit branches. To
improve diﬀusion, Piccolo uses a byte permutation between rounds. Piccolo’s Feistel
function consists of two S-box layers separated by a diﬀusion matrix [321]. The
currently best attack against Piccolo-80 is a meet-in-the-middle attack on 14 rounds,
which was presented by the designers. Our Piccolo implementation follows closely
the description provided in [321]. The arithmetic in GF(24) uses only XORs and two
small lookup tables for multiplication by two and three. Both the S-box and the key
schedule constants are stored in lookup tables. No speciﬁc loop unrolling is applied.
PRESENT. PRESENT has an SPN structure and comes with a bit-oriented
permutation layer. The nonlinear layer is based on a single 4-bit S-box that was
designed for eﬃciency in hardware [58]. A truncated diﬀerential attack against 26
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out of 31 rounds of PRESENT is described in [56]. Since the S-box is quite small,
a lookup table is used in all our implementations. However, its combination with
a bit permutation over a 64-bit word is diﬃcult to optimize without introducing
extremely large lookup tables (up to 1 MB for decryption). The size-optimized
implementation resembles the cipher’s pseudocode and was taken from [74]. In
general, the bit-oriented design of PRESENT makes C implementations very slow
unless one can aﬀord huge lookup tables. Our assembly implementations take
advantage of bit-manipulation instructions that the target devices support. On AVR,
the assembly implementation is around 12 times faster than the C counterpart, while
the MSP assembly version is even 19 times faster than the C code.
PRIDE. The block cipher PRIDE is an SPN with a strong linear layer and a
bit-sliced S-box, which are optimized for 8-bit microcontrollers [9]. It uses the
so-called FX construction with the same key for pre- and post-whitening and a
diﬀerent key as basis for the round keys. A diﬀerential attack on 19 out of 20 rounds
is described in [387]. The designers contributed a C implementation using only 8-bit
operations. PRIDE’s simple key schedule can be performed on the ﬂy to reduce the
RAM requirements at the cost of execution time. The S-box requires only bitwise
operations, and also the linear layer consisting of four transformations (one for every
16 bits of the state) can be implemented eﬃciently in software.
PRINCE. Similar to PRIDE, PRINCE is an FX construction, whereby the ﬁrst
two subkeys are used as whitening keys, while the third subkey is the 64-bit key for
a 12-round SPN called PRINCEcore . PRINCE introduced the α-reﬂection property:
encryption with a given key corresponds to decryption with a related key [62]. To
date, the best cryptanalytic result is a multiple diﬀerential attack on ten out of
the twelve rounds [72]. We implemented PRINCE as described in the original
paper [62, 72]. The optimization strategies we considered include the use of 8, 16,
32, and 64-bit operations where possible and diﬀerent amounts of loop unrolling. We
obtained the best performance with fully unrolled implementations based on 8-bit
operations for AVR and 16-bit operations for MSP. On ARM, the best execution
times were achieved using a partially unrolled version with 32-bit operations.
RC5. RC5 is an FN that uses data-dependent rotations [296]. Though RC5 was
designed before lightweight ciphers became popular, it is obviously suitable for
resource-constrained devices, which is conﬁrmed by its widespread use in sensor
networks [273]. The block and key sizes, as well as the number of rounds, can be
chosen freely. We use RC5-32/20/16, i.e. a version of RC5 that operates on two
32-bit words with a total of 20 rounds (40 half-rounds) and a 16-byte key. The
number of rounds was chosen so as to have a security margin of 0.80. RC5-32/12/16
can be attacked using diﬀerential cryptanalysis as demonstrated in [51]. This attack
can be extrapolated to 18 rounds, but would require almost the full codebook (264
ciphertexts). RC5 was implemented by slightly adapting the reference code provided
in [296]. Because of its elegant and simple design, there are not many possibilities for
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optimization. To explore diﬀerent trade-oﬀs, we fully unrolled the cipher’s operations
and precomputed the encryption-key-schedule array S to store it in ﬂash or RAM.
RECTANGLE. The block cipher RECTANGLE is an SPN that can be eﬃciently
implemented in both hardware and software thanks to its bit-sliced structure [391].
The nonlinear layer applies a 4-bit S-box to each column of the state, which is
represented as a (4 × 16)-bit matrix, while the linear layer rotates each row by a
diﬀerent amount. A diﬀerential attack that covers 18 out of 25 rounds is described
by its designers. RECTANGLE was implemented in C and assembly by its designers
using diﬀerent optimization strategies. The bit-sliced S-box is relatively fast in
software because it uses only bitwise operations. On the other hand, the simple
linear layer consists of three rotations of 16-bit words by 1, 12, and 13 bits, which
can be eﬃciently implemented on 8, 16, and 32-bit architectures.
RoadRunneR. RoadRunnerR has an FN structure that can be eﬃciently imple-
mented on 8-bit microcontrollers in a bit-sliced fashion [35]. The Feistel function
is an SPN, which consists of four 4-bit S-box layers, three linear layers, and three
key additions. There exists a high-probability truncated trail covering ﬁve rounds of
RoadRunneR, which can be exploited to attack a 7-round variant of RoadRunneR-
128 [388]. RoadRunneR can be easily implemented thanks to its simple structure
designed for 8-bit microcontrollers. The Feistel function consists of a bit-sliced S-box
and a linear layer; they use only bitwise operations and rotations of 8-bit values by
1 bit and are, thus, very eﬃcient. The round keys can be computed on the ﬂy to
reduce the RAM requirement.
Robin. Robin is a 128-bit block cipher similar to Fantomas, but its “L-boxes” are
involutions. The lookup table-based diﬀusion layers and the structure of the S-boxes
makes this family of ciphers good candidates for Boolean masking in bit-sliced
software implementations [153]. There exists a set of weak keys of density 2−32
for this cipher, which, if used, leads to an attack on the full primitive [210]. In
response to the so-called invariant subspace attack [210], the designers of Robin
proposed Robin⋆ [176], in which the 8-bit round constant is replaced by a 128-bit
round constant. Robin was implemented in diﬀerent ways that are based on the
C code provided by its designers. The two L-boxes are stored in ﬂash or RAM,
while the S-box layer is computed at each round using the Feistel structure. Robin⋆
requires more memory and is also slower than the original Robin due to expensive
derivation of the 128-bit round constants.
Simon. Simon uses an FN structure with a simple round function performing
bitwise XOR, bitwise AND and circular left shifts. It is optimized for high perfor-
mance in hardware implementations, but achieves excellent results in software as
well [36]. Diﬀerential attacks on 30 out of 42 rounds of Simon-64/96 and on 31 out
of 44 rounds of Simon-64/128 are presented in [80]. Optimized implementations of
Simon written in assembly (for AVR and MSP) and C (for ARM) were provided by
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its designers. The very simple structure of Simon enables various trade-oﬀs between
code size and execution time by combining a diﬀerent number of rounds in one loop
iteration.
Sparx. The block cipher Sparx is an SPN designed on basis of the recently
introduced Long Trail Strategy (LTS), which allows the use of a large and relatively
weak S-Box rather than a small and strong one. The ARX-based S-box consists
of one unkeyed Speck-32 round, while the linear layer is inspired from that of
Noekeon [97]. Its authors described an integral attack based on Todo’s division
property covering 15 out of 24 rounds of Sparx-64/128 and 22 out of 32 rounds
of Sparx-128/128 [106]. Sparx can be implemented using various optimization
strategies thanks to its simple and ﬂexible structure. We explored diﬀerent trade-oﬀs
between execution time and code size by rolling/unrolling the rounds of a step
function and performing one or two step functions at once. For a detailed description
of Sparx and its implementations, we refer the reader to Chapter 4.
Speck. Speck is designed to achieve excellent results in hardware and in software,
especially when executed on resource-constrained microcontrollers. It uses a Feistel
structure in which both branches are modiﬁed at each round using bitwise XOR,
modular addition, and circular shifts in both directions [36]. The best cryptanalytic
results against Speck-64/96 and Speck-64/128 are diﬀerential attacks targeting 19
and 20 rounds out of 26 and 27, respectively [332]. Speck has a very simple round
function that is extremely fast and takes just a few bytes of code. The optimized
implementations of Speck were written in assembly (AVR and MSP) and C (ARM)
and provided by the designers. Depending on the optimization goal, one or several
round functions can be unrolled to improve the execution time at the cost of a minor
increase in code size.
TWINE. TWINE is a generalized FN with 16 branches. The Feistel function
simply consists of a key addition and the application of a 4-bit S-box. The linear
layer is a nibble permutation with much higher diﬀusion than a nibble rotation as
used for example in HIGHT. The cipher’s design aims at small footprint in hardware
implementations and small ROM/RAM consumption in software [344]. The best
attack on TWINE-80 is a multi-dimensional zero-correlation linear attack on 23 out
of 35 rounds [376]. TWINE is a very simple cipher so that the speed-optimized
implementation is only marginally larger than the size-optimized one. It uses 4-bit
branches which, in the authors’ implementation [344], reside in separate bytes (so
that the entire state is twice as large). We wrote a size-optimized implementation
from scratch. Both implementations are small enough to run on all platforms.
3.4 Results
In this section, we ﬁrstly describe our evaluation methodology, including the Figure
of Merit (FOM) we developed to rank the candidates, and then we present and
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discuss the benchmarking results of 19 ciphers in the two scenarios described in
Section 3.2.1. Block sizes of 64 bits were used when available, otherwise 128 bits
were used. We only evaluated cipher versions with a key length of at least 80 bits,
which we consider the minimum security level acceptable for IoT applications.
3.4.1 Methodology
At the time of writing this chapter, our repository contained between two and 35
implementations for each cipher, and more than 250 in total. We benchmarked all
of them on each of the three devices in each scenario. It is possible to order the
implementations according to their execution time, RAM footprint, or code size in
any particular scenario on any device and we maintain a separate interactive web
page [93] where all these ordering options can be chosen. We have aggregated the
data by the following principles, which seem to be the most interesting ones:
• In Scenario 1, we implemented the full encryption and decryption including
key schedule. Then, for each implementation i and device d, we calculate the
performance parameter pi,d. The value pi,d aggregates the three metrics M = {
execution time, RAM consumption, code size } as follows:
pi,d =
∑
m∈M
wm
vi,d,m
mini(vi,d,m)
, (3.1)
where vi,d,m is the value of metric m for implementation i on device d; wm is
the relative weight of metric m and mini(vi,d,m) represents the minimum value
of the metric m from all considered implementations of all considered ciphers
on the same device d. For each cipher and each device we set wm = 1 (the
framework also allows one to choose other weights for the metrics; for example
the results in Table 3.3 are computed using a higher weight for execution time
than for RAM footprint and code size) and select the implementation with the
smallest pi,d. Finally, for each cipher and the selected set of implementations
i1, i2, i3 (one for each device) we calculate the Figure of Merit (FOM) value as
the average performance value over the three devices.
FOM(i1, i2, i3) =
pi1,AV R + pi2,MSP + pi3,ARM
3
(3.2)
Then, we sort the ciphers according to their FOM value (Table 3.2).
• In Scenario 2, we also select for each cipher and device the best implementation.
First, we select the most balanced implementation using Equation (3.1) and
wm = 1 (Table 3.4). In Table 3.5 we calculate pi,d a bit diﬀerently:
pi,d =
∑
m∈{code, RAM}
wm
vi,d,m
maxi(vi,d,m)
, (3.3)
where maxi(vi,d,m) is the maximum value of ﬂash memory (for the code size
metric) or RAM (for the RAM metric) available on device d (see Section 2.6).
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Thus, we essentially measure the fraction of the available memory occupied by
the implementation. Finally, in Table 3.5, the best implementation of a cipher
is the one with the smallest RAM footprint and code size, respectively.
Cipher AVR MSP ARM
Block Key Code RAM Time Code RAM Time Code RAM Time FOM
[b] [b] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.]
Encryption + Decryption (including key schedule)
Chaskey 128 128 1328 229 20622 900 222 16674 438 236 9851 4.0
Chaskey-LTS 128 128 1328 229 33102 904 222 25394 438 236 12859 4.6
Speck 64 96 966 294 39875 556 288 31360 492 308 15427 5.1
Speck 64 128 874 302 44895 572 296 32333 444 308 16505 5.2
Simon 64 96 1084 363 63649 738 360 47767 600 376 23056 7.0
Simon 64 128 1122 375 66613 760 372 49829 560 392 23930 7.2
RECTANGLE 64 80 1152 352 66722 812 398 44551 664 426 35286 8.0
RECTANGLE 64 128 1118 353 64813 826 404 44885 660 432 36121 8.0
LEA 128 128 1684 631 61020 1154 630 46374 524 664 17417 8.3
Sparx 64 128 1198 392 65539 966 392 36766 1200 424 40887 8.8
Sparx 128 128 1736 753 83663 1118 760 53936 1122 788 67581 13.2
HIGHT 64 128 1414 333 94557 1238 328 120716 1444 380 90385 14.8
AES 128 128 3010 408 58246 2684 408 86506 3050 452 73868 15.8
Fantomas 128 128 3520 227 141838 2918 222 85911 2916 268 94921 17.8
Robin 128 128 2474 229 184622 3170 238 76588 3668 304 91909 18.7
Robin⋆ 128 128 5076 271 157205 3312 238 88804 3860 304 103973 20.7
RC5-20 64 128 3706 368 252368 1240 378 386026 624 376 36473 20.8
PRIDE 64 128 1402 369 146742 2566 212 242784 2240 452 130017 22.8
RoadRunneR 64 80 2504 330 144071 3088 338 235317 2788 418 119537 23.3
RoadRunneR 64 128 2316 209 125635 3218 218 222032 2504 448 140664 23.4
LBlock 64 80 2954 494 183324 1632 324 263778 2204 574 140647 25.2
PRESENT 64 80 2160 448 245232 1818 448 202050 2116 470 274463 32.8
PRINCE 64 128 2412 367 288119 2028 236 386781 1700 448 233941 34.9
Piccolo 64 80 1992 314 407269 1354 310 324221 1596 406 294478 38.4
TWINE 64 80 4236 646 297265 3796 564 387562 2456 474 255450 40.0
LED 64 80 5156 574 2221555 7004 252 2065695 3696 654 594453 138.6
Table 3.2: Results for Scenario 1. Encrypt and decrypt 128 bytes of data using
CBC mode. Results of assembly implementations are in italics. For each cipher,
an optimal implementation on each architecture is selected. The Figure of Merit
(FOM) takes into account the three metrics (Code, RAM, and Time) on all platforms
(AVR, MSP, and ARM). The smaller the FOM, the better the implementations of
the cipher.
Deﬁning a fair Figure of Merit that considers various trade-oﬀs is a challeng-
ing task. The Figure of Adversarial Merit (FOAM) introduced in [186] combines
inherent security provided by cryptographic structures and components with their
implementation properties allowing the comparison of security-time-area trade-oﬀs
3.4 Results 77
Cipher AVR MSP ARM
Block Key Code RAM Time Code RAM Time Code RAM Time FOM
[b] [b] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.]
Encryption + Decryption (including key schedule)
Chaskey 128 128 1328 229 20622 900 222 16674 472 240 9313 5.4
Chaskey-LTS 128 128 1328 229 33102 904 222 25394 576 228 11076 6.5
Speck 64 96 966 294 39875 664 290 29611 492 308 15427 7.5
Speck 64 128 1112 302 41103 592 298 31832 444 308 16505 7.8
Simon 64 96 1084 363 63649 758 362 47266 600 376 23056 10.7
Simon 64 128 1122 375 66613 780 374 49328 560 392 23930 11.0
LEA 128 128 1684 631 61020 1154 630 46374 696 644 16192 11.5
RECTANGLE 64 80 1152 352 66722 832 400 44050 664 426 35286 12.4
RECTANGLE 64 128 1118 353 64813 846 406 44384 660 432 36121 12.5
Sparx 64 128 1426 392 61955 986 394 36265 1200 424 40887 13.4
Sparx 128 128 1736 753 83663 1710 758 46640 2290 784 53109 19.6
AES 128 128 3010 408 58246 2684 408 86506 3080 452 73579 23.6
HIGHT 64 128 1414 333 94557 1258 330 120215 1444 380 90385 25.1
Fantomas 128 128 5892 267 111677 4164 234 56788 4604 308 70142 26.3
Robin 128 128 4944 271 146149 3170 238 76588 3572 1312 74665 28.5
Robin⋆ 128 128 5076 271 157205 3312 238 88804 3724 1316 85247 31.1
RC5-20 64 128 3706 368 252368 1240 378 386026 624 376 36473 37.0
PRIDE 64 128 3384 373 111155 2918 380 226135 2240 452 130017 38.8
RoadRunneR 64 80 2504 330 144071 3088 338 235317 2788 418 119537 39.2
RoadRunneR 64 128 2316 209 125635 2952 362 218909 2504 448 140664 39.8
LBlock 64 80 2954 494 183324 1632 324 263778 2204 574 140647 43.7
PRESENT 64 80 2160 448 245232 1838 450 201549 2528 502 270464 59.3
PRINCE 64 128 5358 374 243396 4174 240 357423 4372 504 201136 62.3
TWINE 64 80 4236 646 297265 3796 564 387562 2456 474 255450 70.8
Piccolo 64 80 1992 314 407269 1354 310 324221 1596 406 294478 71.9
LED 64 80 5156 574 2221555 7004 252 2065695 3696 654 594453 264.8
Table 3.3: Results for Scenario 1 (encryption of 128 bytes of data using CBC mode)
when using diﬀerent weights wm for the three metrics in Equation (3.1) to compute
the performance parameter pi, d. Namely, the code size and the RAM size have the
weights wcode = wRAM = 1, while the cycle count has the weight wcycle = 2. Results
of assembly implementations are in italics.
of hardware implementations. Although the FOAM is only suitable for hardware
implementations, a similar metric could be deﬁned for software by replacing area by
RAM consumption and/or code size.
3.4.2 Discussion of Results
In Scenario 1 (“bulk encryption”), the top-3 ciphers based on the FOM score are
Chaskey, Speck, and Simon; the FOM score of these ciphers is less than half of
the FOM score of the AES. Recall that the FOM score takes into account all three
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Cipher AVR MSP ARM
Block Key Code RAM Time Code RAM Time Code RAM Time FOM
[b] [b] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.]
Balanced (globally efficient)
Chaskey 128 128 624 80 1465 388 70 1153 216 76 524 4.4
Chaskey-LTS 128 128 624 80 2265 390 70 1690 216 76 648 5.0
Speck 64 96 506 53 2647 328 48 1959 256 56 1003 5.1
Speck 64 128 452 53 2917 332 48 2013 276 60 972 5.2
Simon 64 96 600 57 4269 460 56 2905 416 64 1335 7.0
Simon 64 128 608 57 4445 468 56 3015 388 64 1453 7.2
LEA 128 128 906 80 4023 722 78 2814 520 112 1171 8.0
RECTANGLE 64 128 602 56 4381 480 54 2651 444 76 2365 8.5
RECTANGLE 64 80 606 56 4433 480 54 2651 444 76 2365 8.5
Sparx 64 128 662 51 4397 580 52 2261 654 72 2338 8.7
Sparx 128 128 1184 74 5478 1036 72 3057 1468 104 2935 13.0
RC5-20 64 128 1068 63 8812 532 60 15925 372 64 1919 14.8
AES 128 128 1246 81 3408 1170 80 4497 1348 124 4044 14.9
HIGHT 64 128 636 56 6231 636 52 7117 670 100 5532 15.9
Fantomas 128 128 2496 108 5919 1920 78 3602 2184 184 4550 19.6
Robin 128 128 2530 108 7813 1942 80 4913 2188 184 6250 23.0
Robin⋆ 128 128 2580 106 8052 1980 80 5262 2272 196 6417 23.7
RoadRunneR 64 80 1420 61 7329 1536 76 13034 1900 172 7234 25.5
PRIDE 64 128 2064 91 5727 1842 68 13108 1592 148 7446 25.6
RoadRunneR 64 128 1184 59 6289 1724 74 13266 1436 164 8573 26.3
LBlock 64 80 1440 64 11183 804 58 16101 1220 284 9015 28.7
PRESENT 64 80 1294 56 16849 1072 58 12347 1222 80 17105 38.6
PRINCE 64 128 1362 72 20060 1576 76 24246 1384 280 15165 44.0
Piccolo 64 80 1114 72 25820 784 70 20081 688 112 17965 44.2
TWINE 64 80 1528 64 21701 1922 136 23662 1180 156 15673 44.6
LED 64 80 2548 267 135061 4422 104 121850 2172 352 35891 149.2
Table 3.4: Results for Scenario 2. Encrypt 128 bits of data using CTR mode.
Results of assembly implementations are in italics. For each cipher, an optimal
implementation on each architecture is selected. The Figure of Merit (FOM) takes
into account the three metrics (Code, RAM, and Time) on all platforms (AVR, MSP,
and ARM). The smaller the FOM, the better the implementations of the cipher.
metrics (i.e. execution time, RAM footprint, and code size) and does so across
three platforms (AVR, MSP, and ARM). Of course, when looking at performance,
RAM footprint, or code size individually, or when looking at AVR, MSP, or ARM
individually, the speciﬁc ranking can diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the overall ranking
based on the FOM score. Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that several
(up to 35) diﬀerent implementations exist for one and the same cipher. Since these
implementations are based on diﬀerent optimization strategies, they can (and usually
do) perform diﬀerently on the three platforms. It may also happen that one and the
same cipher is slower on 16-bit MSP than on 8-bit AVR (e.g. HIGHT, AES, RC5),
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which is not a mistake but simply the result of considering RAM equally important
as execution time. On each platform, we collected our benchmarking results using
the implementation that achieved the best (i.e. smallest) FOM score.
When having a closer look at the results on AVR, it turns out that the top-ranked
algorithms are very similar in terms of RAM footprint, which means the overall
rank is primarily determined by execution time and code size. Speck has roughly
twice the execution time of Chaskey, while Simon carries a performance penalty by
a factor of approximately three. A somewhat surprising result is that the AES beats
Simon on AVR, but its high performance comes at the expense of relatively large
code size. Also LEA and Sparx are slightly faster than Simon when comparing the
versions with 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys. All other ciphers have an execution
time that is more than three times worse than that of Chaskey. The situation is
somewhat similar on MSP in the sense that Chaskey is the fastest cipher, followed by
Speck. Simon is again on the sixth position, outperformed by RECTANGLE, LEA
and Sparx with 64-bit blocks. However, the MSP results also show a disadvantage
of Chaskey, namely its relatively large code size, which is roughly twice the size
of Speck. On the other hand, in terms of RAM footprint, PRIDE, RoadRunneR,
and Fantomas perform very well on the MSP430 platform. Finally, on ARM, the
winners in the performance competition are Chaskey, Speck, and LEA. In addition,
these three ciphers also have the top positions in terms of code size, which is mainly
due to their extremely simple round function operating on 32-bit words. All other
algorithms are both slower and larger than LEA.
The overall ranking in Scenario 2 (“challenge-response authentication”), shown
in Table 3.4, is similar to that of Scenario 1. The three top spots are held by the
same ciphers in the same order, i.e. Chaskey is the best overall performer and Speck
the runner-up. Simon secured the third place, even though on all three platforms
some other ciphers show better execution times. However, Simon proﬁts from its
relatively small code size and low RAM footprint. Positions 4 to 6 are held by LEA,
RECTANGLE and Sparx with FOM scores that are between 1.82 and 1.98 times
worse than Chaskey’s FOM score. All other ciphers have a FOM score that is more
than three times higher than that of Chaskey. Table 3.5 summarizes the results
of the implementations with minimal RAM footprint and code size for each of the
19 ciphers. Speck turns out to be the most lightweight candidate and, therefore,
the best choice for applications where size is the primary constraint. On all three
platforms, Speck has a code size of below 500 bytes and a RAM footprint of at
most 60 bytes. On the other hand, as shown in Table 3.5, when RAM footprint and
code size are of primary concern and execution time does not matter much, then
Speck is clearly the best choice. Also Simon is size-wise consistently good on all
three platforms.
Caveats. The results of any “survey-and-benchmark” work in lightweight cryptog-
raphy, including ours, always reﬂect the state of research at a certain time, namely
the time when it was written. However, the eﬃcient implementation of (lightweight)
ciphers is an active area of research that is likely to provide new approaches for
speeding up one or more of the 19 candidates considered in this chapter. The AES
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Cipher AVR MSP ARM
Block Key Code RAM Time Code RAM Time Code RAM Time
[b] [b] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.]
Small code size & RAM
AES 128 128 1246 81 3408 1170 80 4497 952 140 38191
Chaskey 128 128 624 80 1465 388 70 1153 180 76 785
Chaskey-LTS 128 128 624 80 2265 390 70 1690 180 76 961
Fantomas 128 128 1712 76 9689 1412 74 5506 1384 100 8335
HIGHT 64 128 636 56 6231 636 52 7117 528 88 14244
LBlock 64 80 864 55 17933 804 58 16101 586 84 13818
LEA 128 128 906 80 4023 722 78 2814 528 88 1714
LED 64 80 1162 95 284063 950 102 170135 758 120 114723
Piccolo 64 80 1042 74 32603 784 70 20081 688 112 17965
PRESENT 64 80 1294 56 16849 802 62 513599 582 80 209946
PRIDE 64 128 834 62 14234 944 68 22551 656 96 16310
PRINCE 64 128 1384 70 20812 1518 70 27311 1158 136 22826
RC5-20 64 128 742 65 22635 524 54 23318 372 64 1919
RECTANGLE 64 128 648 54 4665 480 54 2651 464 68 3004
RECTANGLE 64 80 648 54 4665 480 54 2651 464 68 3004
RoadRunneR 64 80 1420 61 7329 628 88 67497 540 140 21475
RoadRunneR 64 128 1112 58 7023 620 82 25577 598 80 16334
Robin 128 128 1710 78 12513 1406 72 7051 1400 112 10070
Robin⋆ 128 128 1754 80 14285 1452 76 8634 1432 112 11679
Simon 64 96 534 57 4521 416 56 3199 324 56 2587
Simon 64 128 542 57 4709 424 56 3323 340 60 2308
Sparx 64 128 662 51 4397 496 54 2623 482 76 3434
Sparx 128 128 1212 73 5602 904 80 3273 932 108 4085
Speck 64 96 448 53 2829 328 48 1959 256 56 1159
Speck 64 128 452 53 2917 332 48 2013 264 56 1029
TWINE 64 80 788 56 42434 850 56 45273 530 72 29986
Table 3.5: Results for Scenario 2. Encrypt 128 bits of data using CTR mode.
Results of assembly implementations are in italics. For each cipher, an optimal
implementation on each architecture is selected.
serves as a good example on how progress in software optimization techniques can
yield signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient implementations. Similar progress could also make
one or more of our lightweight ciphers much faster than anticipated today. This is the
very reason why we maintain a web page [93] where the reader can ﬁnd up-to-date
benchmarking results and cipher rankings. Furthermore, our results reﬂect, to a
certain degree, also the programming skills of the implementers and how much eﬀort
they put into optimization. We invite the cryptographic research community to send
us improved implementations of the 19 ciphers covered in this chapter. In addition,
we also welcome implementations of new ciphers.
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3.4.3 Comparison with other Benchmarking Results
Many of the ciphers we study in this paper have already been evaluated on AVR, MSP,
or ARM processors before, either separately or within some other benchmarking
project. It is not easily possible to compare performance ﬁgures across various
frameworks and implementations because the evaluation methodology is usually
diﬀerent and also the optimization eﬀorts typically vary. The importance of a
consistent evaluation framework and methodology becomes quickly evident when
taking the AES counter-mode implementation for Cortex-M3 processors in [314,
Section 3] as example. This implementation uses the T-table approach in combination
with a careful optimization of the memory accesses and achieves, according to [314],
an average execution time of 659.4 clock cycles for a single-block encryption with a
128-bit key. However, this cycle count was only reached by conﬁguring the Cortex-M3
processor to have a reduced number of wait states for memory accesses, which favors
implementations using T-tables, but limits the maximum frequency the processor
can be clocked with. On the other hand, our benchmarking framework operates the
Cortex-M3 with the full wait states (so that it can be clocked with its maximum
frequency) and reports an execution time of 1641 clock cycles for this T-table
implementation. In addition, it must be taken into account that using T-tables
entails a large memory footprint, which worsens the FOM score. This also explains
why an implementation using only Sbox look-ups can reach a better FOM score than
the T-table approach, despite the fact that T-tables have the potential to reduce the
execution time by a factor of more than two.
The most notable diﬀerences between our benchmarks and previous implementa-
tion results obtained on AVR/MSP/ARM are the following. The BLOC project’s
[74] MSP implementations of LBlock, Piccolo, and Twine are slightly worse than ours,
whereas the implementations of AES, HIGHT, and PRESENT are much slower. On
the other hand, the AVR assembly implementations of PRESENT and AES from the
ECRYPT project [119, 121] are slightly slower than our assembly implementations,
while our implementation of HIGHT is twice as fast as the assembly implementation
from [121] and ten times faster than the assembly implementation from [119].
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a survey and benchmark of 19 lightweight block ciphers
based on two usage scenarios that are common for secure communication in the IoT.
In particular, we studied their implementation aspects on representative 8, 16, and
32-bit platforms.
The metrics (binary code size, RAM footprint and execution time) are extracted
using the FELICS benchmarking framework introduced in Chapter 2. For full
transparency, the source code of the framework, together with the implementations
of the evaluated ciphers, are available under an open-source license. We strongly
encourage the community to use and contribute to our framework, since it allows
easy integration and evaluation of new C and assembly implementations. We are
committed to maintaining a web page [93] that summarizes the latest results obtained
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by each submitted implementation.
Based on the benchmarking results, we inferred some interesting information
regarding the link between the design decisions and performance ﬁgures. In par-
ticular, our results show that state-of-the-art designs based on simple operations
(addition/AND, rotation, and XOR) like Chaskey, Speck and Simon are not only
very fast, but also extremely small in terms of both code size and RAM requirements.
Furthermore, they perform consistently well on all three platforms, which makes
them excellent candidates for a lightweight cipher to secure the IoT.
Designers of new ciphers should focus on simple round functions that use as
few operations as possible and reach a good security level after several iterations.
The most eﬃcient operations to be employed are the bitwise logical operations and
modular addition. The cost of rotations depends on the target architecture and the
rotation amount. One should use rotations by some carefully chosen values (e.g.
7, 8, 9, 15, or 16 for a 32-bit word) to reduce the execution time and code size on
architectures that support only rotations by one bit at a time. The above-mentioned
operations do not require any memory access, provided that the cipher’s state can
be kept into the internal registers. Finally, lookup tables of any size should be
avoided as they increase the code size and/or RAM footprint at the cost of a memory
load. These requirements lead to the following three categories of designs: ARX –
Add-Rotate-XOR (e.g. Chaskey, Speck, LEA, Sparx), AndRX – AND-Rotate-XOR
(e.g. Simon), and bit-sliced (e.g. RECTANGLE).
Further work may include the addition of new ciphers, integration of countermea-
sures against physical attacks, extending the framework’s capabilities to benchmark
other lightweight symmetric primitives (stream ciphers, hash functions, authenticated
encryption algorithms) and the support of additional processors.
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4.1 Introduction
Sparx is a family of lightweight block ciphers designed to be secure and yet eﬃcient
on a variety of resource-constrained devices. As the name suggests, Sparx is a
Substitution-Permutation (SP) network and uses only three operations: addition,
rotations, and XOR (ARX). Thanks to the Long Trail Strategy (LTS) [106], Sparx is
the ﬁrst ARX cipher that was designed to have provable bounds against diﬀerential
and linear cryptanalysis. The family has three instances depending on the block and
key sizes.
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While the primary design goal of Sparx was security, the eﬃciency of its software
implementations on 8-, 16-, and 32-bit microcontrollers played an important role in
shaping this family of lightweight block ciphers. Hence, in this chapter we elaborate
on the implementation-related characteristics of Sparx and how software eﬃciency
inﬂuenced the ﬁnal design. Then, we provide implementation details and results for
two instances of Sparx, namely Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128.
4.2 Short Description
We use Sparx-n/k to refer to the instance of Sparx that operates on a block of n
bits and has a key of k bits. The high-level structure of Sparx depicted in Figure 4.1
works on 32-bit words. Hence, the cipher’s state is represented on w = n/32 words,
while the key consists of v = k/32 words. The encryption function is obtained by
iterating ns times a step, which consists of a substitution layer and a linear mixing
layer. The substitution layer applies ra rounds of a so-called arx-box (preceded by
a key addition) to each word of the state, while the linear layer mixes the cipher’s
state. The linear layer of the last step is followed by the addition of a post-whitening
key to the cipher’s state. The key schedule, shown in Figure 4.2, uses the function
Kv to generate v round keys in each iteration. The main parameters of the three
instances of Sparx are summarized in Table 4.1.
Sparx-64/128 Sparx-128/128 Sparx-128/256
# State words w 2 4 4
# Key words v 4 4 8
# Steps ns 8 8 10
# Rounds ra 3 4 4
# Round keys words 50 132 164
Table 4.1: Sparx parameters.
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Figure 4.1: The structure of Sparx encryption.
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Figure 4.2: The structure of Sparx key schedule.
4.3 Choosing the arx-box A
Once the high-level structure (see Figure 4.1) of the cipher was set, we had to
choose an arx-box that provides good cryptographic properties (i.e. minimizes the
diﬀerential and linear probabilities), while facilitating eﬃcient implementations. We
considered two possible structures, namely MARX-2 and Speckey, which were
introduced by Biryukov et al. [274]. MARX-2 is based on the MIX function of
Skein [124], while Speckey is a variant of Speck-32. The two structures are shown
in Figure 4.3.
≪ 1
⊞
≪ 2
⊕
≪ 7
⊞
≪ 3
⊕
(a) MARX-2.
≫ 7
⊞
≪ 2
⊕
(b) Speckey.
Figure 4.3: The candidate 32-bit arx-boxes, MARX-2 and Speckey. The branch
size is 8 bits for MARX-2 and 16 bits for Speckey.
Although both structures process a 32-bit word, their branches have diﬀerent
sizes. MARX-2 has four 8-bit branches, while Speckey uses two 16-bit branches.
Another major diﬀerence between the two stems from the number of elementary
operations used. MARX-2 needs two additions modulo 28, two bitwise XORs, and
four rotations (by 1, 2, 3, and 7 bits to the left). Moreover, MARX-2 also performs
a branch swap. Speckey requires only one addition modulo 216, one bitwise XOR,
and two rotations (by 2 bits to the left and by 7 bits to the right). The execution
time in number of clock cycles of both MARX-2 and Sparx is given in Table 4.2.
These values correspond to implementations where each branch is stored in its own
register. Consequently, the implementations of these two structures do not require
additional registers. For more details on the cost of each elementary operation, we
refer the reader to Chapter 5.
The above-mentioned implementation properties of MARX-2 and Speckey
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AVR MSP ARM
MARX-2 20 25 17
Sparx 16 9 7
Table 4.2: Comparison between the execution time (in cycles) of MARX-2 and
Speckey.
indicate that Speckey yields much better implementations than MARX-2. Therefore,
we selected Speckey for the arx-box of Sparx. An even better choice for the
overall implementation eﬃciency would have been a primitive that operates on 32-bit
branches because this word size yields better execution times on all platforms (see
Section 5.3.2). However, when we designed the cipher, there was no such construction
with provable diﬀerential and linear bounds for enough rounds.
In order to reduce the pressure on registers, we decided to execute all the arx-
boxes of a branch before processing another branch of the same step. This approach
reduces the number of stack operations required to switch between branches when
the state does not fully ﬁt into the available registers of a microcontroller. On the
other hand, it does not negatively aﬀect the performance of an implementation when
there are enough registers to store the entire state of the cipher.
4.4 Choosing the Linear Layer λw
The linear layer was selected such that it minimizes the probability of diﬀerential and
linear trails as well as the number of steps of the integral characteristic found with
the division property. The Feistel functions L and L′ are used by the linear layers λ2
and λ4, respectively. They provide diﬀusion and yield eﬃcient implementations on
8-, 16-, and 32-bit architectures. Both L and L′ rely on a Lai-Massey structure. The
function L′ is a generalization of L, which is borrowed from Noekeon [97]. The
linear layer λ2 used by Sparx-64/128 is shown in Figure 4.4a, while the linear layer
λ4 used by Sparx-128/128 and Sparx-128/256 is shown in Figure 4.4b. The two
Feistel functions L and L′ are shown in Figure 4.5.
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(b) λ4.
Figure 4.4: The linear layers of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128.
The L transformation maps a 32-bit value x to x ⊕ (x≪ 8) ⊕ (x≫ 8). Its
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Figure 4.5: The Feistel functions used by the linear layers of Sparx.
alternative representation shown in Figure 4.5a works on two 16-bit branches a and
b, which are transformed to a⊕
(
(a⊕ b)≪ 8
)
and b⊕
(
(a⊕ b)≪ 8
)
, respectively.
Similarly to L, the L′ function can be deﬁned in two ways. The representation
shown in Figure 4.5b transforms the four 16-bit branches a, b, c, d to c⊕ t, b⊕ t, a⊕ t,
and d⊕t, where t = (a⊕b⊕c⊕d)≪ 8. In order to deﬁne the representation of L′ that
works on 32-bit values, let L′⋆ be the function that skips the ﬁnal branch swap of L′. If
x || y is the concatenation of two 32-bit words and t =
(
(x⊕y)≫ 8
)
⊕
(
(x⊕y)≪ 8
)
,
then L′⋆(x || y) = x⊕ t || y ⊕ t. Furthermore, L′⋆ can be written using L as follows:
L′⋆(x || y) = y ⊕ L(x⊕ y) || x⊕ L(x⊕ y).
4.5 Key Schedule
The key schedule was designed to quickly mix the bits of the master key into the round
keys. It reuses the arx-box A to reduce the code size of software implementations.
The additions modulo 216 provide diﬀusion, while the addition of the round number
prevents slide attacks [54]. The expensive operations of the key schedule Kv are the
branch swaps. The key schedule of Sparx-64/128 is shown in Figure 4.6a, while the
key schedule of Sparx-128/128 is given in Figure 4.6b.
k0 k1 k2 k3
A
⊞
⊞
⊞r + 1
(a) Key schedule of Sparx-64/128.
k0 k1 k2 k3
A A
⊞
⊞
⊞
⊞
⊞r + 1
(b) Key schedule of Sparx-128/128.
Figure 4.6: The key schedules of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128.
It is important to note that one iteration of the key schedules of Sparx-64/128
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and Sparx-128/128 generates four key words of 32 bits each. On the other hand,
one step of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128 requires 6 and 16 round key words,
respectively. The ﬁnal key addition uses 2 round key words for Sparx-64/128 and 4
round key words for Sparx-128/128. Hence, the number of key words generated by
the key schedule of Sparx-64/128 is not synchronized with the number of key words
required in the step function. Consequently, its rolled implementations consume
more code size (to compute the last two round keys outside the main loop) or waste
some clock cycles (to execute one full iteration and discard two key words).
4.6 Implementation
Next we describe how Sparx can be eﬃciently implemented on three resource-
constrained microcontrollers widely used in the IoT, namely the 8-bit Atmel AT-
mega128, the 16-bit TI MSP430, and the 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3. These devices
are described in Section 2.6. We support the described optimization strategies with
performance ﬁgures extracted from assembly implementations of Sparx-64/128
and Sparx-128/128 using the FELICS open-source benchmarking framework (see
Chapter 2). We refer the reader to Chapter 3 for comparative performance ﬁgures
extracted from software implementations of 19 lightweight block ciphers.
4.6.1 Main Components
In order to eﬃciently implement Sparx on a resource-constrained embedded proces-
sor, it is important to have a good understanding of its instruction set architecture
(ISA). The number of general-purpose registers determines whether the entire ci-
pher’s state ﬁts into registers or if a part of it has to be held in RAM. Memory
operations are generally slower than register operations, consume more energy and
increase the vulnerability of an implementation to side-channel attacks as shown
in Chapter 6. Thus, the number of memory operations should be reduced as much
as possible. Ideally the state should only be read from memory at the beginning
of the cryptographic operation and written back at the end. The three targets we
implemented Sparx for have 32 8-bit, 12 16-bit, and 13 32-bit general-purpose
registers, which result in a total capacity of 256 bits, 192 bits, and 416 bits for AVR,
MSP, and ARM, respectively.
The Sparx family’s simple structure consists only of three components: the
arx-box A and its inverse A−1, the linear layer λ2 or λ4 (depending on the version),
and the key addition. The key addition (bitwise XOR) does not require additional
registers and its execution time is proportional to the ratio between the operand
width and the target device’s register width. The execution time in cycles and the
number of registers required to perform A, A−1, λ2, and λ4 on each target device
are given in Table 4.3.
The costly operation in terms of both execution time and number of required
registers is the linear layer. The critical point is reached for the 128-bit linear layer
λ4 on MSP, which requires 13 registers. Since this requirement is above the number
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Component
AVR MSP ARM
Cycles Registers Cycles Registers Cycles Registers
A 16 4 + 1 9 2 11 1 + 3
A−1 19 4 9 2 12 1 + 3
λ2 – 1-step 24 8 + 1 11 4 + 3 5 2 + 1
λ2 – 2-steps 12 8 7 4 + 1 3 2
λ4 – 1-step 48 16 + 2 36 8 + 1 16 4 + 5
λ4 – 2-steps 24 16 + 2 13 8 + 1 12 4 + 4
Table 4.3: Performance characteristics of the main components of Sparx.
of available registers, a part of the state has to be saved on the stack. Consequently,
the execution time increases by 5 cycles for each push – pop instruction pair.
A 2-step implementation uses a simpliﬁed linear layer without the most resource-
demanding part – the branch swaps. It processes the result of the left branch after
the ﬁrst step as the right branch of the second step and similarly the result of the
right branch after the ﬁrst step as the left branch of the second step. This technique
reduces the number of required registers and improves the execution time at the cost
of an increase in code size. The performance gain is a factor of 2 on AVR, 2.7 on
MSP, and 1.3 on ARM.
The linear transformations L and L′ exhibit interesting implementation properties.
For each platform there is a diﬀerent optimal way to perform them. The optimal way
to implement the linear layers on MSP is using the representations from Figure 4.5a
and Figure 4.5b. On ARM the optimal implementation performs the rotations directly
on 32-bit values. The function L can be executed on AVR using 12 XOR instructions
and no additional registers. On the other hand, the optimal implementation of L′
on AVR requires 2 additional registers and takes 24 cycles. The steps required to
eﬃciently compute L and L′ on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller are shown in Figure 4.7
x
⊕
x≪ 8
⊕
x≫ 8
L(x)
x0 x1 x2 x3
x1 x2 x3 x0
x3 x0 x1 x2
r0 r1 r2 r3
r0 = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 r1 = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2
r2 = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 r3 = x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3
Figure 4.7: Computation of L on 8-bit registers.
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x
t
t≪ 8
⊕
t≫ 8
u
⊕
x′
L′(x)
x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
t0 t1 t2 t3
t1 t2 t3 t0
t3 t0 t1 t2
u0 u1 u0 u1
x4 x5 x2 x3 x0 x1 x6 x7
r0 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7
u0 = x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x7 u1 = x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x6
r0 = u0 ⊕ x4 r1 = u1 ⊕ x5 r2 = u0 ⊕ x2 r3 = u1 ⊕ x3
r4 = u0 ⊕ x0 r5 = u1 ⊕ x1 r6 = u0 ⊕ x6 r3 = u1 ⊕ x7
Figure 4.8: Computation of L′ on 8-bit registers.
and Figure 4.8, respectively. Each intermediate variable is an 8-bit value.
The linear layer performed after the last step of Sparx can be dropped without
aﬀecting the security of the cipher, but it turns out that it results in poorer overall
performance. The only case where this strategy helps is when top execution time
is the main and only concern of an implementation. Thus we preferred to keep the
symmetry of the step function and the overall balanced performance ﬁgures.
4.6.2 Flexibility
The salient implementation-related feature of the Sparx family of ciphers is given by
the simple and ﬂexible structure of the step function depicted in Figure 4.1, which
can be implemented using diﬀerent optimization strategies. Depending on speciﬁc
constraints, such as code size, speed, or energy requirements to name a few, the
rounds inside the step function can be rolled or unrolled; one or two step functions
can be computed at once. The main possible trade-oﬀs between the execution time
and code size are explored in Table 4.4.
Except for the 1-step implementation of Sparx-128/128 on MSP, which needs
RAM memory to save the cipher’s state, all other RAM requirements are determined
only by the process of saving the register context on the stack at the beginning of the
measured function. Thus, the RAM consumption of a pure assembly implementation
would be zero, except for the 1-step rolled and unrolled implementations of Sparx-
128/128 on MSP.
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Implementation AVR MSP ARM
Block Time Code RAM Time Code RAM Time Code RAM
[b] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B]
1-step rolled 64 1789 248 2 1088 166 14 1370 176 28
1-step unrolled 64 1641 424 1 907 250 12 1100 348 24
2-steps rolled 64 1677 356 2 1034 232 10 1331 304 28
2-steps unrolled 64 1529 712 1 853 404 8 932 644 24
1-step rolled 128 4553 504 11 2809 300 26 3463 348 44
1-step unrolled 128 4165 1052 10 2353 584 24 2784 884 40
2-steps rolled 128 4345 720 11 2593 432 18 3399 620 40
2-steps unrolled 128 3957 1820 10 2157 1004 16 2377 1692 36
Table 4.4: Diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between the execution time and code size for encryption
of a block using Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128. Minimal values are given in
bold.
Due to the 16-bit nature of the cipher, performing A and A−1 on a 32-bit platform
requires a little bit more execution time and more auxiliary registers than performing
the same operations on a 16-bit platform. The process of packing and unpacking a
state register to extract and store back the two 16-bit branches of A or A−1 adds
a performance penalty. This cost is ampliﬁed by the fact that the ﬂexible second
operand of an instruction can not be used with a constant to extract the least or
most signiﬁcant 16 bits of a 32-bit register. Thus, an additional masking register
is required. One can use the movt instruction to perform the masking of the 16-bit
values without an additional register, but the implementations of A and A−1 will
require more instructions and hence the execution time and code size will increase.
The simple key schedules of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128 can be imple-
mented in diﬀerent ways. The most eﬃcient implementation turns out to be the one
using the 1-iteration rolled strategy. Another interesting approach is the 4-iterations
unrolled strategy, which has the beneﬁt that the ﬁnal permutation is achieved for free
by changing the order in which the registers are mapped to the generated key words.
This strategy increases the code size by up to a factor of 4, while the execution time
is on average 25% better.
Although we do not provide performance ﬁgures for Sparx-128/256, we emphasize
that the only diﬀerences with respect to implementation aspects between Sparx-
128/256 and Sparx-128/128 are the key schedules and the diﬀerent number of
steps.
4.6.3 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of our implementations of Sparx using FELICS in
the two usage scenarios described in Section 3.2.1. The key performance ﬁgures
are summarized in Table 4.5. The balanced results are achieved using the 1-step
implementations of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128.
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AVR MSP ARM
Block Time Code RAM Time Code RAM Time Code RAM FOM
[b] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B] [cyc.] [B] [B]
Scenario 1 – Encryption of 128 bytes of data using CBC mode
64 30256 358 10 16113 338 22 19131 456 56 8.8
128 37984 614 19 24056 404 36 30466 428 68 13.2
Scenario 2 – Encryption of 128 bits of data using CTR mode
64 4397 662 51 2261 580 52 2338 654 72 8.7
128 5478 1184 74 3057 1036 72 2935 1468 104 13.0
Table 4.5: The performance ﬁgures of the balanced (globally eﬃcient) implementa-
tions of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-128/128 according to the Figure of Merit (FOM)
deﬁned in FELICS.
4.6.4 Comparison
We compare the performance of Sparx with the results available on the Triathlon
Competition website [92] at the time of writing. Up-to-date results are available
at [92]. As can be seen in Table 4.6 the two instances of Sparx perform very well
across all platforms and rank very high in the FOM-based ranking. The superior
competitors are the NSA designs Simon and Speck, Chaskey, RECTANGLE and
LEA, but, apart from RECTANGLE, none of them have been designed with provable
security in mind.
Besides the overall good performance ﬁgures in the two usage scenarios, the
Rank Cipher
Block Key Scenario 1
size size FOM
1 Chaskey-LTS 128 128 4.6
2 Speck 64 128 5.2
3 Simon 64 128 7.2
4 RECTANGLE 64 128 8.0
5 LEA 128 128 8.3
6 Sparx 64 128 8.8
7 Sparx 128 128 13.2
8 HIGHT 64 128 14.8
9 AES 128 128 15.8
10 Fantomas 128 128 17.8
Table 4.6: Top 10 best implementations in Scenario 1 (encryption key schedule,
encryption and decryption of 128 bytes of data using CBC mode) ranked by the
Figure of Merit (FOM) deﬁned in FELICS. The smaller the FOM, the better the
implementation.
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following results are worth mentioning:
• the execution time of Sparx-64/128 on MSP is in the top 3 of the fastest
ciphers in both scenarios thanks to its 16-bit oriented operations;
• the code size of the 1-step rolled implementations of Sparx-64/128 and Sparx-
128/128 on MSP is in the top 5 in both scenarios as well as in the small code
size and RAM table for Scenario 2;
• the 1-step rolled implementation of Sparx-64/128 breaks the previous mini-
mum RAM consumption record on AVR in Scenario 2;
• the execution time of the 2-steps implementation of Sparx-64/128 in Scenario
2 is in the top 3 on MSP, in the top 5 on AVR, and in the top 7 on ARM; it
also breaks the previous minimum RAM consumption records on AVR and
MSP.
4.7 Test Vectors
Test vectors are shown as 16-bit words in hexadecimal notation in Table 4.7. Reference
C implementations of the three instances of Sparx are available on GitHub [95]. All
optimized implementations described in this chapter are included in FELICS [93].
More resources about the Sparx family of lightweight block ciphers can be found on
the primitive’s web page [94].
Sparx-64/128
key 0011 2233 4455 6677 8899 aabb ccdd eeff
plaintext 0123 4567 89ab cdef
ciphertext 2bbe f152 01f5 5f98
Sparx-128/128
key 0011 2233 4455 6677 8899 aabb ccdd eeff
plaintext 0123 4567 89ab cdef fedc ba98 7654 3210
ciphertext 1cee 7540 7dbf 23d8 e0ee 1597 f428 52d8
Sparx-128/256
key
0011 2233 4455 6677 8899 aabb ccdd eeff
ffee ddcc bbaa 9988 7766 5544 3322 1100
plaintext 0123 4567 89ab cdef fedc ba98 7654 3210
ciphertext 3328 e637 14c7 6ce6 32d1 5a54 e4b0 c820
Table 4.7: Sparx test vectors.
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4.8 Other Implementations
Damian Gryski [99] implemented Sparx in Go, while Frank Denis [130] and Quininer
Kel [285] implemented Sparx in Rust.
4.9 Summary
Given its simple and ﬂexible structure as well as its very good overall ranking in the
Triathlon Competition of lightweight block ciphers [92], the Sparx family is suitable
for applications on a wide range of resource-constrained devices. The absence of look-
up tables reduces the memory requirements and provides some intrinsic resistance
against power analysis attacks as described in Chapter 6.
Sparx was designed to achieve two goals, namely security against known cryptan-
alytic attacks and eﬃciency on resource-constrained microcontrollers. In this chapter,
we showed that software eﬃciency played an important role in the design phase of
Sparx and inﬂuenced many design choices. However, as in many lightweight designs,
the main limiting factor was the theoretical framework used to prove the cipher’s
security. In other words, we could have designed much more eﬃcient ciphers, but we
could not prove their security against the main cryptanalytic attacks.
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5.1 Introduction
In a broad sense, the IoT connects devices with various computational capabilities
ranging from small RFID tags to very powerful smartphones and tablets. A more
precise scope of the IoT covers only devices with very low computational capabilities
and middle range IoT devices, but not the very powerful ones. We focus on devices
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that support software implementations (i.e. microcontrollers) for the advantages
that these implementations have over hardware implementations in a dynamic
environment such as the IoT. In this chapter, we consider the three embedded devices
used by FELICS. A description of these devices is provided in Section 2.6. Table 5.1
summarizes the number of general-purpose registers and the total capacity of these
registers for each of the three devices.
MCU Register size GPRs Number of Capacity
(bits) GPRs (bits)
AVR 8 R0 – R31 32 256
MSP 16 R4 – R15 12 192
ARM 32 R0 – R12 13 416
Table 5.1: General-purpose registers (GPRs) of each target device.
One of the main problems raised by the emergence of the IoT is the need for
secure and eﬃcient cryptographic algorithms that meet the security requirements
and the design constraints of IoT systems. On the one hand, there is the need for
basic security functions such as conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability in these
information ecosystems. On the other hand, the use cases for which most of the IoT
devices are built impose numerous constraints ranging from the physical dimensions
of a device and its battery lifetime to acceptable query response time or throughput.
The large body of research on lightweight cryptography aims to conciliate these two
conﬂicting requirements.
5.1.1 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we study how to design lightweight symmetric algorithms that
lead to eﬃcient software implementations on embedded IoT devices. We provide
a detailed analysis of the costs associated with the main building blocks used to
construct lightweight symmetric primitives. Moreover, we give the optimal instruction
sequences in terms of both execution time and number of registers required for all
operations frequently used in lightweight symmetric cryptography, especially for
rotations which are not optimized by C compilers. The optimal implementation
of rotations demand a tremendous eﬀort and a very good understanding of the
instruction set architecture of each target device.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work to provide such a detailed
insight into the eﬃciency of software implementations of lightweight symmetric
cryptography. The contribution of this chapter is particularly valuable for designers
of new lightweight ciphers because they can make design decisions based on both
security and eﬃciency using our results.
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5.2 Efficient Implementations
The eﬃciency of lightweight cryptographic primitives is determined by the properties
of the underlying building blocks. The basic building blocks for lightweight symmetric
algorithms are the individual operations that are combined to achieve the desired
cryptographic properties. We classify the possible operations in the following four
categories: bitwise operations, modular arithmetic operations, rotations, and table-
based lookups. The operand size varies between 4 bits for small S-boxes to 32 bits
for modular addition. Frequently used operand sizes are 8, 16, and 32 bits.
The evaluation of lightweight block ciphers [105] conducted using the FELICS
framework [104] has shown that, in general, assembly implementations give better
results than pure C implementations, especially on 8-bit AVR and 16-bit MSP.
Although more demanding and less portable than C implementations, assembly
implementations allow the implementer to fully control the allocation of registers and
give her access to all instructions supported by the target microprocessor. On the
contrary, the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) does not always manage eﬃciently
the available registers; thus stack memory is used to compensate for the ineﬃcient
allocation of registers. Moreover, the GCC is not able to generate eﬃcient assembly
code for certain bit manipulations such as rotations.
For each of the basic operations considered next, we provide the execution time
in number of CPU cycles and, when relevant, the number of additional registers
required to perform the given operation for diﬀerent operand sizes. When a particular
operation can be implemented in diﬀerent ways to leverage various trade-oﬀs between
the execution time and the number of registers necessary to perform the given
operation, we give the same priority to the execution time and the number of used
registers. Moreover, when such trade-oﬀs are possible we list the both options (i.e. the
high speed implementation that requires more registers and the implementation that
uses less registers, but more execution time) such that one can choose a trade-oﬀ. The
ﬁgures correspond to assembly implementations optimized for the above-mentioned
criteria. Indeed, the execution time for each operation is optimal in the sense that
there is no faster way of performing that operation. Similarly, the number of registers
required to perform each operation is minimal, meaning that there is no way to
perform that operation using less registers.
5.2.1 Bitwise Operations
Bitwise operations such as NOT (¬), AND (∧), OR (∨), and exclusive-OR (⊕) can
be performed very fast on any microcontroller. When the operand size is less than
or equal to the target device’s register size, the execution of a bitwise operation
takes a single clock cycle. When the operand size is greater than the register size,
the execution time of a bitwise operation is equal to the ratio between the operand
size and register size because the operand has to be processed in chunks less than
or equal to the register size. None of these operations requires additional registers.
Table 5.2 summarizes the execution time of the considered bitwise operations for
diﬀerent operand sizes.
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Operand size 8 bits 16 bits 32 bits
Operation ¬ ∧ ∨ ⊕ ¬ ∧ ∨ ⊕ ¬ ∧ ∨ ⊕
AVR 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4
MSP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
ARM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 5.2: Execution time of bitwise operations.
To perform a bitwise NOT, AND, OR, and XOR using the 8-bit registers of the
AVR microcontroller, one needs the following instructions: com (one’s complement),
and, or, and eor, respectively.
On an MSP microcontroller, the instructions inv, and, bis (bit set or OR), and
xor perform the same operations (NOT, AND, OR, and XOR) on 16-bit registers.
In addition to these instructions, the MSP microcontroller supports the bic (bit
clear or AND NOT) instruction that takes a single cycle and two bytes of code, thus
saving one clock cycle and two bytes of code compared to chaining of inv and and
instructions.
The instructions mvn, and, orr, eor are used on the 32-bit registers of ARM
to perform NOT, AND, OR, and XOR, respectively. The ARM microcontroller
provides two additional bitwise instructions: bic (bit clear or AND NOT) and orn
(OR NOT). Each of these instructions combines two basic bitwise operations into a
single instruction to save one clock cycle and four bytes of code.
5.2.2 Modular Arithmetic Operations
The most frequent modular arithmetic operations used by lightweight ciphers are
addition and subtraction. For an operand size of n bits, the modular addition
and subtraction are performed modulo 2n. Common choices for n are 8, 16, or
32. The execution time and number of additional registers required to perform
modular additions and subtractions for diﬀerent values of the operand size are given
in Table 5.3.
Addition and subtraction of two n-bit values using n-bit registers are straightfor-
ward on the three microprocessors. Any of these two operations can be performed
using a single instruction (add/sub) with no need for additional registers.
When the operand size n is a multiple of the register size m, i.e. n = k ·m with
k > 1, then the whole operation is performed in k steps. In the ﬁrst step, the least
signiﬁcant bits of the two operands are added/subtracted without considering the
carry bit. In the subsequent steps, the same operation is repeated, but the carry bit
from the previous step is considered (i.e. adc/sbc – AVR, ARM; addc/subc – MSP).
These steps use k instructions and consequently the execution time is k cycles. The
code size is 2 · k, 2 · k, and 4 · k bytes for AVR, MSP, and ARM, respectively.
Whenever the operand size n is smaller than the register size m, there is at least
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MCU
Operand size 8 bits 16 bits 32 bits
Operation ⊞ ⊟ ⊞ ⊟ ⊞ ⊟
AVR
Cycles 1 1 2 2 4 4
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 0
MSP
Cycles 3 3 1 1 2 2
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARM
Cycles 2 2 2 2 1 1
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.3: Execution time and number of additional registers required to perform
modular arithmetic operations.
one additional instruction (and) necessary to ensure that the ﬁnal result is n bits
long. Hence, an 8-bit addition/subtraction on the MSP microcontroller takes two
extra cycles and four bytes of code. The same operation takes one extra cycle and
four bytes of code on the ARM microcontroller.
The result of an 16-bit addition/subtraction of on ARM can not be masked using
and instruction with an immediate value. Though, the movt instruction can be used
to write a 16-bit immediate value (i.e. 0) to the top halfword of a register, without
aﬀecting the bottom halfword.
When a 32-bit register of an ARM microcontroller stores a single 8-bit value,
then the total cost of an 8-bit addition/subtraction is 2 cycles. One can perform two
8-bit additions/subtractions at the same time on ARM provided that the values are
properly arranged in registers. The additional cost of masking the result is three
cycles, an additional register, and twelve bytes of code because the mask has to be
loaded (ldr) into a register (two cycles and eight bytes of code) since it can not be
used as an immediate value. If the mask can be kept in the auxiliary register, then
the additional cost of subsequent operations is one clock cycle and four bytes of code.
5.2.3 Rotations
It is crucial for the performance of a lightweight primitive to choose the best rotation
amounts possible [106, 39] because the cost of rotations greatly varies as a function of
the operand size, rotation amount, and target microcontroller. This simple principle
is hard to apply in practice in the absence of a detailed analysis of the cost associated
with diﬀerent rotations. Depending on the operand size, we distinguish between
rotations of 8-bit values (Table 5.5), rotations of 16-bit values (Table 5.6), and
rotations of 32-bit values (Table 5.7). For each possible rotation amount, we give
the execution time and the number of additional registers required to perform the
given operation.
We follow two optimization goals of equal priority. The ﬁrst optimization goal is
the execution time and consequently some rotations can also be performed using more
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Operand size MCU Operation Amount Metric Trade-oﬀs
16-bit AVR
≫ 3
Cycles 10 12
Registers 1 0
≫ 5
Cycles 11 12
Registers 1 0
32-bit AVR
≪ 5
Cycles 21 23 25
Registers 3 1 0
≫ 4
Cycles 20 24
Registers 2 0
32-bit MSP
≪ 11
Cycles 15 18
Registers 1 0
≫ 6
Cycles 13 18
Registers 1 0
≫ 11
Cycles 16 18
Registers 1 0
Table 5.4: Trade-oﬀs between the execution time and number of additional registers
required to perform various rotations.
clock cycles but less additional registers. Hence, the execution time is optimal in the
sense that it is not possible to perform the same rotations using less clock cycles. The
second optimization goal is to use the minimal number of registers possible for each
rotation. Therefore, the execution time increases, but the pressure on the registers
decreases. These two extreme cases show the trade-oﬀs one can make between
execution time and register usage. In general, each additional register required for
an operation can be traded for a pair of stack operations (see Section 5.2.5), which
increases the execution time. Consequently, for brevity, we list only those trade-oﬀs
that give a gain according to this principle in Table 5.4 and we show them in italics
in the other tables (Table 5.6 and Table 5.7). However, one can easily explore all
possible trade-oﬀs by simply using the values of the basic rotations displayed in bold
since all other rotations can be performed using a combination of basic rotations.
For an operand of n bits, we consider left (≪) and right (≫) rotations by an
amount up to ⌈n/2⌉ bits. To be able to eﬃciently implement any rotation on the
three target devices, it is important to know the supported instructions that can
be used to perform rotations for each device. Finding the optimal values for the
execution time and number of registers required is an iterative process that requires
a tremendous eﬀort. Thus, besides providing the cost of rotations, we also provide
the optimal implementations for all basic rotations of 8-, 16-, and 32-bit values in
Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C, respectively.
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5.2.3.1 8-bit Operand on AVR
The basic rotation amounts for rotation of an 8-bit value on AVR are 1 and 4. Since
the microcontroller does not have special instructions to rotate the content of a
register by one or more bits, rotations by one bit to the left and to the right take
two and three cycles respectively.
The rotation of an 8-bit register by 1 bit to the left can be done using a logical shift
to the left by one bit (lsl) followed by an addition with carry of zero (__zero_reg__
or R1).
The rotation of an 8-bit register by 1 bit to the right can be performed using
three instructions as follows: store the least signiﬁcant bit of the register to the T
ﬂag of the status register (bst), rotate through carry the content of the register to
the right by one bit (ror), and load the bit T from the status register into the most
signiﬁcant bit of the register (bld).
The rotation of an 8-bit value by four bits to the left or to the right takes only one
clock cycle on AVR thanks to the swap instruction that exchanges the two nibbles
of a byte.
5.2.3.2 16-bit Operand on AVR
The are three basic rotation amounts for rotation of a 16-bit value on AVR: 1, 4 and
8. On the AVR microcontroller, a 16-bit value is stored in two 8-bit registers.
The rotation of a 16-bit operand by 8 bits to the left or to the right can be done
in 3 clock cycles using three XORs (eor) and no additional register.
The rotation of a 16-bit value by 1 bit to the left uses the same principle employed
to rotate an 8-bit value by 1 bit to the left; additionally, it requires a rotation by
one bit to the left through carry (rol). Similarly, the rotation of a 16-bit value by 1
bit to the right makes use of the instructions to rotate an 8-bit value by 1 bit to the
right; additionally, it requires a rotation by one bit to the right through carry (ror).
The optimal rotations by four bits to the left and to the right can be done in
three steps using an auxiliary register. Firstly, the content of the two registers is
swapped. Then, the values of the two registers are XORed in the auxiliary register.
Depending on the rotation direction, the low or high nibble of the auxiliary register
is enabled. Finally, the auxiliary register is XORed to the two registers holding the
value to be rotated.
5.2.3.3 32-bit Operand on AVR
The basic rotations for a 32-bit value are rotations by 1, 5, 8, and 16 to the left and
rotations by 1, 4, 8, and 16 to the right. A 32-bit value is stored in four registers on
AVR.
The rotation of a 32-bit value by 1 bit uses the same technique as the rotation of
a 16-bit value by 1 bit, but requires two more rotations by one bit through carry.
The rotations by 4 bits can be done by extracting each nibble of the initial
32-bit value and inserting them on the correct positions in the four registers. These
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MCU Operation Metric
Amount
1 2 3 4
AVR
≪
Cycles 2 4 4 1
Registers 0 0 0 0
≫
Cycles 3 5 3 1
Registers 0 0 0 0
MSP
≪
Cycles 2 4 6 8
Registers 0 0 0 0
≫
Cycles 2 4 6 8
Registers 0 0 0 0
ARM
≪
Cycles 2 2 2 2
Registers 0 0 0 0
≫
Cycles 2 2 2 2
Registers 0 0 0 0
Table 5.5: Execution time and number of additional registers required to perform
8-bit rotations.
operations take 20 cycles and require two additional registers to perform a 4-bit
rotation.
The rotation of a 32-bit value by 5 bits to the left can done in 21 clock cycles using
the hardware multiplier of the AVR microcontroller. The whole operation requires
three additional registers and consumes one byte of RAM, since the __zero_reg__
(R1) has to be saved on the stack.
The rotations by 8 bits can be done eﬃciently by moving the content of each
register to its neighbour. These operations can be done using ﬁve mov instructions
and an auxiliary register.
The rotations by 16 bits can be done by simply swapping the content of the
four registers using three movw instructions and two additional registers. The movw
instruction copies the content of two registers into another two register in a single
clock cycle.
5.2.3.4 8-bit Operand on MSP
The basic rotations for an 8-bit value on MSP are rotations by 1 bit to the left and
to the right. Each of these rotations can be done in two steps. The left rotation by
one bit consists of an arithmetic rotation to the left by one bit (rla.b) followed by
the addition of the carry bit to the previous result (adc.b). The right rotation by
one bit sets the carry bit to the least signiﬁcant bit of the initial value (bit) and
then rotates the byte stored in register right through carry (rrc.b).
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MCU Operation Metric
Amount
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
AVR
≪
Cycles 3 6 9 7 10 11 7 3
Registers 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
≫
Cycles 4 8 10 7 11 9 6 3
Registers 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
MSP
≪
Cycles 2 4 6 8 7 5 3 1
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
≫
Cycles 2 4 6 8 7 5 3 1
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARM
≪
Cycles 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
≫
Cycles 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.6: Execution time and number of additional registers required to perform
16-bit rotations.
5.2.3.5 16-bit Operand on MSP
There are two basic rotations amounts for rotations of a 16-bit value on MSP, namely
1 and 8. Each 16-bit value fully occupies a register.
The rotations of a 16-bit value by 1 bit use the same two steps as rotations of an
8-bit value by one bit, but, for rotations of 16-bit values, the instructions are applied
to the whole register and not only to its low byte as in the case of 8-bit values.
The rotation of an 16-bit value by 8 bits can be done in a single clock cycle by
swapping the two bytes of a register (swpb).
5.2.3.6 32-bit Operand on MSP
The basic rotations amounts for performing rotations of a 32-bit value on MSP are
1, 8, and 16. A 32-bit value is stored in two registers.
The rotations of a 32-bit value by 1 bit use the same techniques presented for
rotation of 16-bit values on the same microprocessor, but require one additional
instruction per operation: rotate left through carry (rlc) for the rotation to the left
by one bit and rotate right through carry (rrc) for the rotation to the right by one
bit.
To rotate a 32-bit value by 8 bits, one extracts the four bytes of the two input
registers and places them in the correct position of the output registers. These
sequence of operations requires instructions to swap the bytes of a register (swpb), to
move the content of a register into another register, and to XOR the content of two
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MCU Op. Metric
Amount
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
AVR
≪
Cycles 5 10 15 20 21 17 11 5 10 15 20 25 21 15 9 3
Registers 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
≫
Cycles 6 12 18 20 20 15 10 5 11 17 23 23 18 13 8 3
Registers 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
MSP
≪
Cycles 3 6 9 12 15 12 9 6 9 12 15 15 12 9 6 3
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
≫
Cycles 3 6 9 12 15 13 10 7 10 13 16 15 12 9 6 3
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
ARM
≪
Cycles 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
≫
Cycles 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Registers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.7: Execution time and number of additional registers required to perform
32-bit rotations.
registers. An additional register is necessary to properly manipulate the four bytes.
The rotation of a 32-bit value by 16 bits comprises three XORs and does not
require additional registers.
5.2.3.7 ARM
Surprisingly, the GCC compiler does not generate optimal code for rotation of an
n-bit value, with n < 32, by k bits to the right. Namely this operation is done in
two cycles using an additional register, but it can be done without the additional
register. The assembly code generated by the compiler performs a logical shift right
by k bits into the additional register and updates the conditional ﬂags (lsrs). Then,
it does a bitwise OR (orr) between the additional register and the original register
shifted to the left (lsl) by n− k bits. The rotations to the left are performed using
the same sequence of instructions by simply swapping the amounts of the two shifts.
The optimal sequence of instructions required to rotate a n-bit value, with n < 32
by k bits to the right uses the bfi instruction to replace k bits of the data register
starting at the low-bit position n, with k bits starting from bit 0. Then, it performs
a rotation to the right by k bits on the same register. The rotations to the left can be
performed using the same sequence of instructions by simply changing the amounts
of the two instructions from k to n− k.
The rotation of a 16-bit value by 8 bits to the left or to the right can be done in
a single clock cycle without any additional register using the rev16 instruction that
reverses the byte order in each halfword (16 bits) of the register.
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MCU Chunk
4-bit lookup 8-bit lookup
Cycles Registers Cycles Registers
AVR
0 6 2 5 2
1 7 2 – –
MSP
0 4 0 4 0
1 11 0 5 0
2 5 0 – –
3 12 0 – –
ARM
0 – 3 4 2 4 2
4 – 7 4 2 – –
Table 5.8: Execution time and number of additional registers for table lookup
operations. All bits of a register are used to store data. Data chunks are counted in
increasing order from least signiﬁcant bit to most signiﬁcant bit.
The ARM microcontroller has a barrel shifter able to perform rotations of 32-
bit values to the right by any amount within a single clock cycle. This can be
accomplished using the ror instruction. Moreover, a shift or rotation followed by a
bitwise operation or a modular addition/subtraction can be done in a single cycle
thanks to the ﬂexible second operand being passed through the barrel shifter.
5.2.4 Table-Based Lookups
Most frequently, lookup tables are used for the nonlinear layer of a cipher. Sometimes,
lookup tables are also used for the linear layer. A lookup table T returns an n-bit
value T (x) for the m-bit input value x. Typically, the values of m and n are equal
to four or eight, but they can also be diﬀerent as in case of Robin, Fantomas, and
Mysterion [153, 176]. The lookup table can be stored in ﬂash memory or in RAM. If
the code for generation of the lookup table is smaller than the table itself, then the
lookup table can be computed during the initialization of the device and stored in
RAM to save ﬂash memory. Such a trade-oﬀ is possible, for example, for the S-box
of SKINNY [42].
Table lookups are usually slower than most of the operations performed directly
on registers because they require at least one memory access. The execution time and
the number of additional registers for diﬀerent table lookups are given in Table 5.8.
For the AVR microcontroller, the execution time of a load operation depends on
the memory type: a load from ﬂash (lpm) takes 3 clock cycles, while a load from
RAM (ld) takes 2 clock cycles. The results reported consider only loads from ﬂash.
106 Efficient Lightweight Symmetric Cryptography
5.2.4.1 8-bit Table on AVR
The naive way of doing a table lookup takes 7 cycles and 10 bytes of code. If the table
is aligned in memory (on a 256 bytes boundary), then a lookup can be performed in
4 cycles (+1 cycle for loading the table’s memory address) and takes 4 bytes of code
(+2 bytes for loading the table’s memory address).
5.2.4.2 4-bit Table on AVR
Two 4-bit table lookups are slower than a single 8-bit table lookup on AVR because
processing the two nibbles of a byte requires additional instructions to extract each
nibble from a register and to store them back. The overhead of a straightforward
implementation using two 4-bit table lookups is 13 clock cycles and 22 bytes of code
compared to a straightforward implementation using a single 8-bit table lookup. The
high nibble requires one additional instruction (1 clock cycle and 2 bytes of code)
compared to the low nibble. A possible trade-oﬀ between memory and execution
time is to increase the table size from 24 bytes to 28 bytes to be able to perform two
4-bit lookups at a time using a single 8-bit lookup.
5.2.4.3 8-bit Table on MSP
When a single 8-bit value is kept in a register, the execution time of an 8-bit table
lookup is 3 clock cycles and its code size is 4 bytes. If each register stores two bytes
of data, the overhead (associated with extracting the two bytes of a 16-bit register
and inserting them back into the register) is 8 clock cycles and 16 bytes of code
compared to processing two registers that hold a single 8-bit value each. On an MSP
microcontroller it is not possible to perform two 8-bit lookups at the same time,
because the size of the lookup table (216 bytes) exceeds the available memory (both
ﬂash and RAM).
5.2.4.4 4-bit Table on MSP
To perform 4-bit table lookups when a 16-bit register contains four data values on
MSP, one has ﬁrst to extract the correct nibble of a byte, perform the lookup, and
then store the nibble back. While the lookup alone takes only 3 cycles, the process
of extracting the nibble and storing it back adds an overhead of between 1 and 9
cycles depending on the nibble position in the register. To speed up the lookups, the
initial lookup table of 24 bytes can be replaced with a lookup table of 28 bytes to
facilitate two 4-bit lookups at the same time.
5.2.4.5 8-bit Table on ARM
Assuming that a 32-bit register is used to store four data bytes, a straightforward
implementation of an 8-bit lookup on ARM requires 5 cycles and 4 additional registers.
When several loads are done one after the other, the instructions can pipeline their
address and data phases. Consequently, the execution time is decreased to 2 + 3 ·N
cycles, where N is the number of consecutive load instructions. If a 32-bit register
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Instruction AVR MSP ARM
push 2 3 1 + N
pop 2 2 1 + N
Table 5.9: Execution time of stack operations. N is the number of registers in the
register list to be loaded or stored.
stores a single 8-bit value, then the execution time of an 8-bit table lookup is 2
cycles when instructions are not pipelined and 1 +N cycles when N instructions are
pipelined.
5.2.4.6 4-bit Table on ARM
The technique described above can be employed on ARM to perform 4-bit table
lookups. The size of the lookup table can be increased to 28 or 216 bytes to perform
two or four lookups at the same time.
5.2.5 Stack Operations
The stack is the program memory (RAM) used to keep track of the address to which
each active subroutine should return control when it ﬁnishes executing. In addition
to this, the stack is used to pass parameters to a subroutine or for local data storage.
When the available registers of a microcontroller are not enough to keep all data,
then stack operations are necessary to store the content of registers on the stack and
load them back. The push instruction stores the content of a register on the stack.
Similarly, the pop instruction loads a register from the stack.
The execution time of the stack operations is provided in Table 5.9. Whenever
possible, stack operations should be avoided because they are slow and increase the
memory consumption. On an ARM microcontroller the push and pop instructions
can receive a list of registers. In this case, thanks to the pipeline, the execution time
is 1 + N cycles, where N is the number of registers in the register list to be loaded or
stored. The code size of a stack instruction is 2 bytes on any of the three platforms.
5.3 Discussion
5.3.1 Choosing the Best Operations
The reader can easily see that the most eﬃcient operations are bitwise logical
operations, followed by modular arithmetic operations. In general, rotations are
the worst operations, especially rotations of large operands by values at equal
distance from the neighbouring basic rotation amounts. At the same time, diﬀerent
rotation amounts oﬀer diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between security (diﬀerential and linear
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probabilities) and eﬃciency. Hence, it is important to carefully chose the best
rotation amounts as described in [38, 106].
Although the execution time for 8-bit table lookup operations is not very high,
the size of the table adds a signiﬁcant penalty on the code size or RAM consumption.
On the other hand, the 4-bit lookup tables have a lower footprint, but a higher
execution time and thus they are not very eﬃcient.
5.3.2 Choosing the Best Word Size
An important design decision with a profound impact on the performance of a
lightweight symmetric algorithm is the so-called word size. In this context, the
word size gives the operand size and should not be confused with the word size of
a processor, which is typically equal to the number of bits that can be stored in a
register.
The most eﬃcient implementations on a particular microcontroller are reached
when the word size is equal to the register size of that microcontroller. The worst
results are obtained when the register size is greater than the operand size. Conse-
quently, when the word size is a multiple of the register size, the eﬃciency of the
implementation is in between the the best and worst possible ﬁgures.
It is desirable that an implementation of a lightweight symmetric algorithm is
eﬃcient on a wide range of microcontrollers characterized by diﬀerent register sizes.
To achieve this goal, a designer should chose the cipher’s word size equal to the
largest register size since this has no inﬂuence on the platforms with the largest
register size and adds only minor penalties for devices with smaller register sizes.
5.3.3 Substitution Layer
Typically, the substitution layer is implemented using table lookups. Another option
is to use the algebraic normal form (ANF) of an S-box, which requires only bitwise
operations. The popularity of the second option signiﬁcantly increased in the last
years because, compared to lookup tables, implementations based on ANF do not
require memory (ﬂash or RAM) to store the mappings between inputs and outputs.
Moreover, they achieve similar execution times, but may require more registers.
This has led to bit-sliced implementations of S-boxes in ciphers such as PRIDE [9],
RECTANGLE [391], or RoadRunneR [35].
5.3.4 Linear Layer
Sometimes, the linear layer is the most expensive transformation used by a cipher
because it requires additional registers to permute the bits of the cipher’s state. Thus,
special attention must be payed to the selection of the linear layer, in particular for
ciphers designed to be implemented on the 16-bit MSP microcontroller, which has
only 12 general-purpose registers.
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5.3.5 Cipher’s State
A critical property for software eﬃciency of a lightweight cipher is its state size, namely
whether the state ﬁts into the available registers or not. An eﬃcient implementation
should keep the full state of a cipher in registers and, in addition to this, it should
have enough registers to handle round keys and other operations that may require
temporary registers. In this way, the overhead generated by register spills can be
avoided. This goal is diﬃcult to achieve on MSP, which has a register capacity of
only 192 bits as shown in Table 5.1.
5.3.6 Structure
Block ciphers represent a major fraction of the lightweight symmetric primitives
designed so far. They can be built using diﬀerent structures, the most widely used
being: Substitution-Permutation network (SPN), Feistel network (FN), and Lai-
Massey. When analyzing these three structures, one can see that Feistel networks are
software friendly. Typically, each operation aﬀects only one of the two branches of a
Feistel network and thus the number of temporary registers is minimal compared
to a Lai-Massey structure, which updates both branches at the same time, or
an SPN structure, which uses heavy linear layers. In addition, Feistel ciphers
usually have simpler round functions and consequently need more rounds than SPN
ciphers. Nevertheless, there are exceptions from these observations. For example, bit-
sliced designs favour eﬃcient software implementations regardless of their structure
(RECTANGLE [391] is an SPN, RoadRunneR [35] is a FN).
Usually, ARX designs (which use only modular addition/subtraction, rotations,
and bitwise XOR) have very eﬃcient software implementations (e.g. Chaskey [244]).
A variation of this design strategy that replaces modular addition/subtraction
with bitwise AND leads to very eﬃcient software implementations as well (e.g.
Simon [36]).
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have conducted a comprehensive analysis of the implementation
cost associated with basic building blocks of a lightweight symmetric algorithm. At
the same time, we provided optimal cost implementations for rotations of various
operand sizes (8, 16, and 32 bits) on three microcontrollers (8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP,
and 32-bit ARM) widely used for IoT applications.
This chapter provides detailed insights into eﬃciency and security of software
implementations of lightweight symmetric cryptography. The comprehensive analysis
can aid the development of better lightweight symmetric cryptographic algorithms
for software implementations.
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6.1 Introduction
For a long time, it was widely believed in the cryptographic community that side-
channel attacks are primarily an implementation problem rather than a design
problem, i.e. there is little that can be done from a designer’s perspective to eliminate
or reduce the leakage of sensitive information. However, some recent research results
have started to challenge this view. So does the work described in this chapter. More
concretely, it shows that the operations of a symmetric algorithm, which are selected
in the design phase, inﬂuence diﬀerently its resistance to side-channel attacks.
Previous research at the intersection between lightweight cryptography and SCA
focused (almost) exclusively on the AES, i.e. there exist only few papers that deal
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with attacks or countermeasures for other ciphers. In particular, the study of the
SCA-resistance of software implementations of lightweight ciphers did not keep pace
with the high number of new proposals. In [30], the resilience of the AES and three
lightweight block ciphers that share some characteristics (namely KLEIN, LED,
and PRESENT) is investigated against proﬁled single-trace attacks. Unprotected
hardware implementations of Simon and LED were analyzed with respect to DPA
in [318]. An evaluation of both an unmasked and a masked implementation of
Simon for FPGAs was reported in [48]. In [315], the vulnerability of PRINCE and
RECTANGLE against DPA is studied. A second line of research focused on the
design of new ligthweight primitives that can be eﬃciently protected against DPA
via masking; representative examples include PICARO [276], Zorro [140], and the
LS-designs Robin and Fantomas [153].
The above-mentioned studies on DPA attacks against (lightweight) ciphers other
than the AES were mainly “isolated” eﬀorts in the sense that they were carried out
on diﬀerent execution platforms with diﬀerent measurement setups and diﬀerent
analysis frameworks. A comparative (and consistent) study of the DPA-vulnerability
of lightweight block ciphers based on power traces acquired from the same target
device is, to our knowledge, still missing. However, such a study would allow one
to answer the question of whether diﬀerent ciphers are equally diﬃcult to attack or
not (and if not, why not). Furthermore, we could not ﬁnd a detailed analysis of the
power leakage of basic operations (e.g. arithmetic and logical computations, table
lookups) executed in the round function of common lightweight ciphers. Thus, in
this chapter, we ﬁrst try to answer the following questions:
• How do the theoretical metrics used to assess leakage relate to real-world attack
results?
• Which operation leaks more?
Then, we apply the answers of these questions to illustrate how eight lightweight
ciphers (namely AES, Fantomas, LBlock [386], Piccolo [321], PRINCE [62], RC5 [296],
as well as Simon and Speck [37]) behave with respect to CPA. These eight ciphers
were selected from the portfolio of lightweight symmetric algorithms evaluated
in [105] using the FELICS framework [93]. The two main selection criteria were high
performance and to have a variety of diﬀerent design strategies.
In this chapter we focus on CPA attacks against unprotected implementations.
We say that an implementation leaks more than another implementation when it is
easier to attack the ﬁrst implementation using CPA than the second one, i.e. the
correct key can be recovered with less eﬀort.
All results and ﬁndings we describe in this chapter are based on CPA attacks
performed with power consumption traces that were captured on an evaluation board
equipped with an 8-bit AVR microcontroller. Our choice for this speciﬁc platform is
motivated by the widespread use of the 8-bit AVR architecture in resource-limited
environments and its particular relevance in the context of the IoT (e.g. wireless sensor
nodes). A better understanding of the actual leakage of diﬀerent operations on 8-bit
AVR microcontrollers could inﬂuence the design of new lightweight ciphers for the
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IoT and the implementation of more eﬀective and less costly SCA countermeasures.
For example, it is a known fact that the AES leaks signiﬁcantly due to its highly
nonlinear S-box [73], but modern lightweight ciphers generally use smaller S-boxes
with lower nonlinearity compared to the AES, and thus one might expect that they
leak less. However, an actual conﬁrmation of this assumption with measured traces
is still lacking.
We remark that the evaluation of candidates for the NIST SHA-3 standard con-
sidered besides security and performance on various hardware and software platforms
also SCA resistance as a selection criterion (see e.g. [44, 395] for some concrete
results). Currently, a number of standardization bodies, including NIST, are either
considering or have already started the process to standardize lightweight symmetric
primitives for the IoT. In this context, it makes sense to compare diﬀerent aspects
of potential candidates, including the SCA resistance of (unprotected) software
implementations, before deploying them on millions or even billions of devices. This
chapter contributes to a better understanding of how to design lightweight block
ciphers that have a better intrinsic resistance against side-channel attacks.
6.1.1 Research Contributions
Firstly, we quantify the leakage generated by the execution of diﬀerent instructions
on an AVR processor, aiming to identify the instructions that leak most. Then, we
compare the power consumption leakage of basic operations widely used by lightweight
ciphers. For each operation, we analyze the relation between our experimental results,
the nonlinearity of the operation, and the size (in bits) of the attacked intermediate
value.
Secondly, we provide a fair comparison of the resilience of eight lightweight block
ciphers against CPA attacks. Knowing which instructions and operations leak more,
and knowing all implementation details of the eight ciphers helps to identify the
weakest point of each cipher, which can be attacked with maximal eﬃciency. Our
experimental results show that, in some cases, the actual leakage is lower than
expected due to certain implementation-related aspects.
The practical approach we follow has the beneﬁt that it gives more realistic
results compared with simulated power traces, where the noise is modeled in a
deterministic way, which favors the attacker. Thus, our work sheds new light on the
resilience of diﬀerent operations against CPA attacks, and we illustrate this for a set
of eight lightweight block ciphers. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no
similar eﬀort published in the literature.
6.2 Preliminaries
We use the following operators for the corresponding (bitwise) logical operations: “∧”
for AND, “∨” for OR, “⊕” for XOR. The operators “⊞” and “⊟” denote a modular
addition and a modular subtraction, respectively. The two functions MSB(x) and
LSB(x) are used to extract the most and the least signiﬁcant byte from a stream of
bits x, respectively. We represent the S-box layer of a block cipher α by Sα, which
116 Resilience to Correlation Power Analysis Attacks
may involve the application of one or more S-boxes in parallel, depending on the
input size and the speciﬁcations of the cipher. The symbol L−1i,Fantomas stands for the
result of the inverse linear layer of Fantomas computed with L-box i, where i ∈ {0, 1}.
Finally, HW(x) denotes the Hamming weight of x, whereas HD(x, y) = HW(x⊕ y)
is the Hamming distance between x and y.
Definition 6.2.1 (Iterated Block Cipher). An iterated block cipher, sometimes called
a product cipher, is a block cipher obtained by iterating r times a round function
R : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, each time with its own key Ki ∈ K, where K is called round
key space. The cipher block size is n bits, the number of rounds is equal to r, X(0) is
the plaintext, and X(r) is the ciphertext. It works as follows:
X(i) = RKi(X
(i−1)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r
Definition 6.2.2 (Selection Function). In the context of side-channel attacks, a
selection function gives the intermediate result, also referred to as sensitive value
φk = ϕ(x, k), which is used by the attacker to recover the secret key. It depends on
a known part x of the input X(i−1) of the round function RKi and on an unknown
part k of the round key Ki.
The attacker computes the intermediate values φk for a ﬁxed (either known or
chosen) input x and for all possible subkeys k. The bit-size |k| of the subkey k
determines the memory complexity m of the side-channel attack. Then, she uses the
sensitive values φ1, φ2, . . . , φ2|k| and the side-channel leakage to guess the subkey k
∗
used during the actual computations on the target device. The higher the number
of inputs x for which the attacker manages to measure the leakage, the higher the
chances to recover the subkey k∗. Usually, the selection functions are chosen to
be easy to compute, typically at the ﬁrst round of the encryption or decryption
operation.
Definition 6.2.3 (Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)). Given a set of power traces
and the corresponding sets of intermediate values φ1, φ2, ...φ2|k|, Correlation Power
Analysis (CPA) aims at recovering the secret subkey k∗ using a correlation factor
between the measured power samples and the power model of the computed sensitive
values.
The concept of CPA was studied as an improvement of DPA and formalized
in [68]. A power model is used to describe the hypothetical power consumption of the
target device as a function of the intermediate value φk considering the device’s power
consumption characteristics. The Hamming weight (HW) model is more common for
software implementations, whereas the Hamming distance (HD) model is generally
used for hardware devices.
6.2.1 Theoretical Metrics for the SCA Resistance of S-Boxes
In the deﬁnitions introduced in this subsection, we denote by “+” the addition
of integers in Z and by “⊕” the addition mod 2. We will also use “+” for the
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addition of two vectors in Fn2 since there is no ambiguity. For a pair of vectors
a = (a1, a2, . . . , am) and b = (b1, b2, . . . , bm) from Fm2 , the scalar product a · b is
deﬁned as a · b = ⊕mi=1ai · bi.
One way to achieve nonlinearity in symmetric cryptographic primitives is to use
S-boxes. Formally, an S-box is an (n,m) function F : Fn2 7→ F
m
2 that maps n input
bits to m output bits. If m = 1, then F is nothing else than a Boolean function.
For any given (n,m) function F , we denote by (F1, F2, . . . , Fm) the coordinate
functions of F , such that F (x) = (F1(x), F2(x), . . . , Fm(x)), where Fi : Fn2 7→ F2
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The derivative of F with respect to a vector a in Fn2 is the function
DaF : F
n
2 7→ F
m
2 such that DaF (x) = F (x) + F (x + a). The Walsh transform
of F is the function WF (u, v) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)v·F (x)+u·x, while the cross-correlation
transform of Boolean functions Fi and Fj with respect to a vector a ∈ Fn2 is deﬁned
as CFi,Fj (a) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)Fi(x)+Fj(x+a).
Definition 6.2.4 (Nonlinearity). The nonlinearity of an (n,m) function F is defined
as:
NL(F ) = 2n−1 −
1
2
max
u∈Fn2
v∈Fm∗2
|WF (u, v)| (6.1)
Nonlinearity characterizes the resistance of F against linear cryptanalysis [230].
The higher the nonlinearity of a function, the more resistant the function is to linear
cryptanalysis. It is widely accepted that the higher the nonlinearity of a function F ,
the more information it leaks through side channels.
Definition 6.2.5 (Transparency Order). The Transparency Order of an (n,m)
function F , where n and m are two positive integers, is:
TO(F ) = max
β∈Fm2
(∣∣∣m− 2HW(β)∣∣∣− 1
22n − 2n
∑
a∈Fn∗2
∣∣∣ ∑
v∈Fm2
H(v)=1
(−1)v·βWDaF (0, v)
∣∣∣)
The Transparency Order was introduced in [279] to “quantify” the resistance of
an S-box against DPA attacks using the Hamming weight power model. In general,
the smaller the transparency order of F , the higher is its resistance to DPA attacks.
TO(F ) satisﬁes the following relation: 0 ≤ TO(F ) ≤ m.
Definition 6.2.6 (Improved Transparency Order). The Improved Transparency
Order of a balanced (n,m) function F is defined as:
ITO(F ) = max
β∈Fm2
(
m−
1
22n − 2n
∑
a∈Fn∗2
m∑
j=1
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
(−1)βi+βjCFi,Fj (a)
∣∣∣)
The Improved Transparency Order addresses the limitations identiﬁed in the
initial deﬁnition of TO [77].
Definition 6.2.7 (DPA Signal-to-Noise Ratio). The DPA Signal-to-Noise Ratio of
function F is defined as:
SNR(F ) = m22n
( ∑
a∈Fn2
(m−1∑
i=0
( ∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)Fi(x)+x·a
))4)− 12
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The DPA Signal-to-Noise Ratio was proposed in [154] as a way to model the
information leakage of CMOS circuits using the tools of traditional cryptanalysis. The
SNR increases when the resistance of an S-box to linear and diﬀerential cryptanalysis
increases. A novel deﬁnition of the SNR based on the maximum likelihood estimator
was introduced in [155].
For an extensive comparison of the metrics proposed to assess the intrinsic
resistance to side-channel analysis attacks of a given S-box at the design stage, we
refer the reader to [341].
6.3 Evaluation Framework
6.3.1 Measurement Setup
All experiments reported in this chapter were performed using two diﬀerent measure-
ment setups. The main diﬀerence between the two setups stems from the budget
spent on equipment. The ﬁrst setup costs more than $5, 000 and is referred to as a
high-cost setup, while the second setup is worth less than $300 and thus it is deemed
to be a low-cost setup.
The ﬁrst setup consists of on an evaluation board equipped with an 8-bit AT-
mega2561 processor clocked at 16 MHz as shown in Figure 6.1a. A regulated power
supply provides the 5 V supply voltage required for the operation of the board. The
evaluation board and the computer used to control the measurements are connected
through optical ﬁber. We placed the board in a Faraday cage to reduce the environ-
mental noise. The measurements of the power traces were performed with a LeCroy
waveRunner 104MXi digital sampling oscilloscope using a diﬀerential probe.
The second setup uses an Arduino Uno board based on the ATmega328P micro-
controller and an Analog Discovey oscilloscope from Digilent as shown in Figure 6.1b.
Unlike the ﬁrst setup, the second setup does not use noise reduction techniques.
(a) First setup. (b) Second setup.
Figure 6.1: Measurement setups.
We mounted the CPA attacks against the ANSI C implementations of the selected
ciphers available in the FELICS framework [93]. The only modiﬁcation of the original
C source codes we made was the insertion of a trigger signal to indicate the beginning
and the end of the side-channel relevant portion of the power traces. To have a
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common ground for comparison, we assumed that the attacker needs to recover the
32 bits of the round key K1 = 0x01234567 for all eight block ciphers. Note that, in
all of our experiments, we acquired the same number of traces, namely q for the
encryption of q known plaintexts.
6.3.2 Metrics
To ensure a fair and uniform side-channel evaluation of the selected ciphers, we used
the evaluation methodology for key-recovery attacks proposed in [336]. In that paper,
two diﬀerent types of evaluation metrics are deﬁned: an information-theoretic metric
quantifying the amount of information that leaks from a given implementation, and
an actual security metric, which quantiﬁes how well the leaked information can be
used by the attacker.
Since we conducted a practical evaluation based on leakages acquired from a target
board using the described setup instead of attacks based on simulated power traces,
the actual security metrics (i.e. success rate and guessing entropy) are sound for our
study. We do not use the information-theoretic metric from [336] (i.e. conditional
entropy) because it involves proﬁling the target device in order to approximate the
probability distribution of the leakage, which reduces the applicability of the attack
to a certain class of devices. Moreover, both the template creation and the approxi-
mation of the probability distribution for all leakage samples are computationally
intensive.
We recall that side-channel attacks are generally performed using a divide-and-
conquer approach. The adversary attacks a subkey class κ with |κ| ≪ |K| using
the selection function ϕ(x, k) and q measurements. As result she gets a guess
vector g = [g1, g2, . . . , g2|k| ] for the subkey k with the possible candidates sorted in
descending order, the most-likely subkey candidate being g1, and the least-likely
subkey candidate being g2|k| . The following two metrics quantify the amount of
eﬀort required to recover the correct subkey k∗ from the guess vector. Consequently,
they serve as an indicator of how eﬃcient an attack is in the case of q measurement
queries.
Definition 6.3.1 (Success Rate). The success rate of order o, o ≤ 2|k|, of a side-
channel key recovery attack is defined as:
SRo(k
∗, g) =
{
1, if k∗ ∈ [g1, g2, . . . , go]
0, otherwise
Definition 6.3.2 (Guessing Entropy). The guessing entropy of a side-channel key
recovery attack is:
GE(k∗, g) = log2 i, such that k
∗ = gi for gi ∈ [g1, g2, . . . , g2|k| ]
Given an implementation C to be evaluated using N experiments with the
maximum number of measurement queries q, the memory complexity m, and the
time complexity t, Algorithm 1 shows in detail how the mean success rate of order
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o, i.e. SRio, and the mean guessing entropy, i.e. GE
i, can be computed for i power
consumption traces. The results are accompanied by the respective standard errors
SE
SR
i
o
and SE
GE
i . Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the results in this chapter are based on
N = 100 experiments, each with q = 2000 queries. Both the time complexity t and
memory complexity m were determined by guesses of at most 8-bit subkeys of the
round key K1, where k∗ is the actual key used by the implementation C.
Algorithm 1 CPA evaluation algorithm
Input: C, k∗, q, m, t, N
Output: SRio, GE
i, SE
SR
i
o
, SE
GE
i
1: for j in [1, N ] do
2: AcquirePowerTraces(C, k∗, q)
3: for i in [5, q] do
4: g = CPA(C, i,m, t)
5: compute and store SRj,io (k
∗, g),GEj,i(k∗, g)
6: end for
7: end for
8: for i in [5, q] do
9: compute SRio =
1
N
∑N
j=1 SR
j,i
o (k
∗, g),GEi = 1
N
∑N
j=1 GE
j,i(k∗, g)
10: compute SE
SR
i
o
, SE
GE
i
11: end for
6.4 Quantifying the Leakage
Using the ﬁrst measurement environment described before, we quantify the leakage of
diﬀerent instructions to ﬁnd out which instruction gives the “best” target in the power
traces when performing a CPA attack. For this purpose, we deﬁne the correlation
coefficient difference δ = ck∗− ck⋄ as the diﬀerence between the correlation coeﬃcient
of the correct key k∗, i.e. ck∗ , and the correlation coeﬃcient of the most likely key
guess k⋄, i.e. ck⋄ , with k⋄ 6= k∗.
In this work, we use the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence to quantify the leakage
of diﬀerent selection functions in the context of CPA attacks. We selected this metric
because it is simple and describes well the result of a CPA attack. Moreover, it can be
applied to both measured and simulated traces. For a better understanding of how the
metric works, we give a graphical representation of the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence
spectrum in Figure 6.2. Our metric works regardless the sign of the correlation
coeﬃcient of the correct key k∗, i.e. ck∗ , and the correlation coeﬃcient of the most
likely key guess k⋄, i.e. ck⋄ . However, the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence should be
used with care in other contexts such as when comparing distinguishers [293].
The mean correlation coefficient difference δ¯ is the arithmetic mean of all values
of the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence δ such that each value of δ corresponds to a
diﬀerent correct key (k∗) and all possible values of HW(k∗) are considered once.
For the measurements we used a simple assembly code fragment that contains
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δ = ck∗ − ck⋄
0
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ck∗
ck⋄
δ
δ < 0
1 guess
ck∗
ck⋄ δ
δ > 0
Figure 6.2: Correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence spectrum.
the targeted assembly instruction guarded by several nop instructions to reduce the
noise from other operations such as the communication between the board and the
computer or the peaks of the trigger signal. The measurements were done with
values of the correct key k∗ such that HW(k∗) runs through all possible values once.
For a ﬁxed value of the input plaintext x and key k∗, we averaged eight power
measurements of the analyzed instruction to get a single power trace. The plaintext
took all possible values from 0x00 up to 0xFF; thus the number of traces q is 256.
We performed N = 10 experiments for each value of k∗.
6.4.1 Understanding the Device’s Leakage
Understanding the device’s leakage requires to understand how diﬀerent assembly
instructions executed by the processor can impact the power consumption of the
device. For this purpose, we evaluated two instructions that operate on registers
(namely and and add) as well as three instructions that require access to memory
(namely lpm, ld, and st). The and instruction performs a bitwise AND of two 8-bit
words, while the add instruction executes a modular addition of two 8-bit words.
Loading an 8-bit word from the ﬂash memory of the device into a register can be
achieved through the lpm instruction, whereas loading an 8-bit quantity from RAM
into a register requires a ld instruction. Finally, the st instruction writes the content
of an 8-bit register to memory. We used the AES S-box with the index value given
by the plaintext XORed with the key to perform the memory accesses.
Our results given in Table 6.1 show that the memory-access instructions leak
a lot more information about the secret key than the register instructions. The
writing of a register to memory leaks most, followed by the loading of a word from
memory. At the other end of the spectrum is the and instruction, which is leaking
approximately 20 times less than the add instruction (see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3).
We also observed that increasing the number of power traces does not signiﬁcantly
change the values of δ.
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Instr.
Correct key
δ¯ SEδ¯
0x00 0x01 0x03 0x07 0x0F 0x1F 0x3F 0x7F 0xFF
and -0.798 -0.643 -0.577 -0.518 -0.465 -0.392 -0.329 -0.178 -0.016 -0.435 0.183
add 0.190 -0.218 -0.160 -0.079 -0.053 0.001 0.049 0.041 0.001 -0.025 0.093
lpm 0.376 0.312 0.271 0.219 0.174 0.169 0.164 0.156 0.143 0.220 0.062
ld 0.244 0.200 0.178 0.225 0.215 0.226 0.215 0.195 0.222 0.213 0.015
st 0.596 0.581 0.578 0.577 0.566 0.594 0.603 0.585 0.592 0.586 0.008
Table 6.1: Correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence δ = ck∗ − ck⋄ between the correlation of
the correct key (i.e. ck∗) and the correlation of the most likely key (i.e. ck⋄) where
k⋄ 6= k∗ for diﬀerent Hamming weights of the correct key k∗ (δ¯ and SEδ¯ are the mean
and the standard error for a 95% conﬁdence interval, respectively).
Leaks 
less
Leaks 
more
0.5860.220-0.435 -0.025 0
several 
guesses
1 guess
and add lpm st
Figure 6.3: Correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence spectrum for four assembly instructions.
Although these experiments may remind the reader about template attacks
(where the attacker creates in the proﬁling phase leakage templates for various
instructions), we stress that we did not perform actual template attacks, but we
used a technique inspired by classical template attacks to quantify the leakage of
diﬀerent assembly instructions. Our results indicate that an attacker should target
the store of a sensitive value to increase the success rate of the attack.
6.4.2 Comparison of Different Selection Functions
We now extend the previous experiments to diﬀerent selection functions, where-
by we target the writing of the selection function’s result to memory using the st
instruction, which, as we saw, has the highest leakage. Table 6.2 summarizes the
nonlinearity NL and the mean correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence δ¯ for a total of 16
diﬀerent selection functions, which are divided into four groups. Detailed values for
diﬀerent correct keys can be found in Table 6.3.
The ﬁrst group of selection functions comprises the three logical operations AND,
OR, and XOR, which all have a negative value for the mean correlation coeﬃcient
diﬀerence δ¯. This means that using one of these logical operations as a selection
function for a CPA attack is not a very good option. As our results show, only
the AND and OR, but not XOR, are sometimes able to recover the correct key k∗,
whereby AND is slightly more eﬃcient than OR.
One can notice the contrast between the huge nonlinearity of the AND and OR
selection functions on the one side, and all other selection functions listed in Table 6.2
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on the other side. It is also interesting to note that these high values of nonlinearity
are accompanied by (relatively) poor values for the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence.
In the case of the bitwise logical operations, it seems the high nonlinearity values do
not provide the useful leakage one normally would expect. This contrasts with the
conventional wisdom saying that the higher the nonlinearity of a selection function,
the more information it leaks in SCA.
Selection function n m NL δ¯ SEδ¯
ϕ1(x, k) = x ∧ k 16 8 16384 -0.005 0.074
ϕ2(x, k) = x ∨ k 16 8 16384 -0.018 0.060
ϕ3(x, k) = x⊕ k 16 8 0 -0.153 0.168
ϕ4(x, k) = x⊞ k 16 8 0 0.127 0.011
ϕ5(x, k, c) = x⊞ k ⊞ c 17 8 0 0.121 0.010
ϕ6(x⊕ k) = SAES(x⊕ k) 8 8 112 0.586 0.008
ϕ7(x⊕ k) = SLBlock(x⊕ k) 4 4 4 0.342 0.008
ϕ8(x⊕ k) = SLBlock(x⊕ k) 8 8 64 0.235 0.006
ϕ9(x⊕ k) = SPiccolo(x⊕ k) 4 4 4 0.339 0.019
ϕ10(x⊕ k) = SPiccolo(x⊕ k) 8 8 64 0.259 0.006
ϕ11(x⊕ k) = SPRINCE(x⊕ k) 4 4 4 0.269 0.010
ϕ12(x⊕ k) = SPRINCE(x⊕ k) 8 8 64 0.138 0.004
ϕ13(x⊕ k) = LSB(L
−1
1,Fantomas(x⊕ k)) 8 8 0 0.087 0.015
ϕ14(x⊕ k) = MSB(L
−1
1,Fantomas(x⊕ k)) 8 8 0 0.041 0.014
ϕ15(x⊕ k) = LSB(L
−1
2,Fantomas(x⊕ k)) 8 8 0 0.136 0.007
ϕ16(x⊕ k) = MSB(L
−1
2,Fantomas(x⊕ k)) 8 8 0 0.083 0.018
Table 6.2: Leakages of diﬀerent selection functions (n and m are the input and
output size of the selection function in bits, NL is the nonlinearity of the selection
function, δ¯ is the mean correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence, and SEδ¯ is the standard
error for a 95% conﬁdence interval).
The modular addition is similar to the XOR operation; the main diﬀerence is the
carry propagation in the case of modular addition. Although the nonlinearity of the
two modular addition selection functions in Table 6.2 is zero, there are components
of these functions that reach high nonlinearity because of the carry propagation. For
clarity, it should be mentioned that all the components of the XOR selection function
have a nonlinearity equal to zero, and that the nonlinearity of an (n,m) function
is determined by the component having the lowest nonlinearity. By nonlinearity
of a component of an (n,m) function F , we mean the nonlinearity of F computed
for a ﬁxed vector v ∈ Fm∗2 as shown in Equation (6.1); see Table 6.4 for details.
This exhibits another imperfection of the nonlinearity metric when used to compare
various selection functions regarding side-channel leakage. We note that considering
the carry bit c from a previous operation when using selection function ϕ5 (adc
instruction) does not improve the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence compared with ϕ4
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Selection Correct key
function 0x00 0x01 0x03 0x07 0x0F 0x1F 0x3F 0x7F 0xFF
ϕ1 -0.225 0.098 0.086 0.057 -0.031 -0.052 -0.001 0.011 0.007
ϕ2 0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.073 -0.002 0.026 0.015 0.072 -0.202
ϕ3 -0.145 -0.160 -0.173 -0.190 -0.167 -0.152 -0.142 -0.125 -0.124
ϕ4 0.129 0.134 0.134 0.127 0.150 0.125 0.117 0.096 0.131
ϕ5 0.121 0.120 0.147 0.125 0.113 0.109 0.111 0.141 0.110
ϕ6 0.597 0.582 0.578 0.577 0.566 0.595 0.603 0.586 0.593
ϕ7 0.341 0.343 0.338 0.354 0.337 – – – –
ϕ8 0.234 0.223 0.228 0.249 0.230 0.245 0.244 0.233 0.234
ϕ9 0.319 0.331 0.361 0.350 0.338 – – – –
ϕ10 0.252 0.245 0.264 0.256 0.263 0.268 0.264 0.255 0.268
ϕ11 0.265 0.257 0.273 0.273 0.278 – – – –
ϕ12 0.139 0.135 0.146 0.143 0.136 0.142 0.129 0.145 0.131
ϕ13 0.094 0.089 0.079 0.061 0.061 0.080 0.105 0.099 0.120
ϕ14 0.036 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.018 0.047 0.060 0.062 0.069
ϕ15 0.144 0.121 0.137 0.127 0.129 0.145 0.134 0.151 0.143
ϕ16 0.078 0.073 0.072 0.037 0.074 0.093 0.120 0.100 0.100
Table 6.3: Detailed leakages for diﬀerent selection functions ϕi as deﬁned in Table 6.2.
(add instruction). The modular addition selection function successfully recovered the
secret key in all our test cases and should thus be preferred over logical operations.
A further group of selection functions is composed of the substitution layers of
diﬀerent lightweight block ciphers. These selection functions clearly leak the most
with respect to CPA. In fact, the selection function using the S-box of the AES has
the highest leakage among all studied selection functions. For ciphers using 4-bit
S-boxes, we considered two diﬀerent selection functions: one with an 8-bit input and
one with a 4-bit input. The 8-bit selection functions based on the substitution layer
of LBlock, Piccolo and PRINCE leak two times less than the selection function using
the AES S-box. Surprisingly, although our target device has an 8-bit architecture,
the 4-bit selection functions ϕ7, ϕ9, ϕ11 leak more than the 8-bit selection functions
of the same substitution layers.
The selection functions based on the L-boxes of Fantomas are analyzed in a
fourth group since they are linear operations, which are generally expected to leak
less than nonlinear operations. To our surprise, this group (which consists of the last
four selection functions listed in Table 6.2) leaks more than the logical operations
and is on a similar level with the modular addition. Thus, they can be considered as
selection functions when performing CPA attacks.
We remark that in [212], the basic algebraic group operations XOR, addition
modulo 2n, and modular multiplication are studied in the context of multi-bit CPA
attacks using simulated power traces. Then, selection functions based on the addition
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NL Number Proportion (%)
0 1 0.39
16384 26 10.20
24576 100 39.22
28672 112 43.92
30720 16 6.27
NL Number Proportion (%)
0 1 0.39
32768 26 10.20
49152 100 39.22
57344 112 43.92
61440 16 6.27
(a) ϕ4 : F162 7→ F
8
2, ϕ4(x, k) = x⊞ k (b) ϕ5 : F
17
2 7→ F
8
2, ϕ5(x, k, c) = x⊞k⊞ c
Table 6.4: Nonlinearity (NL) of the components of the modular addition (selection
functions ϕ4 and ϕ5 from Table 6.2). By nonlinearity of a component of an (n,m)
function F , we mean the nonlinearity of F computed for a ﬁxed vector v ∈ Fm∗2 as in
Equation (6.1). “Number” denotes how many components have the given nonlinearity
NL, “Proportion (%)” is the proportion of the given nonlinearity NL with respect to
the nonlinearity of all components of F .
modulo 216 and multiplication modulo 216 + 1 are applied to an implementation of
IDEA running on an 8-bit AVR processor. In the case of the modular addition, the
characteristics of the correlation coeﬃcients for practical attacks do not correspond
to the simulated ones due to signal superposing.
Through these experiments, we revealed some interesting aspects about the
leakage of the studied selection functions with respect to CPA. In contradiction to
intuitions based on nonlinearity, we made the following observations:
• The bitwise logical AND and OR operations leak much less than expected and
do not always reveal the secret key.
• For block ciphers that use 4-bit S-boxes, a 4-bit selection function is more
eﬃcient than an 8-bit selection function.
• The linear lookup tables (i.e. L-boxes) used by Fantomas leak more than
expected and can be considered as selection functions for CPA attacks.
The lessons we learned from these experiments helped us a lot to select the
appropriate leakage functions to attack the eight lightweight block ciphers we brieﬂy
describe in the following section.
6.5 Analyzed Ciphers
We chose the eight lightweight ciphers included in our evaluation according to the
following criteria. Firstly, we selected the ciphers from those that achieved good
software performance in the Triathlon competition [105]. Besides selecting the ciphers
for our CPA study from the ones evaluated in [105], we also used the provided C
source codes. This approach has the advantage that all ciphers are implemented
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according to a common set of guidelines and by the same team of developers, and
therefore all implementations had undergone a similar level of optimization. Secondly,
we chose our ciphers from the two major structural classes, namely Feistel Networks
(FN) and Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN) with the goal of having many
diﬀerent design approaches with unique features or properties. For example, PRINCE
introduced the α-reﬂection property, which means that a message encrypted under a
certain key can only be decrypted with a related key. RC5 introduced data-dependent
rotations, while Fantomas is the ﬁrst instance of the so-called LS-designs.
The main characteristics of the studied ciphers are given in Table 6.5. A short
description of each cipher can be found in Section 3.3. Half of the eight ciphers
use substitution boxes; Table 6.6 summarizes the most important properties of each
S-box. In the following we describe for each cipher the selection function we used to
attack it.
Cipher
Block size Key size
Rounds Structure
Target Attacked
(bits) (bits) platform operation
AES 128 128 10 SPN SW, HW S-box lookup
Fantomas 128 128 12 SPN SW L-box lookup
LBlock 64 80 32 Feistel HW, SW S-box lookup
Piccolo 64 80 25 Feistel HW S-box lookup
PRINCE 64 128 12 SPN HW S-box lookup
RC5 64 128 20 Feistel SW modular addition
Simon 64 96 42 Feistel HW, SW bitwise AND
Speck 64 96 26 Feistel SW, HW modular subtraction
Table 6.5: Main characteristics of the analyzed lightweight ciphers.
AES. The 8-bit selection function we used in our experiments targets the result of
the S-box lookup in the ﬁrst round of encryption.
Fantomas. Because there are four possible 8-bit inputs for the same MSB or LSB
of the output of the 16-bit L-boxes used for the linear layer, we had to attack both
the MSB and LSB to recover the key. The selection function targets the inverse
linear layer at the ﬁrst round of decryption.
LBlock. The 4-bit selection function is given by the result of the substitution layer
at the ﬁrst round of encryption.
Piccolo. The 4-bit selection function targets the result of the ﬁrst substitution
layer of the ﬁrst round function of encryption.
PRINCE. The 4-bit selection function we used targets the substitution layer
applied to the initial state XORed with the whitening key k0 and round key k1 at
the ﬁrst round of PRINCEcore. Thus, the attacker recovers the key k∗ = k0 ⊕ k1.
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Cipher S-box NL TO ITO SNR
AES S 112 7.860 6.916 9.600
LBlock
s0 4 3.667 2.567 2.946
s1 4 3.667 2.567 2.807
s2 4 3.667 2.567 2.807
s3 4 3.667 2.567 2.946
s4 4 3.667 2.567 2.946
s5 4 3.667 2.567 2.807
s6 4 3.667 2.567 2.946
s7 4 3.667 2.567 2.946
Piccolo S 4 3.667 2.567 3.108
PRINCE S 4 3.400 2.333 2.129
Table 6.6: Properties of the S-boxes of four analyzed ciphers. The values of TO, ITO,
and SNR have a similar behavior as the value of NL for diﬀerent S-boxes, but they
have a diﬀerent granularity. Thus, the study of NL with respect to CPA holds also
for TO, ITO, and SNR, which are variations of NL.
RC5. The selection function for RC5 targets the modular addition of the round key
before the ﬁrst encryption round. To avoid correlations with the reading the round
key from memory instead of modular additions, we wrote the selection function in
assembly language to measure just the leakage generated by the targeted operation.
Simon. To increase leakage, we attacked the composition of the XOR and AND
operations at the end of the ﬁrst round of decryption because at that time the
intermediate value is written to memory.
Speck. The used selection function gives the result of the modular subtraction
of the two Feistel branches in the ﬁrst decryption round. The attacker can take
advantage of the memory-write operation of the result of the selection function
rotated by 8 bits to the left.
6.6 Experimental Results
We distinguish between two main classes of lightweight ciphers with respect to their
implementations’ resistance against CPA. The ﬁrst class contains ciphers that are
implemented using lookup tables, while the second class comprises designs that
involve only three operations (addition/AND, rotation, and XOR), which generally
leak less than table lookups.
First Class. The ﬁrst class can be further divided into three diﬀerent categories
of ciphers. The first category contains the AES, whose 8-bit S-box leaks much more
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than any other considered selection function. Our attacks required only 59 power
traces to recover the four key-bytes with 100% success rate. The second category
consists of the three lightweight ciphers LBlock, Piccolo, and PRINCE, each using
one or more 4-bit S-boxes for the substitution layer. All members of this category
leak enough information to make the recovery of the key with a small number of
traces possible. On average, a little bit more than 100 traces were enough to get the
subkeys of these ciphers with 100% success rate. However, two subkeys of LBlock
and two subkeys of Piccolo required a lot more traces since the sensitive results of
the selection functions are not written to memory after the targeted operation and
hence the attacker correlates the reading of the S-box content (i.e. ld instruction)
instead of the writing of the S-box output (i.e. st instruction). The third category
is represented by ciphers that use linear lookup tables, e.g. Fantomas. Our attack
against the implementation of Fantomas is a multi-target attack [229] because a
normal attack failed to recover two bits of each attacked subkey. The multi-target
attack enabled us to reveal the four key-bytes using 165 traces with 100% success
rate.
Second Class. The second class covers RC5, Simon, and Speck, for which we
were not able to recover the full secret key due to reduced leakage. If we consider,
for example, the attacks to obtain the fourth key byte k∗ = 0x67 using q = 2000
traces, our experiments for RC5 and Simon gave a mean guessing entropy GE of
1.58 and 3.05, respectively. However, in the case of Speck, we managed to reveal k∗
using 1345 traces with 100% success rate.
The assembly code generated from the C implementations of these ciphers
executes four consecutive st instructions, which entails signal superposing. We tried
to “cancel” this eﬀect by reducing the frequency of the processor, but we had no
success. Although the insertion of nop instructions between the stores improved the
results, we decided to not use these modiﬁed implementations in our experiments
because they give the attacker an unreasonable advantage and aﬀect therefore the
fair comparison with the ciphers from the ﬁrst class.
Given the small size of the state of these designs and the rather simple operations
they carry out, we investigated the possibility of keeping the whole state in registers
during the entire encryption process. The 64-bit block version of both Simon and
Speck can be implemented in assembly without having to execute a single st
instruction between the start and the end of the encryption operation. This approach
signiﬁcantly reduces the amount of leakage available to the attacker. But this
leakage reduction optimization can not be applied to 128-bit block implementations
of RC5, Simon, and Speck due to the restricted register space available on an 8-bit
microcontroller. For RC5, we also tried the butterﬂy attack proposed in [394] on
the modular addition, but the results were worse than when using the classical CPA
attack.
We performed the described attacks also with a “low-cost” setup consisting of an
Arduino Uno board and an Analog Discovery oscilloscope with a built-in diﬀerential
probe. The Arduino board gets its supply voltage through an USB connection,
which is also used for the communication with the computer that controls the
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trace acquisition process. We did not employ any noise reduction techniques. The
experiments with the low-cost setup produced similar results for the ciphers in the
ﬁrst class, except for Fantomas, but required more traces due to the increased noise
levels. For example, the AES key could be recovered with 80% success rate using 36
power traces with the ﬁrst setup, but 58 traces were necessary with the second (i.e.
low-cost) setup. Similarly, to retrieve the PRINCE key with the same success rate,
the ﬁrst setup needed 65 traces, while the second setup required 85 traces. For the
ciphers from the second class, the low-cost setup yielded much worse results. When
using 5000 traces, the mean guessing entropy for the attack against RC5 increased
from 3.68 (low noise) to 22.29 (high noise). Similarly, for Simon we got GE = 9.97
in the noise-reduced setting and GE = 16.44 with the cheap equipment.
All our experiments were conducted on unprotected implementations of the
ciphers. However, many security-critical applications require countermeasures against
SCA attacks, e.g. masking. In this context, it is known that linear and Boolean
operations, such as those performed by Fantomas, RC5, Simon, and Speck, can
be masked with relatively low overheads in terms of execution time and code size.
On the other hand, masking a nonlinear S-box like that of AES generally entails a
signiﬁcant performance and code-size penalty. Somewhere in the middle between
these two extremes are LBlock, Piccolo, and PRINCE.
6.7 Summary
Following a practical approach, we investigated the leakage of various selection
functions widely used in existing lightweight ciphers for an 8-bit processor. We
analyzed how these results relate to the intuition about side-channel leakages based on
the nonlinearity of the selection function. Thereby, we identiﬁed three imperfections of
leakage evaluation based on nonlinearity, namely for AND and OR bitwise operations,
for 4-bit S-boxes, and for linear lookup tables.
Using the knowledge gained from the evaluation of selection functions, we attacked
unprotected software implementations of eight well-known lightweight ciphers, namely
AES, Fantomas, LBlock, Piccolo, PRINCE, RC5, Simon, and Speck. We grouped
the results of our experiments into two classes according to the observed resistance
against CPA attacks. The unprotected implementation of AES was broken with the
smallest number of power traces, followed by the implementations of lightweight
ciphers using 4-bit S-boxes, and thereafter the implementation of Fantomas, whose
L-boxes required slightly more traces than the 4-bit S-boxes. On the other hand,
the implementations of RC5, Simon, and Speck leaked less as we could not recover
the full key for any of them. We also demonstrated that diﬀerent implementation
options can increase the resilience of lightweight block ciphers against power analysis
attacks.
The software implementations of the three designs that do not use lookup tables
(i.e. RC5, Simon and Speck) are characterized by a certain level of “intrinsic” re-
silience against CPA. They can also be eﬃciently masked with relatively small impact
on execution time and code size. These features make constructions based solely on
addition/AND, rotation, and XOR excellent candidates for the implementation of
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lightweight block ciphers for the IoT.
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7.1 Introduction
Side-channel attacks use observations made during the execution of an implementation
of a cryptographic algorithm to recover secret information. From the multitude of
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side-channel attacks, Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [68] stands out as a very
eﬃcient and reliable technique. Its success is augmented by the minimally invasive
methods employed for the acquisition of the side-channel information. Some of the
most frequently used sources of side-channel leakage are the power consumption or
the electromagnetic (EM) emissions of a device under attack.
Flags Source Address Frame Ctr
Key
Ctr Block Ctr
1 byte 8 bytes 4 bytes 1 byte 2 bytes
Figure 7.1: The ﬁrst input block for the AES-CTR and AES-CCM modes used in
IEEE 802.15.4 [170].
Nowadays, AES [250] is the most popular symmetric cryptographic algorithm
in use. It is widely deployed to secure data in transit or at rest. Various network
protocols rely on the AES in diﬀerent modes of operation to provide security services
such as conﬁdentiality and authenticity. The usage spectrum of the AES stretches
from powerful servers and personal computers to resource-constrained devices such
as wireless sensor nodes. While the security of the algorithm and its implementations
have been placed under scrutiny since it was standardized by NIST, with a few
notable exceptions, most of the previous work focused on the AES itself and less on
the usage of the AES in complex systems.
By far, most of the experimental results reported in the side-channel literature
are for implementations of the AES. They usually assume the attacker has full
control of the AES input. This is not the case in a real world communication
protocol, when often a major part of the input is ﬁxed and only few bytes are
variable. Moreover, sometimes the attacker cannot control these variable bytes and
she has to passively observe executions of the targeted algorithm without being able
to trigger encryptions of her own free will. With the notable exceptions of [175, 259],
the security of communication scenarios based on the AES against side-channel
attacks has not been thoroughly analyzed so far. Thus, in this chapter we analyze
how much control of the AES input does an attacker need to recover the secret key
of the cipher by performing a side-channel attack against a communication protocol.
Numerous standards for communication in the Internet of Things (IoT) such as
IEEE 802.15.4 [170] and LoRaWAN [220] use the AES to encrypt and authenticate
the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer frames. The 802.15.4 standard uses a
variant of the AES-CCM [380, 115], while LoRaWAN uses AES-CMAC [331]. The
same CCM mode is used with the AES to encrypt the IPsec Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) [168]. According to [305] the security architecture of IEEE 802.15.4
relies on four categories of security suites: none, AES-CTR, AES-CBC-MAC, and
AES-CCM. A typical input for the AES-CTR and AES-CCM modes used in the
IEEE 802.15.4 protocol is shown in Figure 7.1. In this particular example, an attacker
can manipulate up to 12 bytes of the input (Source Address and Frame Counter),
while the other input bytes (Flags, Key Counter and Block Counter) are ﬁxed.
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The attack on IEEE 802.15.4 wireless sensor nodes described in [259] assumes the
control of only four input bytes (Frame Counter), while the remaining input bytes
are constant. Thus the following question arises:
How many input bytes should an attacker change in the injected messages
in order to fully recover the master key without triggering any network
protection mechanism?
While numerous network protocols use the AES to secure the communication
between end nodes, major cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL [261] and ARM
mbed TLS [18] do not have a side-channel protected implementation of the AES
for devices that do not support the AES-NI [163] instruction set as is the case with
most IoT devices. Therefore, an elaborate analysis of the security of the unprotected
implementations of the AES used in communication protocols is necessary. Only
such a careful analysis can assess the impact of side-channel attacks on the security
of real world systems using unprotected implementations of the AES.
In this chapter, we chose to focus on CPA attacks thanks to their eﬃciency and
reliability. We opted for a non-invasive measurement setup and hence we selected the
EM emissions of the target processor as source of side-channel leakage. The target
is an ARM Cortex-M3 processor mounted on a STM32 Nucleo [340] board from
STMicroelectronics. These processors are widely used for low-power applications
and meet the requirements for use in the IoT.
The IoT will be a security nightmare if the whole information ecosystem is not
designed with security in mind. While many communication protocols for the IoT
are in formative stages, the threat model of the IoT is less understood despite it is
widely accepted that its attack surface is large. Although we focus on a particular
side-channel attack (i.e. power/EM), other side-channel attacks such as timing, fault,
cache or data remanence attacks might pose a similar or even a higher threat for the
security of the IoT ecosystem. Attacks that do not exploit side-channel information,
such as those used to compromise Internet-connected computers, should not be
neglected since they have certain advantages over side-channel attacks. Thus, our
work adds another piece to the security puzzle of the IoT by showing the need for
side-channel countermeasures to prevent a somehow overlooked threat.
7.1.1 Research Contributions
This chapter presents a thorough analysis of the scenarios in which an attacker can
mount a DPA attack against software implementations of the AES used to secure
various communication protocols. Firstly, we present an algorithm for symbolic
processing of a given input state of the AES. The algorithm outputs the number
of rounds and the bytes that must be attacked to recover the secret key. Then,
using this algorithm we perform a classiﬁcation of all possible inputs depending on
the number of rounds that must be attacked in order to recover the master key.
The result is a set of 25 independent evaluation cases. Secondly, we describe an
optimal algorithm that uses the above-mentioned symbolic representation to recover
the master key of the AES using CPA attacks. The algorithm explores all possible
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combinations of input key bytes and discards the invalid key candidates, thus yielding
only the correct master key if enough power traces with a good signal-to-noise ratio
are provided. Afterwards, we evaluate the results of the attack algorithm in each
of the 25 evaluation cases identiﬁed in the classiﬁcation step using traces from an
ARM Cortex-M3 processor.
Our results show that popular implementations of the AES found in well-known
and widely used cryptographic libraries can be broken using CPA attacks. The only
requirement is that a part of the AES input is known and variable, while the rest is
constant, which is a common scenario in communication protocols. Knowledge of
the AES implementation strategy improves the attack results, but it is not crucial.
7.2 Preliminaries
7.2.1 Description of the AES
We give a brief description of the AES [250] to recall relevant aspects of the algorithm
and to introduce the notation used in this chapter. For more details on the AES
algorithm, we refer the reader to the oﬃcial speciﬁcations.
The AES is a version of the Rijndael cipher [98] with 128-bit blocks and three
diﬀerent key lengths: 128, 192, and 256 bits. The round function is applied to the
4× 4 byte state matrix 10, 12, or 14 times depending on the key length. It comprises
four transformations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey. The
ﬁnal round function does not include the MixColumns transformation.
Let si,j be the state byte located at row i and column j (0 ≤ i, j ≤ 3), kl
the corresponding round key byte (l = 16 · r + i + 4 · j) and r the round number.
After application of the AddRoundKey transformation, each byte of the state becomes
s′i,j = si,j ⊕ kl, where the “⊕” symbol denotes bitwise exclusive or of two 8-bit values.
The nonlinear SubBytes operation transforms each byte of the state using an 8-bit
S-box S as follows: s′i,j = S[si,j ]. The ShiftRows transformation performs a rotation
of row i by i bytes to the left. In the MixColumns transformation, a polynomial
multiplication over GF (28) is applied to each column of the state matrix. The
symbol “•” is used for multiplication of two polynomials in GF (28), while {01}, {02},
and {03} are 8-bit vectors representing elements from GF (28).
The key schedule expands the master key into the 16-byte round keys. The
round constant array Rcon contains the powers of {02} in GF (28) as described in
the speciﬁcations. The structure of the AES encryption is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 3 describes the AES key schedule at the byte level when using a 16-byte
master key.
7.2.2 Attacking Temporary Key Bytes
To attack the AES in counter mode, Jaﬀe introduced a technique that propagates a
DPA attack to later rounds. It can be used when just few bytes of the AES input
are known and variable, while the others are ﬁxed (constant) and unknown [175].
Next we brieﬂy describe how the unknown ﬁxed bytes can be incorporated into a
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Algorithm 2 AES encryption
Input: state, round_keys
1: AddRoundKey(state, round_keys[0])
2: for r = 1 to R− 1 do ⊲ R is the total number of rounds
3: SubBytes(state)
4: ShiftRows(state)
5: MixColumns(state)
6: AddRoundKey(state, round_keys[r])
7: end for
8: SubBytes(state)
9: ShiftRows(state)
10: AddRoundKey(state, round_keys[R])
11: return state
Algorithm 3 AES key schedule for a 16-byte master key
Input: key
1: rk[0] = key
2: for i = 1 to R do ⊲ R is the total number of rounds
3: rk[i][0] = rk[i− 1][0]⊕ SubBytes(rk[i− 1][13])⊕ Rcon[i− 1]
4: rk[i][1] = rk[i− 1][1]⊕ SubBytes(rk[i− 1][14])
5: rk[i][2] = rk[i− 1][2]⊕ SubBytes(rk[i− 1][15])
6: rk[i][3] = rk[i− 1][3]⊕ SubBytes(rk[i− 1][12])
7: for j = 4 to 15 do
8: rk[i][j] = rk[i− 1][j]⊕ rk[i][j − 4]
9: end for
10: end for
11: return rk
round key byte to recover a temporary key byte. Then, using these temporary key
bytes the attack can be carried to later rounds until enough round key bytes are
recovered to reverse the key schedule.
Using a CPA attack an adversary can recover only those key bytes that are
XORed with variable and known state bytes in the AddRoundKey transformation.
The gist of Jaﬀe’s technique is that an attacker can still recover a temporary key
byte when an input byte of the AddRoundKey transformation is the result of the
MixColumns transformation applied to at least one known and variable input byte
while the other input bytes are unknown and constant.
To better illustrate how this technique works, let us consider the ﬁrst state byte
s′0,0 after performing the ﬁrst round function:
s′0,0 = ({02} • s0,0)⊕ ({03} • s1,1)⊕ ({01} • s2,2)⊕ ({01} • s3,3)⊕ k16
Suppose now that the input bytes s0,0 and s1,1 are known and variable (key bytes
k0 and k5 were successfully recovered using a side-channel attack on the SubBytes
transformation of the ﬁrst round), while the other input bytes (s2,2 and s3,3) are
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unknown, but ﬁxed. Thus s′0,0 can be written as ({02} • s0,0)⊕ ({03} • s1,1)⊕ k
′
16,
where the constant part is included in the temporary key k′16 that will be recovered
by attacking the SubBytes transformation of the second round; k′16 = ({01} • s2,2)⊕
({01} • s3,3) ⊕ k16. The temporary key k′16 enables the computation of four state
bytes in the following round. In this way, the attack is carried to the next rounds
until all state bytes are known; consequently, the real key bytes can be recovered.
The technique works similarly when three input bytes are known and variable.
Though, when only one input byte is known and variable, the attacker will recover the
same two equally likely key candidates for two bytes of the same column of the cipher
state. For example, when only s3,3 is known and variable while the other input bytes
are unknown and ﬁxed, then s′0,0 = ({01} • s3,3)⊕ k
′
16 and s
′
1,0 = ({01} • s3,3)⊕ k
′
17.
Thus attacking either of the two, an attacker will get two equally likely key bytes (k′16
and k′17). If the state bytes are not processed in order by the SubBytes transformation,
the attacker will not know which key byte corresponds to s′0,0 and which key byte
corresponds to s′1,0.
7.2.3 Software Implementations of the AES
There are various ways to implement the AES in software depending on the execution
time, code size and RAM consumption requirements. Other factors that inﬂuence
the implementation strategy are the cipher mode of operation and the number of
plaintext blocks to be encrypted. Schwabe and Stoﬀelen [314] identiﬁed four diﬀerent
strategies to implement the AES in software: traditional, T-tables, vector permute,
and bit slicing. In this chapter, we consider the following two implementation
approaches for the AES that are relevant for a secure communication protocol:
• The straightforward implementation (S-box strategy) performs the four round
transformations as described above. The substitution layer is implemented
using a 256-byte lookup table based on S-box S. This implementation approach
is suitable for 8-bit architectures.
• The table based implementation (T-table strategy) uses four lookup tables
(T0, T1, T2, and T3) of 1024 bytes each to perform the SubBytes, ShiftRows,
and MixColumns operations at the cost of 16 table lookups, 16 masks and 16
XORs per round, except for the ﬁnal round. A low memory alternative uses
just one T-table, but performs 12 additional rotations per round. This strategy
was initially described by the designers of Rijndael [98]. It leads to very fast
implementations on 32-bit platforms.
We did not analyze bit-sliced or vector permute implementations because such
implementations are uncommon in cryptographic libraries due to the following
limitations. The bit-sliced implementations process at least two blocks in parallel
and thus they can be applied only to non-feedback modes of operation. The vector
permute implementations require support of vector permute instructions, but most of
the resource-constrained microcontrollers for the IoT do not support such instructions.
An analysis of the existing AES implementations used by diﬀerent open-source
cryptographic libraries is given in Table 7.1. The default implementations of the
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Library Language Version Release AES-NI T-table
Botan [288] C++ 2.1.0 Apr 2017 ✓ ✓
cryptlib [90] C 3.4.3 Feb 2017 ✓ ✓
Crypto++ [91] C++ 5.6.5 Oct 2016 ✓ ✓
Libgcrypt [146] C 1.7.6 Jan 2017 ✓ ✓
libtomcrypt [143] C 1.17 Apr 2017 ✗ ✓
libsodium [215] C 1.0.12 Mar 2017 ✓ ✗
mbed TLS [18] C 2.4.2 Mar 2017 ✓ ✓
Nettle [251] C 3.3 Oct 2016 ✓ ✓
OpenSSL [261] C 1.1.0e Feb 2017 ✓ ✓
wolfCrypt [383] C 3.10.2 Feb 2017 ✓ ✓
Table 7.1: A summary of the existing AES implementations used by open-source
cryptographic libraries written in C/C++. All the T-table implementations are
vulnerable to the attack described in this chapter.
AES for platforms that do not support the AES-NI [163] instructions in popular
cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL [261, 262] or mbed TLS [18, 144] use the T-
table approach. Except for libsodium [215], all other cryptographic libraries analyzed
have an implementation of the AES based on the T-table strategy. Moreover, these
implementations are not protected against side-channel attacks such as DPA or
cache attacks. It is well known that unprotected implementations of cryptographic
algorithms are an easy target for DPA attacks. Recently, researchers from Rambus
Cryptography Research Division have shown that even an unprotected software
implementation based on AES-NI instructions can be attacked with DPA [302]. The
T-table implementations of the AES are vulnerable to various cache attacks as shown
in [264, 216]. Although the unprotected T-table implementations are vulnerable to
side-channel attacks, nine out of the ten libraries considered in Table 7.1 have such
an implementation of the AES.
7.2.4 Measurement Setup
For all experimental results reported in this chapter we used a STM32 Nucleo [340]
board from STMicroelectronics. It has a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 processor clocked at
8 MHz, 512 KB of ﬂash, 80 KB of RAM and 16 KB of EEPROM. The measurement
of the electromagnetic emissions was performed from a spot above the chip using a
Langer RF-K 7-4 H-ﬁeld probe as shown in Figure 7.2. The target board executed
software implementations of the AES. The signal was ampliﬁed by 30dB and then
sampled at 500 MS/s using a Teledine LeCroy WaveRunner 8254M-MS oscilloscope.
We did not use any noise reduction technique. The board was powered through an
USB cable, which was also used to control the device under test (DUT).
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Figure 7.2: The device under test (DUT).
7.3 Quantifying the Leakage
We introduced the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence metric in Section 6.4 to analyze
the leakage of diﬀerent selection functions in the context of CPA. The correlation
coeﬃcient diﬀerence δ gives the diﬀerence between the correlation coeﬃcient of the
correct key and the correlation coeﬃcient of the most likely key guess, where the
most likely key is diﬀerent from the correct key.
We use the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence to quantify the leakages of two
selection functions: ϕ1 based on the AES S-box and ϕ2 based on the AES T-table.
The two selection functions are deﬁned below:
ϕ1 : F
8
2 7→ F
8
2, ϕ1(x⊕ k) = S(x⊕ k)
ϕ2 : F
8
2 7→ F
32
2 , ϕ2(x⊕ k) = T (x⊕ k)
Correct key
δ¯ SEδ¯
0x00 0x01 0x03 0x07 0x0F 0x1F 0x3F 0x7F 0xFF
ϕ1 0.146 0.126 0.108 0.156 0.126 0.960 0.153 0.140 0.084 0.126 0.020
ϕ2 0.104 0.072 0.143 0.074 0.070 0.126 0.078 0.044 0.028 0.082 0.028
Table 7.2: Correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence δ between the correlation of the correct
key and the correlation of the most likely key [50], for diﬀerent Hamming weights of
the correct key; δ¯ and SEδ¯ are the mean and the standard error for a 95% conﬁdence
interval, respectively. The leakages are acquired from an ARM Cortex-M3 processor.
When using simulated leakages, the values of the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence
are 0.813 and 0.7 for ϕ1 and ϕ2, respectively. These values are the same regardless
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(a) S-box. (b) T-table.
Figure 7.3: Distribution of the Hamming weight of the output of the AES (a) S-box
and (b) T-table for all possible input combinations.
of the correct key used. In the simulated environment, the leakages of the two
selection functions are very high and the diﬀerence between them is about 14% of
the ﬁrst one. On the other hand, the mean correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence δ¯ for
diﬀerent values of the correct key using leakages acquired from an ARM Cortex-M3
processor is given in Table 7.2. The measurements were performed at a sampling
rate of 500 MS/s using assembly implementations of the analyzed selection functions.
Increasing the sampling rate to 1 GS/s does not signiﬁcantly improve the results.
The mean correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence δ¯ is positive for both selection functions,
which means they leak enough information about the secret key such that an attacker
can recover the key byte using only one key guess. In practice, the selection function
based on the AES S-box leaks about 50% more than the selection function based
on the AES T-table. This can be explained by analyzing the distribution of the
Hamming weight of the two selection functions for all possible input combinations
(See Figure 7.3).
The reader can easily observe in Figure 7.3a that the distribution of values in
the case of the AES S-box follows a binomial distribution. On the other hand, the
distribution of values in the case of the AES T-table shown Figure 7.3b does not
resemble a binomial distribution. Moreover, there are 14 out of 32 possible output
values that never occur (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32). Each
Hamming weight value can be seen as a predicted power consumption that is used
in a CPA attack. Therefore, the 8-bit output of an S-box can generate any of the 9
possible power levels, while the 32-bit output of a T-table generates only 54.54%
of the 33 possible power levels. Consequently, it is easier for a CPA attacker to
determine which 8-bit input corresponds to the 8-bit output of an S-box than to the
32-bit output of a T-table. For this reason, the leakage of ϕ1 is greater than the
leakage of ϕ2 as quantiﬁed using the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence. This means
that a CPA attack against an implementation based on the T-table strategy requires
more eﬀort (i.e. power traces) compared to a CPA attack against an implementation
based on the S-box strategy.
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7.4 Generating the Evaluation Cases
In this section we describe the algorithm for symbolic processing of a given initial
state to determine the number of rounds required to recover the master key of the
AES. We used this algorithm to explore all possible attack cases and to choose the
relevant evaluation cases for our scenario. The algorithm relies on the following
symbolic representation of a byte located at row i and column j of the AES state at
the start of round r:
sri,j =


0, the corresponding key byte can not be recovered
1, the corresponding key byte can be recovered
−n, n temporary key bytes can be recovered
Thus, the byte sri,j is variable if its symbolic representation is diﬀerent from 0
and ﬁxed (constant) when its symbolic representation is 0. Due to the MixColumns
transformation, each column of the state at round r+1 can be expressed as a function
of four bytes of the state at round r. At the start of round r + 1 each byte of the
state is updated using the following rules:
• if the number of variable input bytes is 0, then the symbolic representation of
the output byte is set to 0;
• if the number of variable input bytes is 1, then the symbolic representation of
the output byte is updated as follows:
– if the variable input byte is multiplied by {01} in the MixColumns trans-
formation, then the symbolic representation of the output byte is set to
−2p+1, where p is the number of independent input pairs. A new pair is
added to the output byte;
– else, the symbolic representation of the output byte is set to −2p;
• if the number of variable input bytes is 2 or 3, then the symbolic representation
of the output byte is set to -1;
• if the number of variable input bytes is 4, then the symbolic representation of
the output byte is set to 1.
Besides updating the symbolic representation of the state, the algorithm keeps a
list of key pairs for each byte of the state and carries this list into the next round.
The algorithm stops when the symbolic representation of all bytes in a round is 1. It
outputs the symbolic representation of the state and the associated key pairs. These
can be used to compute the number of rounds required to recover the master key
and the number of possible master keys. The pseudocode for the algorithm is given
in Algorithm 4. The algorithm returns the processed state and the associated set
of pairs. Using this output, an attacker knows what key bytes have to be attacked
in each round of the AES, the number of rounds to be attacked, and the maximum
number of possible master keys.
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Algorithm 4 Symbolic processing of an initial state
Input: state ⊲ Initial state: 0 – fixed byte, 1 – variable byte
1: function ProceessColumn(r, pairs, i0, i1, i2, i3, o0, o1, o2, o3)
2: Compute the number of variable inputs for i0, i1, i2, i3: var_in
3: Update pairs
4: if var_in == 0 then ⊲ No key bytes recovered
5: state[r][o0] = state[r][o1] = state[r][o2] = state[r][o3] = 0
6: else if var_in == 1 then ⊲ 4 temporary key bytes recovered; new pair
7: Compute the number of independent pairs: p
8: pairs = pairs ∪ {new_pair}
9: state[r][o0] = state[r][o1] = state[r][o2] = state[r][o3] = −2
p
10: if state[r][oi] == state[r][oj ] == ({01} • state[r − 1][it])⊕ k
′ then
11: state[r][oi] = state[r][oj ] = −2
p+1
12: end if
13: else if var_in ∈ {2, 3} then ⊲ 4 temporary key bytes recovered
14: state[r][o0] = state[r][o1] = state[r][o2] = state[r][o3] = −1
15: else if var_in == 4 then ⊲ All 4 key bytes recovered
16: state[r][o0] = state[r][o1] = state[r][o2] = state[r][o3] = 1
17: end if
18: end function
19: function ProcessRound(r, pairs)
20: ProcessColumn(r, pairs, 0, 5, 10, 15, 0, 1, 2, 3)
21: ProcessColumn(r, pairs, 4, 9, 14, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
22: ProcessColumn(r, pairs, 8, 13, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11)
23: ProcessColumn(r, pairs, 12, 1, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)
24: end function
25: function RoundKeyRecovered(r)
26: for i = 0 to 15 do
27: if 0 ≥ state[r][i] then return False
28: end if
29: end for
30: return True
31: end function
32: function Process(state)
33: pairs = ∅
34: for r = 1 to R do ⊲ R is the total number of rounds
35: if RoundKeyRecovered(r − 1) then return state, pairs
36: end if
37: ProcessRound(r, pairs)
38: end for
39: end function
40: return Process(state)
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Figure 7.4: Symbolic processing of an initial state.
Figure 7.4 gives a graphical representation of how the algorithm works when only
the ﬁrst byte of the initial state is variable and known, while the other bytes are
ﬁxed and unknown. By attacking the result of the SubByte transformation applied
to the ﬁrst byte of the state in the ﬁrst round, the key byte k0 is recovered. This
recovered key byte allows a carry of the attack to the second round where four key
bytes (k′16, k
′
17, k
′
18, k
′
19) can be recovered by attacking the result of the SubBytes
transformation. Because the attacker cannot distinguish between k′17 and k
′
18, a new
pair S1 = {1} is added to the corresponding state bytes. Then, the attacker targets
the third round, where she can recover temporary key bytes for all state bytes. The
pair S1 from previous round aﬀects all bytes of the third and fourth column of the
state and thus the corresponding pairs are updated accordingly. In addition, new
pairs are added when the attacker can not distinguish between key candidates as
shown in Figure 7.4. In the fourth round, the attacker is able to recover all round
key bytes. Then, having all the round key bytes of the fourth round, she can reverse
the AES key schedule to get the master key.
The attacker has to build 2p possible round keys, where p is the number of
independent pairs associated with the state bytes of the last attacked round. For
the example in Figure 7.4, the number of possible keys is 25 because card(S) =
card(S6 ∪ S7) = card({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) = 5. Thus, in addition to the number of rounds
to attack, the algorithm for symbolic processing of an initial state gives the number
of possible master keys to be recovered by an attacker. Though, the attacker does
not have to check all 2p candidates to see which one is the correct one since she
can discard the wrong candidates based on the diﬀerence between the correlation
coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst two key candidates as we will show in Section 7.5.
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Bytes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
min(Rnds) 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
Prop. (%) 100 100 100 14.1 35.2 55.9 72.7 84.7 92.3 96.7 98.9 99.8 100 100 100 100
max(Rnds) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 1
Prop. (%) 100 100 100 85.9 64.8 44.1 27.3 15.3 7.7 3.3 1.1 0.2 100 100 100 100
Trade-off ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Table 7.3: Possible attack outcomes for diﬀerent number of bytes (“Bytes”) controlled
by attacker. “Rnds” is the number of rounds that have to be attacked in order to
recover the master key. “Prop. (%)” is the proportion of a given evaluation case with
respect to all possible input conﬁgurations for a ﬁxed number of bytes controlled by
attacker.
Using the algorithm for symbolic processing of an initial state we evaluated all
possible input combinations. More precisely, we considered all conﬁgurations of the
initial state when the attacker controls i bytes of the input for i ∈ [1, 16]. When the
attacker controls i bytes, there are
(
16
i
)
possible input conﬁgurations. This results
in 216 − 1 possible conﬁgurations of the initial state in total. Then, we divided
these inputs into equivalence classes (evaluation cases) depending on the number of
rounds that must be attacked in order to recover the master key. The results are
summarized in Table 7.3. When the attacker controls between four and eleven bytes
of the input, a trade-oﬀ between the input conﬁguration and the number of rounds
to be attacked is possible. When this is the case, the proportion of possible input
conﬁgurations shows which evaluation case is more likely to appear if the initial state
is chosen at random. Thus, when the attacker controls only four or ﬁve bytes of the
input, it is crucial to carefully choose an input conﬁguration from the limited set of
possible input conﬁgurations that minimize the number of rounds to be attacked.
We give an example of a possible initial state for each of the 25 distinct evaluation
cases identiﬁed after processing all possible input combinations in Table 7.4. Any
possible input conﬁguration for the AES encryption falls into one of these evaluation
cases depending on the number of bytes controlled by attacker and the number of
rounds that must be attacked in order to recover the master key.
7.5 The Attack
The attack we present in this section uses the symbolic representation of the AES
state (described in Section 7.4) in conjunction with CPA attacks to recover individual
bytes of the AES round keys. After executing Algorithm 5, the attacker has all round
key bytes of round R. Thus, she is able to recover the master key of the cipher by
reversing the key schedule.
The algorithm follows the symbolic representation of the state to infer which
key bytes must be attacked and how many key candidates it should yield for each
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Algorithm 5 The attack algorithm
Input: state ⊲ Initial state: 0 – fixed byte, 1 – variable byte
Input: λ = (plaintexts, traces) ⊲ Recorded in the acquisition phase
1: state, pairs = Process(state) ⊲ Symbolic processing (Algorithm 4)
2: known_pairs = ∅, mapped_pairs = ∅
3: keys[2p] = ∅, valid_keys[2p] = True ⊲ p is the number of independent pairs
4: for r = 1 to R do ⊲ R is the number of rounds to be attacked
5: for i = 0 to 15 do
6: if state[r][i] 6= 0 then
7: if pairs[r][i] == ∅ then ⊲ No pair
8: keys[0, · · · , 2p − 1][r][i] = CPA(λ, keys[0], r, i)
9: else if pairs[r][i] ⊆ known_pairs then ⊲ Known pair(s)
10: if i /∈ mapped_pairs[pairs[r][i]] then
11: mask = 0, temp_keys = ∅, αmax = −1
12: for pair ∈ pairs[r][i] do
13: mask = mask ∨ 2pair−1
14: end for
15: for j ∈ [0, 2p − 1] do
16: if valid_keys[j] and temp_keys[j ∧mask] == ∅ then
17: temp_keys[j ∧mask], α = CPA(λ, keys[j], r, i)
18: if α > αmax then
19: αmax = α
20: end if
21: end if
22: valid_keys[j][r][i] = temp_keys[j ∧mask]
23: end for
24: for j ∈ [0, 2p − 1] do
25: if abs(state[r][i]) == 1 and α+ β < αmax then
26: valid_keys[j] = False
27: end if
28: end for
29: end if
30: else ⊲ New pair
31: mask = 2pairs[r][i]−new_pair, k1 = k2 = ∅
32: for j ∈ [0, 2p − 1] do
33: if k1[j ∧mask] == ∅ then
34: k1[j ∧mask], k2[j ∧mask] = CPA(λ, keys[j], r, i)
35: end if
36: if j ∧ 2new_pair−1 then
37: keys[j][r][i] = k1[j ∧mask], keys[j][r][i
′] = k2[j ∧mask]
38: else
39: keys[j][r][i′] = k2[j ∧mask], keys[j][r][i
′] = k1[j ∧mask]
40: end if
41: end for
42: known_pairs = known_pairs ∪ new_pair
43: Add (i, i′) to mapped_pairs[new_pair]
44: end if
45: end if
46: end for
47: end for
48: return keys[i], where valid_keys[i] == True for i ∈ [0, 2p − 1]
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Case Bytes Rounds Possible initial state
0 1 4 [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
1 2 4 [1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
2 3 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
3 4 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
4 4 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
5 5 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
6 5 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
7 6 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
8 6 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
9 7 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
10 7 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
11 8 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
12 8 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
13 9 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
14 9 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0]
15 10 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
16 10 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]
17 11 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
18 11 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0]
19 12 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0]
20 12 4 [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1]
21 13 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]
22 14 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0]
23 15 3 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0]
24 16 1 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]
Table 7.4: All evaluation cases with an example of a possible initial state for each
evaluation case. “Bytes” gives the number of bytes controlled by attacker; “Rounds”
gives the number of rounds that have to be attacked to recover the master key.
attacked key byte. By tracking the pairs associated with the recovered key bytes,
the algorithm is able to discard all impossible round keys, thus saving computational
resources. Indeed, the algorithm uses an optimal number of CPA attacks to recover
the master key.
Initially, the set of known pairs is empty and all possible keys are considered
valid. The algorithm keeps track of 2p possible keys, where p is the total number of
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independent pairs in the symbolic representation of the state at round R.
The main loop of the algorithm runs through all rounds that must be attacked.
At each round, the key bytes corresponding to variable state bytes are attacked to
recover one or more temporary key bytes or a round key byte. Depending on the
pairs associated with the byte to be attacked, there are three possible cases:
• No pair. If the symbolic representation does not have a pair associated with
the byte of the state to be used for the attack, then the algorithm will recover
a single key byte, which is distributed to all possible keys.
• New pair. If one of the pairs associated with the byte under attack is
not present in the set of known pairs, then the algorithm will recover 2u
possible values for the corresponding key byte, where u is the number of known
independent pairs associated with the byte under attack. The number of known
pairs determines the number of CPA attacks to be performed. Using a mask
based on the existing pairs and a mask for the new pair, the algorithm correctly
distributes the recovered key byte values to all possible keys. The new pair
is added to the set of known pairs and the two indexes of the state aﬀected
by the recovered temporary keys are mapped to this new pair. This mapping
prevents the computation of the same temporary keys twice.
• Known pairs(s). In the case where the t independent pairs associated with
the key byte to be attacked are known but not mapped to the current state
byte, the algorithm performs 2t CPA attacks. Then, it distributes the attack
results (the recovered key and the diﬀerence between the correlation coeﬃcients
of the ﬁrst two most likely key candidates α) to the corresponding bytes of all
possible keys. Afterwards, the possible keys for which the value of α is less than
the maximum observed value αmax minus a threshold β are marked as invalid.
In this way, only the combination of keys yielding the highest correlation peak
is selected. At this moment, the input pairs are solved in the sense that the
algorithm can uniquely assign each of the two temporary keys of a pair to the
corresponding state bytes. As a consequence, the algorithm will not further
process the possible keys marked as invalid. Thus, this optimization improves
the algorithm eﬃciency by reducing the number of performed CPA attacks.
Finally, the algorithm returns all possible keys, which are marked as valid. If the
threshold β tends to zero, the algorithm will return only one possible key. When the
quality of the side-channel acquisition is good (i.e. high signal-to-noise ratio) and
there are enough power traces, the algorithm yields the correct key.
7.5.1 Optimality
We prove that our algorithm uses the minimum number of CPA attacks possible to
recover the master key and thus is optimal. Hence, the lower bounds provided in
Table 7.5 are optimal.
Theorem 7.5.1. Algorithm 5 performs an optimal number of CPA attacks to recover
the 16-byte master key of the AES.
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Proof. The only way an attacker can recover the 16-byte master key of the AES is
to recover all key bytes of a round r and then to reverse the key schedule. Since the
function that derives the round keys of round i from the round keys of round i− 1 is
bijective, knowledge of all round key bytes of a round r leads to the knowledge of
the master key.
Let us assume that Algorithm 5 uses n individual CPA attacks for a given initial
state and it is not optimal. Thus, there exists at least one algorithm that is able
to recover the master key using only m CPA attacks, with m < n. We show next
that such an algorithm does not exist. If there exists an algorithm that uses less
CPA attacks than Algorithm 5, then this algorithm attacks at least one key byte
less. But if it does so, then the attack can not be carried to later rounds any more
because the state byte corresponding to the unrecovered key yields unknown and
variable state bytes after the MixColumns transformation. These bytes can not be
recovered using a CPA attack and thus the attack fails. As a consequence, there is
no algorithm that uses less CPA attacks than Algorithm 5.
7.5.2 Choosing the Best Attack Strategy
For up to seven bytes controlled by the attacker, our attack algorithm (Algorithm 5)
is more eﬃcient than the classic attack algorithm where all possible key bytes are
attacked to recover the master key. The improvement varies between 15% and 68%
of the number of CPA attacks required by the classic attack. When an attacker has
control of more than seven input bytes, our algorithm performs the same number of
CPA attacks as the classic attack. At the same time, our algorithm gives a unique
master key, provided that there are enough traces with a high signal-to-noise ratio
available. This is not the case for a classic attack unless an additional mechanism to
discard invalid keys, as the one in Algorithm 5, is employed.
Bytes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
min(Rnds)
Classic attack 150 104 188 80 66 52 46 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 16
Algorithm 5 48 42 48 38 38 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 16
Improvement 102 62 140 42 28 14 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
max(Rnds)
Classic attack 150 104 188 110 72 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 45 46 47 16
Algorithm 5 48 42 48 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 45 46 47 16
Improvement 102 62 140 62 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 7.5: The number of individual CPA attacks required to recover the master key
for diﬀerent number of bytes (Bytes) controlled by attacker; “min(Rnds)”/“max(Rnds)”
and “Bytes” precisely identify the evaluation case. “Classic attack” does not use the
optimizations introduced in “Algorithm 5” to discard the invalid keys. “Improvement”
gives the number of CPA attacks saved by an attacker using Algorithm 5 over an
attacker using “Classic attack”.
An attacker willing to reduce the duration of the oﬄine phase of the attack
(without increasing the number of rounds that must be attacked) can use the
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results in Table 7.5 in corroboration with the data in Table 7.3 to adjust the attack
accordingly. More precisely, if an attacker is able to control up to n bytes of the
AES input, she can choose to control m (m ≤ n) bytes of the input because m
variable bytes minimize the number of CPA attacks required to recover the master
key. This decision has to be made before performing the side-channel acquisition
since it inﬂuences the chosen inputs. Another argument in favor of using less variable
input bytes is that the attack is much more diﬃcult to detect if the injected packets
have fewer variable bytes and mimic the appearance of a normal network traﬃc.
For example, when n = 12, an attacker can choose m = 4, 5, or 6 to reduce the
complexity of the oﬄine attack from 44 to 38 individual CPA attacks, while still
attacking just three rounds. The result is an overall improvement of the attack
eﬃciency by 14% over the classic attack.
An even better decision can be made with the help of experimental results for
diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the input from a similar target to the one to be attacked
in addition to the results presented so far. For this reason, in the next section we
determine experimentally the number of traces required to recover the master key
for each evaluation case using EM leakages from an ARM Cortex-M3 processor.
7.6 Results
7.6.1 Electromagnetic Leakage
For the experimental evaluation, we considered two unprotected implementations
of the AES written in ANSI C. The ﬁrst implementation uses table lookups for the
S-box, while the second one uses the T-table strategy. For each of the 25 evaluation
cases we measured up to 2000 EM traces. The acquisition took about 90 minutes
for an evaluation case. The samples were split into ﬁles corresponding to the AES
round number. Then, we mounted the attack presented in Algorithm 5 using an
increasing number of traces in the interval [100, 2000] with a step of 100 traces until
the guessing entropy converged to zero.
For each implementation we considered two selection functions based on the
AES S-box and T-table, respectively. The minimum number of traces for which the
guessing entropy becomes zero and remains stable is pictorially shown in Figure 7.5
for each evaluation case. All attacks recovered the full 16-byte master key with
less than 1600 EM traces. In general, the master key was recovered with fewer
traces when the selection function perfectly matched the implementation strategy.
Though, our results show that full key recovery is possible even when the selection
function does not perfectly match the attacked implementation. The attacks on
the S-box implementation using the T-table selection function needed 204 more
traces on average to recover the master key compared to the attacks on the same
implementation using the S-box selection function. Similarly, using the S-box selection
function instead of the T-table selection function to attack the implementation based
on the T-table strategy required 354 more traces on average. For details on the exact
number of traces required to recover the master key for each evaluation case and
attack scenario we refer the reader to Section 7.6.3
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Figure 7.5: The number of EM traces required to fully recover the master key. Scenar-
ios: (a) S-box implementation, S-box selection function; (b) S-box implementation,
T-table selection function; (c) T-table implementation, T-table selection function;
(d) T-table implementation, S-box selection function.
7.6.2 Simulated Leakage
We averaged the guessing entropy of 100 experiments on simulated traces for each
of the 25 evaluation cases. Then we selected the minimum number of traces for
which the guessing entropy was zero and remained stable. The results are shown in
Figure 7.6.
Comparing the results for the simulated traces (Figure 7.6) with the results for
the EM traces acquired from the Cortex-M3 processor (Figure 7.5), we can notice
the following diﬀerences:
• In general, for simulated traces the attacks against the T-table implementation
using the T-table selection function (c) required a similar but slightly smaller
number of traces than the attacks on the S-box implementation using the
S-box selection function (a). In contrast, the leakage estimation of the two
selection functions indicates that the S-box selection function leaks a little
bit more than the T-table selection function. But when the leakages of the
two selection functions were quantiﬁed, they were clearly isolated from the
leakages of other operations. As a consequence, the intermediate results of
similar neighboring operations have a greater inﬂuence on the correlation of
the S-box leakage than on the correlation of the T-table leakage. This can be
explained by the fact that there are 19 possible Hamming weight values for
the T-table output but only 9 possible Hamming weight values for the S-box
output. Thus, it is easier to distinguish a T-table output from the neighboring
T-table outputs than an S-box output from the neighboring S-box outputs. On
the other hand, for the EM traces, the attacks on the S-box implementation
using the S-box selection function (a) required less traces than the attacks on
the T-table implementation using the T-table selection function (c). For the
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Figure 7.6: The number of simulated traces required to fully recover the master
key. Scenarios: (a) S-box implementation, S-box selection function; (b) S-box
implementation, T-table selection function; (c) T-table implementation, T-table
selection function; (d) T-table implementation, S-box selection function.
EM traces, the attack results are consistent with the leakages of the selection
functions as quantiﬁed by the correlation coeﬃcient diﬀerence.
• The attacks that used the non-matching selection functions (b, d) required a
similar number of simulated traces. Contrariwise, the attacks on the T-table
implementation using the S-box selection function (d) required more EM traces
than the attacks on the S-box implementation using the T-table selection
function (b).
• In the case of simulated traces attacked with the matching selection functions (a,
c), the number of traces necessary to fully recover the master key when the
attacker controlled less than six input bytes was greater than when the attacker
controlled more than six input bytes. On the contrary, the number of traces
necessary to fully recover the master key for the EM leakage was minimal when
the attacker controlled exactly three input bytes.
For details on the exact number of traces required to recover the master key for
each evaluation case and attack scenario we refer the reader to Section 7.6.3.
7.6.3 Detailed Results
We give the number of traces required to fully recover the AES master key using
simulated and EM traces for all evaluation cases in Table 7.6.
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Case Bytes Rounds
EM leakage Simulated leakage
(a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
0 1 4 700 960 630 1120 20 34 19 40
1 2 4 620 760 600 490 15 28 13 30
2 3 4 80 100 180 80 14 32 16 29
3 4 3 430 700 790 1060 24 33 19 39
4 4 4 570 760 300 160 13 31 19 33
5 5 3 390 660 820 1140 15 37 21 38
6 5 4 520 730 390 690 14 33 12 35
7 6 3 280 540 790 1290 20 35 17 34
8 6 4 620 900 910 1170 11 39 8 40
9 7 3 280 590 800 1160 14 42 13 32
10 7 4 500 780 800 1190 11 32 8 40
11 8 3 500 570 640 1220 11 30 7 39
12 8 4 490 730 660 1590 10 33 7 36
13 9 3 410 670 1010 1240 11 35 7 32
14 9 4 670 870 800 1210 12 39 7 33
15 10 3 430 500 830 1150 10 29 8 34
16 10 4 570 790 1000 1440 10 33 8 35
17 11 3 380 560 780 1050 10 37 9 34
18 11 4 400 590 790 1420 11 33 9 32
19 12 3 420 650 820 990 11 29 7 31
20 12 4 530 910 790 1460 11 39 9 39
21 13 3 490 620 720 1130 11 40 8 42
22 14 3 350 670 640 1200 11 35 8 37
23 15 3 510 650 810 1200 10 33 8 32
24 16 1 240 310 590 890 10 30 7 30
Average 459 663 716 1070 13 34 11 35
Table 7.6: The number of traces required to fully recover the master key for each
evaluation case (“Case”). “Bytes” gives the number of bytes controlled by attacker;
“Rounds” gives the number of rounds that have to be attacked to recover the master
key. Scenarios: (a) S-box implementation, S-box selection function; (b) S-box
implementation, T-table selection function; (c) T-table implementation, T-table
selection function; (d) T-table implementation, S-box selection function.
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7.7 Countermeasures
Our experimental results show that side-channel countermeasures such as masking
must be employed in order to protect the AES implementations based on lookup
tables (S-box and T-table implementation strategies) even in a communication
protocol scenario, when the adversary has limited control of the input. Masking
nonlinear lookup tables is a challenging task since it adds a considerable penalty on
execution time and memory usage [368].
Although bit-sliced implementations are not present in many cryptographic
libraries due to their limitations (i.e. can not be used in a feedback mode of operation
such as CCM), they have a lower CPA leakage than implementations using lookup
tables [50]. Nevertheless, they are still vulnerable to DPA attacks [29].
A lightweight algorithm (block cipher or authenticated encryption), particularly
one designed for eﬃcient masking, is a good replacement for the AES-CCM when
considering side-channel protection.
Other countermeasures, such as a key refreshing mechanism, can support a
defense in depth approach. However, any additional countermeasure aﬀects the
overall eﬃciency of an IoT protocol and consequently the most eﬀective ones (i.e.
masking) must have priority given the resource constraints.
7.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an extensive security analysis of AES software im-
plementations against CPA attacks in the context of network protocols. In this
scenario the attacker has control of several input bytes, while the remaining input
bytes are ﬁxed. To asses the resilience of AES implementations to all possible input
combinations, we presented an algorithm for symbolic processing of the cipher state.
Then, we classiﬁed all possible inputs into 25 independent evaluation cases depending
on the number of input bytes controlled by attacker and the number of rounds
that must be attacked to recover the master key. Finally, we described an optimal
algorithm that recovers the master key by mounting the minimum number of CPA
attacks possible. It makes clever decisions based on the set of key pairs that aﬀects
the key byte under attack and the correlation coeﬃcient of possible key candidates
to discard impossible keys.
We showed that unprotected implementations of the AES based on the S-box and
T-table strategies can be broken even when the attacker controls only one input byte
of the cipher with less than 1600 electromagnetic traces acquired from a 32-bit ARM
Cortex-M3 processor in about one hour. Knowledge of the implementation strategy
does not signiﬁcantly improve the attack outcome, nor does it reduce the attack
complexity. Thus, unprotected implementations of the AES should not be used to
secure the communication between end devices in networks. Care must be taken
when using implementations of the AES from popular open-source cryptographic
libraries since most of them are not protected against side-channel attacks.
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8.1 Introduction
Over the last few years we have seen a huge increase of IoT-enabled devices available
on the market. These devices, intended to make our lives easier by collecting,
processing and exchanging data, are manufactured by various companies around
the world. To foster the development of industry-wide standards for smart devices,
companies from diﬀerent business ﬁelds gathered together in various working groups,
organizations or consortia. Their aim is to augment the smart objects’ capabilities
by enhancing the communication and data exchange between devices from diﬀerent
manufacturers. This is a challenging task given the heterogeneous nature of the
IoT comprising a vast variety of devices, of which the overwhelming majority is
characterized by a multitude of constraints such as energy or power consumption,
code size and memory footprint to name a few.
The IoT ecosystem is still in its early inception stages and a lot has to be done
until all smart devices can communicate seamlessly with each other. Unfortunately,
compared to the current abundance of emerging standards for the IoT, there is little
to no eﬀort to thoroughly analyze the security of these proposals. Thus, neither
the companies involved in the development of such standards, nor the end users are
fully aware of the security and privacy aspects of future connected products that
will ﬂood the market in the coming years.
8.1.1 Attack Surface and Threats for Connected Devices
In the connected world, attacks that can be mounted remotely pose a major threat.
Software exploitation and network attacks fall into this category. They require low
resources (usually just a connected PC), and do not require physical proximity.
Especially in the context of the connected home, most current devices are within
the home perimeter and physical access would mean that the attacker is already
inside the house (assuming building access as an asset). However, devices like smart
locks and cameras are on the edge or outside of the building perimeter, and thus
may be physically accessed. In the near future, we will most likely see devices for
outdoor lighting or garden sprinklers connected to the smart home ecosystem. An
attack on one of such devices may provide an entry point to the ecosystem.
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Physical proximity attacks pose a relatively larger threat in a commercial setting,
for instance a hotel where rooms are equipped with wireless door locks. If an
adversary has access to such a smart lock connected to a mesh network like Thread
in her room, she might be able to exploit it in a similar way to what we describe in
this chapter to get access to the hotel network. A recent security incident targeting
the access control system of a hotel [256] shows that this type of scenario is well
possible; see also the physical attack on a door lock presented in [342].
8.1.2 Motivation
With the growing complexity of exploit-mitigation techniques, recent software attacks
need to chain several vulnerabilities to succeed (e.g. [147]). Moreover, new network
protocols are designed with security in mind.
We are driven by the curiosity to see if extending the attack surface to physical
attacks, such as electromagnetic or power analysis (common in the smart card
security world), would give additional beneﬁts to the attacker that pay oﬀ the need
for physical proximity. With the increased availability and reduced cost of both
hardware and software tools for side-channel attacks ([252], [76], [323] to list a few)
these attacks are becoming familiar and aﬀordable to a wide hacker community. We
are interested to evaluate the realistic eﬀort required to apply such an attack in the
IoT context.
The network layer of the connectivity stack typically relies on a master key
and relatively long-lived network keys to provide the ﬁrst layer of defense against
an attacker in the proximity of an IoT device. A question raised by the designers
of IoT hardware is: Do cryptographic implementations in the network layer need
protection against side-channel attacks? We have not seen a consolidated opinion on
this matter, with academic experts in Diﬀerential Power Analysis (DPA) claiming
attacks are possible (see related work paragraph below), while industry being on the
conservative side. In our view, this disagreement is due to the lack of in-depth case
studies that could demonstrate the feasibility (or infeasibility) of such attacks.
Numerous articles and marketing campaigns advertise Thread [351] as a new,
eﬃcient and secure solution for the connected home with the roadmap to expand
into the commercial building and professional sectors. The claim of being always
secure 1 garnered our attention and made us curious to check ourselves if this claim
is true, especially in view of the availability of OpenThread. The lessons learned
from side-channel analysis applied to the Thread networking stack could be used to
improve the overall security level of current and future protocols designed for the
IoT.
8.1.3 Contribution
We perform, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst public side-channel vulnerability
analysis of Thread. Thread is a complex networking stack and an exhaustive analysis
1Meanwhile, the claim has been changed to “built-in security”. See http://threadgroup.org/
What-is-Thread/Overview
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would require a tremendous eﬀort, especially when multidisciplinary attack vectors
are considered as in our work. While providing some coverage, we focus on ﬁnding
fast and eﬀective ways to get access to a Thread network. Our contributions are:
• We perform a vulnerability analysis of Thread speciﬁcally with respect to
an adversary capable to mount electromagnetic side-channel attacks. In this
context, we outline several attack vectors to bypass the security mechanisms
of the networking stack. In particular, we target manipulations of the security
material (i.e. cryptographic keys).
• We describe a fully implemented attack that chains the exploitation of network-
level mechanisms and electromagnetic side-channel analysis techniques to get
unauthorized access to an existing Thread network after several hours of
acquisitions in the close proximity of a Thread Router or Router-Eligible End
Device that is already in the network.
• We explain that the failure of the full attack is due to a fortunate side-eﬀect
of a feature not related to security (packet fragmentation). Therefore, the
protocol weaknesses we discovered are relevant.
• We describe a range of countermeasures for the protocol and for the implemen-
tation that can be applied whenever side-channel resistance is required.
We believe this case study provides a useful lesson to designers of IoT protocols and
devices. Our work comes early in the life cycle of future Thread products. Because
of this, we believe that it has a more profound impact, although being less impressive
than breaking an oﬀ-the-shelf Thread device.
8.1.4 Related Work
In the past years, numerous papers addressed various aspects of IoT security. One
notable direction is the analysis of the security and privacy of software frameworks
for the IoT [126, 127]. A survey of the security and privacy of implantable medical
devices and body area networks is given in [301].
Though, the impact of side-channel attacks on the security of connected objects is
far from being completely and clearly understood. A step towards this goal was made
by the following works. O’Flynn and Chen attacked the MAC layer encryption of an
IEEE 802.15.4 node [259] using side-channel attacks; they describe the approach and
implement the basic steps but not the full attack. Their attack builds on previous
works of Jaﬀe [175] and Kizhvatov [190]. Ronen et al. [300] exploited popular smart
lights to create a worm capable to quickly spread an infection over large areas. Their
work used side-channel attacks to recover the global AES-CCM key used to encrypt
and authenticate ﬁrmware updates.
Compared to the work described in [259], our attack is performed in the context
of Thread. It bypasses more complex security mechanisms to aﬀect the full Thread
networking stack and not only the standalone MAC layer. By our full implementation,
we demonstrate that the threat posed by the recovery of the MAC layer key largely
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depends on the context, speciﬁcally on the upper layers, and that there may be
unexpected hurdles. Additionally, we improve the attack on AES-CCM of [259] by
increasing the number of ciphertext bytes under our control. As a consequence, we
have to attack one AES round less to recover the 16-byte key.
Therefore, to our knowledge, this work is one of the few to demonstrate an EM
analysis attack in a complex wireless network setting, and to address the security of
an IoT network protocol with respect to adversaries capable to mount side-channel
attacks.
8.1.5 Responsible Disclosure
We informed the Thread Group in October 2016 about our ﬁndings and proposed
countermeasures. We received a conﬁrmation of our ﬁndings. Based on our report,
the Thread Group decided to elaborate a set of recommendations for implementers
in order to enhance the security of Thread products.
8.2 Thread
Supported by more than 200 companies, including most major players in the IoT
arena, the Thread Group [351] is a nonproﬁt organization that promotes Thread’s
use in connected home solutions. Thread is a network and transport level stack
of protocols designed to simplify consumer lifestyles by controlling and connecting
products at home. In November 2016, the Thread Group announced the expansion
of Thread beyond the connected home to commercial spaces where people work [353].
Nest released an open-source implementation of Thread, called OpenThread, on
GitHub [263] in May 2016. As of October 2017, the OpenThread GitHub repository
is supported by ten members of the Thread Group and is an important resource for
hobbyists and early adopters who cannot aﬀord the membership fee. OpenThread
runs on a number of wireless hardware platforms.
Based on well-established technologies, the Thread networking stack is built on
top of physical and data link layers of IEEE 802.15.4 [170], operating at 250 kbps in
the 2.45 GHz band [351]. Thread uses 6LowPAN to enable IPv6 addressing of up to
250 devices per network. The mesh network topology of Thread accommodates up
to 32 routers to create a resilient network with no single point of failure. It provides
an eﬃcient way to forward messages between nodes using the RIPng distance vector
routing protocol. For its transport layer, Thread uses UDP and DTLS. CoAP is
used as application layer for the commissioning of new devices.
Thread devices are classiﬁed into two groups (see Table 8.1) based on power
requirements and resource characteristics: Full Thread Devices (FTDs) and Minimal
Thread Devices (MTDs).
• An FTD is usually supplied directly from the power lines, but it can also
run on batteries. A FTD can have three diﬀerent roles in a Thread network:
Router, Router-Eligible End Device (REED), and Full End Device (FED).
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• An MTD runs a lighter version of the Thread stack with reduced capabilities
due to its limited resources; it usually runs on batteries. A MTD can have
one of the following roles: Minimal End Device (MED) or Sleepy End Device
(SED).
A key diﬀerence between FTDs and MTDs is that FTDs keep a communication
link with neighboring Routers, while MTDs do not. A device that is not a Router is
called an End Device (ED) and it is attached to a Parent with whom it communicates
through a direct link.
A device attaches to a Thread network as an ED. During the lifetime of a
Thread network, a device can have diﬀerent roles at diﬀerent moments of time. For
example, a REED can become a Router if the network conﬁguration is favorable;
similarly, a Router can become a REED. A Thread network is managed by a Router
autonomously elected by the network and called Leader. The Leader assigns router
addresses, collects and distributes information about the network state to all Routers.
If the current Leader becomes unavailable, another Router will replace it. A Thread
Router having other network interfaces (Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, etc.) is called
a Border Router. It can forward the traﬃc between the Thread network and other
networks.
Type Role Description End Device (ED)
FTD
Router acts as a router ✗
REED can act as a router ✓
FED will never act as a router ✓
MTD
MED always on ✓
SED sleeps most of the time ✓
Table 8.1: Device types and roles in a Thread network.
Network security is enforced at the MAC (Media Access Control) and MLE
(Mesh Link Establishment) layers using AES in CCM mode [263]. All communication
within a Thread Network is secured, except for MLE Discovery Request and MLE
Discovery Response messages. Commissioning security is based on a DTLS tunnel
established using elliptic curve J-PAKE and the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.
8.2.1 Security Material
Once successfully commissioned into a Thread network, the connected device gets
the 16-byte network master key MK used to secure Thread communication and the
Commissioning Key CK used to secure Thread commissioning [263].
Each node keeps its own 4-byte Sequence counter in synchronization with neigh-
boring devices through the use of designated ﬁelds in the security header of MAC
frames (1-byte Key Index) and MLE messages (4-byte Key Source). The 1-byte
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Key Index is computed from the 4-byte Sequence number:
KeyIndex = (Sequence ∧ 0x7F) + 1 (8.1)
Thread communication is secured using a 16-byte MAC key KMAC or a 16-
byte MLE key KMLE . These keys are derived from the 4-byte Sequence number
concatenated with the ASCII binary representation of the string “Thread” (0x54
0x68 0x72 0x65 0x61 0x64) using the keyed-hash message authentication code
(HMAC) function HMAC under the network master key MK as described below.
The hash function used is SHA-256.
KMAC ‖ KMLE = HMACMK(Sequence ‖ “Thread”) (8.2)
Fresh MAC and MLE keys are generated when the default key rotation timer (set
to 672 hours) expires. The Sequence number is incremented by one, the KeyIndex
value is updated, the HMACMK function is executed and the key rotation timer is
rearmed. When refreshing the keys, the outgoing MAC and MLE frame counters are
reset to zero.
When receiving an MLE message with a diﬀerent Sequence number set in the
Key Source ﬁeld, the receiver computes a temporary key using the received sequence
as described in Equation 8.2. In the case of MAC frames, if the received KeyIndex
is not equal to the computed KeyIndex from Equation 8.1, the receiver will generate
a temporary key only when the absolute diﬀerence between the two values is one.
This temporary key allows a node to synchronize with its Parent after a period of
absence from the Thread network.
Each Thread node, regardless of its type and role, stores the security material
and network parameters of the Thread network to its non-volatile memory to be
able to rejoin the network after a reset without human intervention.
8.2.2 Mesh Link Establishment (MLE)
The Mesh Link Establishment (MLE) protocol facilitates the secure conﬁguration
of radio links and exchange of network parameters. The MLE messages are sent
inside UDP datagrams with the source and destination ports set to 19788. The
security of MLE messages is provided by AES in CCM mode using the MLE key
KMLE . The Auxiliary Security Header, Source IP address and Destination
IP address are authenticated using a 32-bit message integrity code (MIC), while
the payload is encrypted. The Auxiliary Security Header of an MLE message
includes the 4-byte Key Source.
A Thread Router periodically multicasts MLE Advertisement messages to adver-
tise its presence. Such a message is sent at an interval between 1 and 32 seconds
after the previous advertisement was sent by the same Router. The Thread REEDs
advertise their presence by multicasting a similar message every ten minutes on
average.
The process of establishing a communication link between two Thread nodes
N1 and N2 is depicted in Figure 8.1. In this case, the Child node N1 is creating a
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communication link with its Parent N2 in three phases: Attaching, Child Synchro-
nization, and Link Synchronization. This message exchange occurs, for example,
when an MTD reconnects to a Thread network.
Before initiating the MLE message exchange shown in Figure 8.1, the Child
sends an MLE Discovery Request to locate the existing Thread devices. It gets
in response an MLE Discovery Response message containing the Thread network
channel number and its PAN ID.
In the Attaching phase, the Child (N1) multicasts an MLE Parent Request mes-
sage with a randomly generated 8-byte challenge. All Routers and REEDs that
receive this request store the received challenge and answer with an MLE Parent
Response message including the received challenge and a new random 8-byte chal-
lenge. N1 selects one of the answers it receives based on the link quality and unicasts
an MLE Child ID Request message that includes the received challenge to the corre-
sponding node N2. The Parent sends an MLE Child ID Response which may include
the network conﬁguration parameters. Then, the Child Synchronization takes place.
The Child sends an MLE Child Update Request to its Parent and gets in response
an MLE Child Update Response message.
The communication link is established in the Link Synchronization phase. Initially,
the Child multicasts an MLE Link Request message containing an 8-byte random
challenge. The Parent answers with an MLE Link Accept & Request message that
includes the received challenge and a new randomly generated challenge. The Child
conﬁrms the Parent request by sending an MLE Link Accept message, which includes
the challenge received from the Parent.
Child (N1) Parent (N2)
MLE Parent Request
MLE Parent Response
MLE Child ID Request
MLE Child ID Response
Attach.
MLE Child Update Request
MLE Child Update Response
Child
Sync.
MLE Link Request
MLE Link Accept & Request
MLE Link Accept
Link
Sync.
Figure 8.1: Establishing a communication link between two Thread nodes.
8.3 Threat Model
The are numerous avenues an attacker can try to compromise a Thread network.
While some threats were well understood and properly mitigated in the design phase
of the networking stack, others were less obvious and thus overlooked. The latter ones
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are harder to eliminate as the protocol becomes more mature and widely used [242].
We make a classiﬁcation of the possible attack types in the IoT environment, without
aiming at a complete coverage of all threats speciﬁc for these settings. The threat
modeling we performed for Thread can be easily adapted to other IoT protocols and
the lessons learned from this study can be employed to protect other IoT solutions
as well.
The goal of our threat model is to provide a classiﬁcation and a better under-
standing of Thread’s attack surface. The attacker attempts to aﬀect one or more of
the basic security functions: conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability. The primary
goal of the attacker is to get access into a Thread network in order to intercept and
understand the communication or to take control of the network. Other objectives in-
clude, but are not limited to, disrupting the normal network operation by performing
a DoS attack or altering data sent across the network through a man-in-the-middle
attack.
Similar to the work of Atamli and Martin [21], we consider three main entities
that can threaten the security of an IoT system: legitimate user, device maker, and
malicious adversary. A legitimate user poses a threat to the security of an IoT
system when, for example, she seeks to bypass the authentication, authorization,
and accounting mechanisms used by the target system. In this way, she might
unlock restricted features of the device or use the existing ones without paying for
them. A device maker can threaten the security of an IoT system either accidentally
(e.g. poorly implemented security mechanism) or deliberately (e.g. aiming to collect
user’s data). Finally, a malicious adversary is the classical attacker willing to get
unauthorized access to a system or to damage that system.
Depending on the location of the attacker with respect to the target system, we
distinguish between: remote, proximity, and invasive attacks. The powerful remote
attacks are well understood from the classical Internet-connected systems. Although,
some IoT protocols such as Thread assume that not all IoT devices inside a network
are directly accessible from the Internet. Thus the attack surface of remote attacks
on IoT networks is reduced compared to the attack surface of the same attacks on
the classical Internet. The IoT is a highly heterogeneous environment with devices
deployed in various, including distant, locations. In such settings, it is hard to enforce
the physical security of these systems that become vulnerable to proximity and even
invasive attacks. Proximity attacks can be performed without physical access to the
target device and thus are harder to detect than invasive attacks. A summary of
the attack types speciﬁc to the IoT is given in Table 8.2.
Proximity attacks are very feasible in the IoT since most protocols use wireless
communication means and are deployed in easily accessible spots. Hence, the attacker
can easily get in the proximity of a Thread device and observe it performing various
operations. Given the ubiquitous nature of the IoT, it is expected that the attacker
is able to quickly identify such target devices. We assume the attacker can carry a
portable oscilloscope and an EM probe required to perform an EM analysis attack.
We do not restrict the attacker’s capabilities in terms of equipment or physical
location to accurately capture the current state of security in the IoT with respect
to EM analysis attacks.
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Attack type Attack Mitigation
remote
software exploitation system hardening
guessing password
strong security policy
brute force
proximity EM analysis
side-channel
countermeasures
invasive
power analysis
fault attacks
ﬂash read-out ﬂash read-out protection
Table 8.2: Summary of the attack types speciﬁc to the IoT.
8.4 Side-Channel Vulnerability Analysis
The goal of our vulnerability analysis was to investigate attack paths that can provide
full access to a Thread network. This allows us to sniﬀ and understand all network
traﬃc, to add new devices into the network, and to take control of the network
by changing the security material. In order to achieve this, we explored diﬀerent
attack vectors to recover the security material of the network. We ﬁrst explore the
feasibility of several active attacks paths; these are attacks in which the attacker
injects packets to trigger diﬀerent operations on the target nodes. Then, based on
the results of the active attacks, we can estimate how successful a passive attack
exploiting the same mechanism could be.
We did not look for implementation-speciﬁc issues such as buﬀer overﬂow attacks,
fragmentation attacks, or improper input sanitization, because they would be mean-
ingful only for a particular software implementation. We did not include attacks
that aﬀect the availability of the network such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in
our scope. Below we present the most promising attack paths. Other attack paths
are described in Section 8.8.
8.4.1 Relationship between MK and KMLE
Having the master key MK and Sequence number, a node can compute the MLE
key KMLE using Equation 8.2. If a node possesses the MLE key KMLE but does
not have the master key MK, it can send an MLE Child ID Request to ask for the
network master key. Its Parent will answer with an MLE Child ID Response, which
includes the Master Key TLV containing the requested master key MK. This means
that MK and KMLE are equivalent, in the sense that if a node has one of them,
it can easily compute or retrieve the other one. Giving access to the master key
to nodes having a key derived from it generates serious security issues as we will
describe later.
However, this approach has a major limitation. The Master Key TLV is just
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a small fraction of the data included in the MLE Child ID Response. Although
the attacker can ask for some speciﬁc TLVs in his request, the Parent decides the
exact content of the response message. If the answer ﬁts into a single MLE message,
then the response is encrypted only at the MLE layer. As the total payload length
of the MLE Child ID Response message exceeds the maximum transmission unit
(MTU) of 127 bytes, the MLE message is fragmented at the 6LowPAN layer. When
fragmentation occurs, all resulting fragments are encrypted at the MAC layer using
KMAC . Thus, the attacker has to ﬁrst decrypt the MAC frames, then to reassemble
the fragments of the original MLE message, and ﬁnally to decrypt the MLE message
in order to get the value of the Master Key TLV.
Hence, the attacker can get the master key when she knows only the MLE key
if the response MLE message is not fragmented and thus not encrypted at the
MAC layer. We note that this mechanism is not aﬀected by the OBTAIN_MASTER_KEY
bit of the Security Policy TLV. When set, the OBTAIN_MASTER_KEY bit enables a
Commissioner to extract the master key for out-of-band commissioning after she was
authenticated.
This mechanism does not help a node to reconnect to a Thread network if the
network master key was changed while it was sleeping because the node does not
possess a valid MLE key to ask for the new master key. Thus its MLE requests will
be dropped, and it has to be commissioned again by a human to the Thread network.
8.4.2 Processing of an MLE Parent Request
An obvious option for an attacker is to exploit the very ﬁrst message exchange
that allows a Child to connect to a Parent in a Thread network. Next we detail
how a Router processes the ﬁrst message sent by a Child that wishes to establish a
communication link with a Parent.
Upon receipt of an MLE Parent Request message, the receiving Router extracts
the received Sequence number from the Key Source ﬁeld. Then, it compares the
value of the received Sequence with its current internal Sequence number. There
are two possible cases:
• If the two sequence numbers are equal, then the Router continues by processing
the authentication tag of the received MLE message using the current MLE
key KMLE of the Thread network.
• If the two sequence numbers are not equal, then the Router derives a temporary
key from the received Sequence number. The Router uses this temporary MLE
key K ′MLE to process the authentication tag of the received message.
If the resulting tag is the same as the authentication tag present in the received MLE
Parent Request message, then the Router prepares a response. Else, it will drop
the received MLE message.
Whatever processing path the Router follows, it will perform at least an AES-
CCM operation on the received message. Thus, an attacker can easily trigger
executions of HMAC-SHA256 or AES-CCM by pretending to be a Child willing to
connect to a Parent. If the attacker chooses to trigger HMAC-SHA256 executions
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on the receiving Router, she has to inject MLE Parent Request messages with a
diﬀerent Sequence number from the one observed in MLE Advertisement messages.
On the other hand, if the attacker is interested in observing AES-CCM computations
with the current network MLE key KMLE , she has to inject MLE Parent Request
messages with the same Sequence number. Hence, an attacker not yet connected to
the target Thread network can take advantage of a normal network mechanism used
to establish a communication link between a Child and a Parent Router to trigger
executions of the underlying cryptographic algorithms with sensitive key material at
her own will.
8.4.3 Attack on Key Generation
An attacker can inject MLE Parent Request messages with a chosen Sequence
number. When receiving an MLE Parent Request with a diﬀerent Sequence number
from its own Sequence number, a Router will derive a temporary MLE key using
Equation 8.2.
Although it is possible to trigger executions of the HMAC function, the number
of input bytes controlled by attacker is not enough to make the recovery of the
master key MK possible as we show next.
IV F
MK ⊕ ipad
F
m
IV F
MK ⊕ opad
F KMAC ‖ KMLE
k1
k2
Figure 8.2: Key generation using HMAC.
The key derivation is pictorially shown in Figure 8.2. The one-way compression
function of SHA-256 is denoted by F . The input message m to the HMAC function
is obtained by concatenating the 4-byte Sequence number with the 6-byte represen-
tation of the “Thread” string, the 46 bytes of padding, and the 8-byte message length
len: m = Sequence ‖ “Thread” ‖ 0x80 0x00 . . . 0x00 ‖ len. It is easy to observe
that the only variable part of the message m is the Sequence number. Thus, the
attacker controls exactly four bytes of the input message of the HMAC function.
If the attacker could recover k1 = F (IV,MK⊕ipad) and k2 = F (IV,MK⊕opad),
then she could generate the MLE and MAC keys having only the correct Sequence
number, but not the master key MK. Though, having the current MAC and MLE
keys of the Thread network, the attacker can get the network master key from a
Thread node as described in Section 8.4.1. In order to recover k1 and k2, the attacker
will target executions of the compression function F (k1,m). The attacker controls
four bytes (a 32-bit word) of the input message, which are mixed in the ﬁrst iteration
of the compression function F with constant but unknown bytes of the internal state.
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As a consequence, she can learn the relationship between four unknown but constant
32-bit words by attacking a 32-bit modular addition in the ﬁrst iteration. The attack
stops here, because the attacker can not propagate it to the next iterations in absence
of known and variable data.
Thus, an attacker can not exploit executions of the HMAC function in unprotected
implementations using a CPA attack due to the limited control she has over the
input. Though, the attacker still has the option to perform a template attack. Due
to the complexity of the proﬁling phase required for mounting a template attack,
we decided to stop our investigation at this point and to explore other attack paths
instead.
8.4.4 Attack on the AES in CCM Mode
By injecting MLE Parent Request messages with the same Sequence number as the
one used by the target Thread network, an attacker triggers executions of the AES
in CCM mode with the current MLE key on the receiving Routers and REEDs.
A typical input block for the two stages (AES-CBC and AES-CTR) of the
AES-CCM is shown in Figure 8.3. The constant (ﬁxed) input bytes are given in
hexadecimal notation, while the variable bytes are colored in gray. The ﬁrst input
block of the AES in CBC mode is very similar to the ﬁrst input block of the AES
in CTR mode. The ﬁrst input byte is used for ﬂags and thus is ﬁxed. The last
three input bytes are also ﬁxed. The antepenultimate byte speciﬁes the security
level (0x05). As in the MAC layer of IEEE 802.15.4, this value indicates the use of
encryption and authentication with a 4-byte message integrity code (MIC). In the
case of AES-CBC the last two bytes are used to indicate the input plaintext length,
while in the case of AES-CTR they represent the counter value. The counter value
starts from one because the all-zero counter value is used for the computation of the
authentication tag [115]. The variable bytes for both input blocks are the 8-byte
source MAC address and the 4-byte frame counter.
(a) 49 Source MAC Address Frame Ctr 05 00 15
(b) 01 Source MAC Address Frame Ctr 05 00 01
Figure 8.3: Input format for the ﬁrst block of (a) AES-CBC and (b) AES-CTR.
An attacker can choose to craft MLE Parent Request messages having diﬀerent
payload lengths. As a consequence, the last byte of the AES-CBC is variable. This
additional variable byte does not improve the attack outcome, but it is very likely to
trigger an alert for abnormal network traﬃc in an intrusion detection/prevention
system (IDS/IPS), if available.
To successfully mount a CPA attack, the attacker needs to vary a part of the
input of the AES-CCM executions. As shown, an attacker can control up to 12 bytes
of the input for AES executions. Thus, she can target either the ﬁrst execution of
the AES in CBC mode or the ﬁrst execution of the AES in CTR mode.
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Since the attacker does not control all input bytes, she has to attack three rounds
of the AES in order to recover the 16-byte key. To propagate the CPA attack to the
later rounds, the attacker must use the method described by Jaﬀe [175] to compute
temporary keys that incorporate the constant input bytes. We found this MLE key
recovery attack vector very promising and we chose to exploit it. Details of the full
attack are given in Section 8.5.
8.5 Implementation of the Most Feasible Attack
In this section we describe each individual step of an attack path against a Thread
network that chains the vulnerabilities presented above in the most feasible way.
Then, we present the experimental setup we used to perform the attack. We show
and analyze the results of the attack. Finally, we discuss the cost and complexity of
the full attack.
The attack consists of the following four steps:
1. The attacker eavesdrops on the network traﬃc and records the Sequence
number present in the MLE Advertisement messages sent by Thread Routers
and REEDs.
2. The attacker observes and records the EM emanations of a target Router or
REED while she injects MLE Parent Request messages. The injected messages
use the observed Sequence number to trigger executions of the AES with the
current network MLE key. The variable and known inputs necessary to perform
the CPA attack are the source MAC address and frame counter ﬁelds. They are
randomly generated for each injected message. We stress that the side-channel
attack is applicable only to Thread Routers and REEDs because they process
the MLE Parent Request messages. This step requires the attacker to be in
the proximity of the target device such that she is able to reliably measure the
EM emissions. After the attacker has recorded enough traces, she continues
with the next step of the attack.
3. The attacker correlates the observed EM leakages with a hypothetical model
of a key-dependent sensitive intermediate variable in order to determine the
unknown key. In practice, CPA is an eﬃcient technique and thus it is employed
to recover the MLE key used during the observed computations.
4. Having the current MLE key of the network, the attacker attaches to a Thread
Router. She asks the Router for the network conﬁguration parameters including
the master key by sending an MLE Child ID Request message. The Router
will give the attacker the requested information in an MLE Child ID Response
message.
It is essential for the success of the attack that all the above-mentioned steps
succeed. Failure of any of these steps will render the full attack infeasible. The
success of the last step highly depends on how the Parent handles the MLE Child
ID Request messages and on the length of the MLE Child ID Response message as
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discussed in Section 8.4.1. If the message is fragmented and therefore additionally
encrypted with the MAC key, the attacker will need to recover KMAC . For example,
the MAC key can be recovered by mounting a CPA attack on the AES-CCM
executions that use KMAC . Though this is a possible path, we believe that it makes
the attack even more complex and we do not analyze it further.
An important factor that can be controlled to a certain extent by the attacker is
the quality of the side-channel acquisition. The better the signal-to-noise ratio of
the recorded traces, the fewer traces the attacker will need. The number of traces
required to recover the MLE key inﬂuences the duration of the acquisition. Thus,
the risk of the attacker being noticed increases as she needs more EM traces. The
reason is twofold. Firstly, the attacker has to spend more time in the vicinity of
the target Router or REED. Secondly, she has to inject more messages to trigger
executions of the AES.
Once the attacker has the network conﬁguration parameters, including the security
material, she has all the rights of a genuine member of the Thread network. Hence,
she is able to communicate with other nodes and can understand the communication
between other nodes. The attacker can commission new devices to the Thread
network. She can become a Router and then change the network parameters so that
the owner of the Thread network loses the control over his network.
8.5.1 Experimental Setup
8.5.1.1 Thread Network
We created our own Thread network consisting of two CC2538EM wireless micro-
controllers [349]. These devices were an obvious choice since they were the ﬁrst
to support the OpenThread implementation [263]. Moreover, our experimental
network uses one of the seven products (device and software stack bundle) certiﬁed
by the Thread Group [352]. The CC2538EM microcontroller has an ARM Cortex-M3
processor clocked at 32 MHz, up to 512 KB of ﬂash memory and an IEEE 802.15.4
radio transceiver. The purchasing cost of this hardware was much smaller than that
of similar devices shipped with proprietary implementations of Thread.
Initially, we experimented using the source code of Open-Thread to understand the
communication and the network mechanisms. Then, we modiﬁed the source code such
that we were able to generate various sequences of messages. Following this approach
we were able to better understand the source code and we inferred information about
part of the Thread speciﬁcations. We emphasize that OpenThread’s codebase is
very complex. Thus, understanding the relevant network mechanisms to our analysis
was a challenging task that required a tremendous eﬀort. Finally, we modiﬁed the
state machine of the OpenThread implementation to make an attacker able to inject
custom-crafted messages.
8.5.1.2 Measurement Setup
For the acquisition of the EM emissions from the target device, we used a Teledyne
LeCroy WaveRunner 625Zi [347] oscilloscope. Initially, we ran AES encryptions in a
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loop on the target device and we used an EM probe to locate the spots that leak
information during these executions. To hasten the process we ﬁrstly checked the
area around the chip and then several decoupling capacitors we could identify using
the schematic and layout of the board [349].
(a) H-field probe. (b) Near field probe.
Figure 8.4: The EM probes used for measurement of the EM leakage.
We started to capture the EM signal with a relatively cheap NewAE H-ﬁeld
probe having a 15 mm coil as shown in Figure 8.4a. Because the signal-to-noise ratio
was not satisfactory, we switched to a more precise (coil sizes of about 1 mm) and
relatively more expensive set of near ﬁeld probes from Langer (see Figure 8.4b). We
set the probe a few millimeters above the target board. For the results reported in
this chapter we ﬁxed the sampling rate to 1 GS/s. A lower sampling rate (500 MS/s)
signiﬁcantly aﬀected the attack outcome, while a higher sampling rate (5 GS/s) did
not signiﬁcantly improve the results.
The attacker’s board running the custom implementation of OpenThread gen-
erated a trigger signal on an output port each time an injected message was sent.
This signal was used by the oscilloscope to record the EM emissions. The injected
messages and the corresponding EM traces acquired by the oscilloscope were saved on
a personal computer. The target board ran a genuine implementation of OpenThread
and acted as a Router in our Thread network. We stress that no dedicated trigger
signal was provided from the target board. We chose to power the target board from
a regulated power supply rather than from a PC USB port to reduce the noise. These
settings accurately replicate a real usage scenario of a Thread device. Admittedly,
the network traﬃc may not be similar to the one of a real Thread network with very
active data transfers.
8.5.2 Alignment of the Electromagnetic Traces
Once the side-channel acquisition is over, the attacker has to align the EM traces.
The timing of diﬀerent events that occur during the acquisition of a trace are shown
in Figure 8.5. The injected message is sent at t0 and the oscilloscope is triggered.
The oscilloscope records the sampled signal between δmin and τ = δmax + tAES ,
while the relevant part for the attacker tAES is between t1 and t2.
The attacker has to determine experimentally the interval in which the relevant
part of the AES execution is very likely to start at δ ∈ [δmin, δmax]. Besides, she can
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timet0 δmin t1 δmax t2 τ
δ ∈ [δmin, δmax]
tAES
recorded samples
Figure 8.5: Timing of various events that occur during the acquisition of an EM
trace.
record a suﬃciently long interval that includes the relevant samples for most of the
measurements. For our experiments, the value of δ was in the interval [555, 564] µs,
while the relevant part of the AES execution tAES took 14.656 µs.
As illustrated by Figure 8.5, the relevant AES execution occurs at diﬀerent
locations in the recorded traces. For the CPA attack to work, the attacker has to
extract and align the relevant samples from the recorded traces. To this end, the
attacker builds a pattern consisting of interesting samples by precisely identifying
the relevant computations within a trace. We were able to visually identify the ﬁrst
round of the AES in the ﬁrst trace and thus we used this part as the alignment
pattern.
We explored two methods for alignment of the EM traces: Sum of Absolute
Diﬀerences (SAD) and Cross-Correlation (CC). For the sake of accuracy we quantiﬁed
the precision of the alignment for each of the two methods. We raised a signal when
the relevant part of a trace starts and we compared the corresponding sample number
to the determined sample number by the SAD and CC methods. The comparison
showed that a diﬀerence between the two values of more than three samples occurs
for less than 1% of the traces. Therefore, both methods are very eﬃcient. We chose
to use the SAD method because it was a little bit faster while discarding slightly
less traces than the CC method.
8.5.3 Attack Results
The most diﬃcult step of the attack was the side-channel acquisition. Indeed, we
spent about half of the total time devoted to mount the full attack on improving the
side-channel attack outcome. This was an iterative process, which required a good
understanding of the EM leakage of the target and ﬁne adjustments of the attack
parameters. The type and position of the probe are crucial for the quality of the
side-channel acquisition.
The number and quality of the EM traces required to recover the MLE key
determine the cost of the full attack. Our experimental results showed that 10,000
EM traces are suﬃcient. We note that two key bytes were much more diﬃcult to
recover than the rest. We tried diﬀerent side-channel techniques, including linear
regression attacks [218], but we did not see an improvement. This behaviour is
determined by the hardware characteristics of the target device, the clock frequency,
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and the sequence of instructions executed by the target device. It does not depend on
the value of the attacked key byte, but on its location. Similar results were reported
in the side-channel literature [219].
The acquisition of 10,000 EM traces took about three hours. Given the cost of
the active attack, a passive attack scenario is rendered almost impossible. It is very
likely that the temporary keys are changed before the attacker has observed enough
executions for diﬀerent input messages.
The last step of the attack appeared to be impossible in a recent version of
the OpenThread implementation we experimented with (commit 11c1b49), because
the fragmentation of the MLE Child ID Response messages (and therefore their
additional encryption with KMAC) can not be avoided. We do not exclude the
possibility to get non-fragmented answers from other stacks depending on the Parent
implementation.
8.5.4 Improving the Attack
Although the attacker can control up to 12 bytes of the input as shown in Section 8.4.4,
she might want to ﬁx the two input bytes corresponding to the key bytes that are
diﬃcult to recover. This requires some understanding of the target’s leakage, but it is
by far easier to perform and much more reliable than a template attack. For example,
the attacker can use a similar device running OpenThread to learn which key bytes
are more diﬃcult to attack and then adjust the variable input bytes accordingly.
To further optimize the attack, one can search an input conﬁguration that
minimizes the number of attacked bytes while considering the input constraints. The
number of AES rounds that have to be attacked in order to recover the full key must
be kept to the minimum value of three, since attacking more rounds requires more
EM samples and thus increases the cost of the measurement equipment as well as
the duration of the oﬄine attack.
In our case, there are 45 out of the 210 − 1 possible input conﬁgurations that
minimize the number of attacked bytes. Compared to the straightforward attack,
the improved attack reduces the number of individual CPA attacks from 44 to 37,
which results in a 16% improvement.
The novelty of the improved attack stems from the fact that the attacker can
adjust her attack strategy depending on the leakage of the target by ﬁxing some
input bytes she can control. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to use
this attack techniques to improve the outcome of a CPA attack. The total number
of traces required to recover the full key can be decreased by about 50%, to no more
than 5,000 EM traces. Another advantage of this approach is that the attack may
pass undetected when it uses fewer variable input bytes because the injected packets
resemble normal network traﬃc. A detailed description of the technique used to
improve this attack is provided in Chapter 7.
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8.6 Feasibility and Limitations
The main question arising is perhaps the relative complexity of the attack and the
realism of the setting where the attacker needs to be in a very close proximity of a
Thread Router or REED with a digital oscilloscope. This is a reasonable question,
especially in the setting where Thread brings IPv6 to the end nodes and opens up
the remote attack surface. We are realistic to state that the attacks we outlined
are currently beyond the reach of an average hacker familiar just with software and
networking techniques (and absolutely not for “script kiddies”), and apply only in
particular settings. Section 8.7 shows a formalized quantiﬁcation of the attack eﬀort
common to the smart card world.
8.6.1 Equipment Cost
The need of specialized equipment (i.e. a digital oscilloscope, an EM probe, and
if needed an ampliﬁer) hinders fast widespread application of the attack. In our
experiments, we have used a high-end digital oscilloscope because we just had one
available. Our experiments suggest that perhaps the cheapest available side-channel
analysis hardware, ChipWhisperer [252], would not be suﬃcient to succeed on most
of the targets due to its relatively low sampling rate. However, low- to mid-range
digital oscilloscopes such as the Picoscope [275] should be suﬃcient. Combined with
the increased availability of tooling to perform the analysis part of the side-channel
attack, starting from the software tooling and tutorials of [252] to higher-performance
toolkits like [323] and [76], this makes us claim that the attack is well feasible. With
side-channel techniques and expertise becoming more mainstream in the hacker
community, the threat of such attacks increases.
8.6.2 Portability
Our attack is moderate in portability. Namely, on another target family (a diﬀerent
hardware or software implementation) the attacker would most likely need to tune the
side-channel attack to that target in terms of probe position, alignment parameters,
etc. Hence, she has to invest into the identiﬁcation phase of the attack. Due to the
physical nature of side-channel attacks, our complexity estimate is based on one
particular implementation we analyzed. For other implementations the complexity
may be lower or higher; the attack may require a less or more expensive oscilloscope;
however, for an unprotected cryptographic implementation we expect the same order
of magnitude in terms of the amount of traces (and therefore time).
8.6.3 Other Attacks
Though we considered in our analysis a side-channel capable adversary, we were
not excluding attack paths that do not require the use of side-channel techniques
and therefore specialized equipment. However, we did not discover any paths that
do not require specialized equipment. They may still exist, though. We did not
consider other implementation attacks such as fault injection attacks or timing
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Factors
Identification Exploitation
Rating Score Rating Score
Elapsed time more than 1 month 5 less than 1 day 3
Expertise expert 5 proficient 2
Knowledge of TOE public 0 public 0
Access to TOE less than 10 0 less than 10 0
Equipment specialized 3 specialized – standard 3
Open samples public/not required 0 – –
Sum 13 8
Total 21 (enhanced-basic)
Table 8.3: Attack rating using an adaptation of the rating for smart cards from Joint
Interpretation Library [330].
attacks. They may be applicable and there may be settings where they are a realistic
threat, especially timing attacks that can be performed remotely without specialized
equipment [3].
The advantage of our attack is that it would circumvent IP protocol protections
such as ﬁrewalls, akin to the recent ZigBee worm [300], thus may serve as a more
feasible entry-point to the system. A limitation of our attack is that it does not
address the application layer security mechanisms that would normally be deployed
on top of the Thread networking stack. However, such mechanisms are not addressed
by Thread.
8.7 Quantification of the Attack Effort
There is no standard procedure to quantify the attacker’s potential to perform an
attack on an IoT device. Thus, we use an adaptation of the rating for smart cards
from the Joint Interpretation Library [330] to rate our attack. The rating procedure
interprets the Common Criteria methodology based on smart card evaluation experi-
ence gained by the industry. It is used in practice by testing laboratories to quantify
the resistance of smart cards to various attacks, including protocol and side-channel
attacks. The aforementioned procedure distinguishes two independent phases for
an attack: identiﬁcation and exploitation. The identiﬁcation phase refers to the
demonstration of the attack, while the exploitation phase considers the impact of the
attack when all necessary tools are readily available from the identiﬁcation phase.
Next, we brieﬂy introduce the factors considered by the rating methodology. The
elapsed time deﬁnes the time required by the attacker to mount the attack from
the moment she has access to the target. The expertise reﬂects the knowledge the
attacker should have to mount the attack. The knowledge of the target of evaluation
(TOE) indicates the level of access to the speciﬁcations. In the case of our attack,
although the access to the oﬃcial speciﬁcations is restricted, relevant information
can be inferred from the open-source implementation placed in the public domain.
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The number of diﬀerent devices on which the attacker needs to perform the attack is
captured by the access to TOE factor. The technical resources required for the attack
are comprised in the equipment factor. Finally, the open samples factor measures
to which extent the attacker is able to modify the software running on the target
device. For more details, we refer the reader to [330].
The individual scores for each factor are given in Table 8.3 for an implementation
where the last step of the attack is feasible. The ﬁnal score of 21 classiﬁes our attack
as an enhanced-basic attack. The rating places our attack in between basic attacks
that are easy to perform and enhanced attacks that require an advanced eﬀort.
8.8 Additional Attack Paths
8.8.1 Attack on Loading the Security Material
Template attacks are powerful side-channel attacks that can recover sensitive values
using very few traces. Thus, an attacker can purchase a device similar to the one to
be attacked to create EM proﬁles. Then, she can force the targeted Thread device
to reset such that she can observe the EM emanations corresponding to the loading
of the network parameters from non-volatile memory. In particular, the attacker is
interested to capture the loading of the network master key MK and commissioning
key CK. Though powerful, template attacks depend on the quality of the templates
made in the proﬁling phase. Thus, we did not investigate this attack vector further.
8.8.2 Elliptic Curve Implementations
The execution of elliptic curve computations might be vulnerable to timing [198]
or Simple Power Analysis (SPA) [200] attacks if not properly implemented. The
OpenThread implementation of the Thread networking stack relies on mbed TLS [18]
for cryptographic services. Recently, Dugardin et al. showed that the point blinding
countermeasure must be activated in mbed TLS for elliptic curve implementations
to prevent horizontal and vertical template attacks [113]. We did not investigate
into this direction further.
8.9 Countermeasures
Although it is desirable to achieve a defense in depth for a Thread network by
employing redundant security mechanisms, other factors such as manufacturing costs
or usability pose major constraints. Thus, a trade-oﬀ between these contradicting
requirements should be sought to ensure an appropriate level of security. Though
inspired by our case study of Thread, the countermeasures laid out next are applicable
to other IoT protocols and devices as well. They are valuable for both protocol
designers and engineers of IoT products.
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8.9.1 Tamper Resistance
We suggest the use of shielded and tamper resistant components and cases. A
trade-oﬀ between cost and product dimensions would be to insert small air gaps
between the circuitry and the external case. This would most likely require device
disassembly to enable EM analysis, making the attack more cumbersome to perform.
8.9.2 Protected Cryptographic Implementations
We stress that in scenarios where side-channel attacks pose a threat, Thread imple-
mentations should employ side-channel protection mechanisms for the manipulation
of the security material. Consequently, the loading of the security material as well
as all cryptographic algorithm implementations should use countermeasures, such as
masking and hiding [223]. If the cost of the countermeasures is prohibitive, oﬄoading
the cryptographic algorithms to hardware cryptographic engines might be a good
trade-oﬀ. In general, it is harder (but still feasible) to attack a hardware implemen-
tation than a software implementation. Protected hardware implementations should
be considered where both high security and high performance are necessary.
8.9.3 Fresh Re-keying
When the cost of protecting the cryptographic implementations of a block cipher is
too high, fresh re-keying schemes can be used to prevent side-channel attacks [236,
235, 110]. These schemes make use of a re-keying function to generate new session
keys based on the secret master key and random nonces for every block of message
to be encrypted. Although fresh re-keying has the beneﬁt that the re-keying function
can be protected against side-channel attacks at a much lower cost than the block
cipher [109], it involves signiﬁcant changes in the protocol.
8.9.4 Protocol-level Mitigations
We suggest to consider ways to mitigate the presented attack paths at the protocol
level, changing the network mechanisms that facilitate the attacks. Most importantly,
disabling or limiting the message exchange that allows a node to get the network
master key by sending an MLE Child ID Request message to its Parent should be
considered. Rate limiting the incoming MLE Parent Request messages processed
by a Parent (Router or REED) signiﬁcantly slows the attacker, but care should be
taken not to expose the network to DoS attacks. A more complex solution would be
to design a mechanism for tracking valid commissioned devices in a Thread network.
Such a mechanism would have the beneﬁt that it allows a Router to treat incoming
messages diﬀerently depending on the node status. This is a rough idea that needs
further investigation.
8.9.5 Security Certification Scheme
We recommend enforcing a security certiﬁcation scheme for Thread products in
addition to the functional certiﬁcation scheme currently in place. Although a
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certiﬁcation scheme can not prevent new attacks, the beneﬁts for the security of
the whole ecosystems are obvious. A security certiﬁcation seal increases consumer
awareness of possible security issues and attests resistance to known attacks. The
major drawbacks are an increase of the overall price and an additional delay before
the certiﬁed products are available on the market.
8.10 Summary
We conducted the ﬁrst electromagnetic side-channel vulnerability analysis of the
Thread networking stack. We described how diﬀerent network mechanisms that
can be learned by the attacker from the published OpenThread code can be used
to create attack vectors for side-channel attacks. We showed that some of the
side-channel attack paths are hard or impossible to exploit in the context of Thread.
We implemented the most promising attack path that provides complete access to
the Thread network. It exploits a chain of network mechanism and side-channel
attacks on executions of unprotected implementations of cryptographic algorithms.
The full attack did not succeed in an experimental network of OpenThread nodes.
We consider the setting where the last attack step is indirectly prevented by the MLE
Child ID Response payload size to be insuﬃcient to rely upon. Firstly, it is not
in the design of the protocol that the master key is protected by both KMLE and
KMAC . Additional protection by the KMAC is a side eﬀect (though, of course, a
fortunate one). Secondly, a possibility to request the master key having the derived
key(s) is questionable security-wise as it subverts the essence of key derivation using
HMAC. Hence, we suppose that the full attack may succeed with moderate eﬀort in
other implementations of the stack.
The possibility of an arbitrary Thread device to trigger cryptographic operations
and responses from a commissioned Thread device at unlimited rate presents a
standalone risk of a denial-of-service attack.
The lessons learned from our work can be applied to other IoT systems and
protocols as well. Our threat model can be used to better shape the attack surface
of future IoT products and prevent issues such as: processing of invalid injected
messages, EM leakage, converting temporary keys into master key, and using a single
network master key to secure the whole network. In light of our results, designers
of future protocols for the IoT should carefully consider the threat of side-channel
attacks from the early inception.
In general, we demonstrated that in the context of a modern IoT network protocol
mounting a side-channel attack is not trivial. Similar to a modern software exploit,
it requires chaining multiple vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, such attacks are feasible.
Being perhaps too expensive for settings like smart homes, they pose a relatively
higher threat to commercial settings.
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9.1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the technical revolutions of our time, with
vast amounts of IoT devices being deployed every day to create a global network
of smart objects. According to Gartner, 8.4 billion connected things will be in use
worldwide by the end of 2017 [136]. From 2018 onwards, Gartner forecasts that
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devices to be used in smart buildings (LED lighting, HVAC, and physical security
systems) will have the biggest market share [136]. In light of the very recent security
vulnerabilities [84, 300] discovered in such devices, immediate action is required to
prevent large-scale security incidents similar to the Mirai botnet [14].
The attack surface of IoT devices is considerably larger than the attack surface
of classical Internet-connected systems due to the various use cases these gadgets,
sensors, and actuators are built for. Most of the IoT systems are characterized by
low physical security, with devices being deployed in easily accessible places. As a
consequence, attack vectors that exploit these weaknesses came to light. Side-channel
attacks, such as EM and power analysis attacks, fall into this category of attack
vectors that require physical proximity to the target system. If the target system
uses an unprotected implementation of a cryptographic algorithm, the adversary can
determine the secret key used by the system from the leakage generated during the
execution of the algorithm. Hence, countermeasures against side-channel attacks are
mandatory for the security of IoT devices.
There are two main requirements an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm
to be deployed in the IoT has to satisfy. On the one hand, the implementation must
be lightweight (i.e. consume few resources) considering the limited computational
resources of embedded devices for the IoT. On the other hand, the implementation
must be secure against side-channel attacks given the attack surface speciﬁc to
the IoT. Most implementations of the existing lightweight ciphers do not satisfy
the second requirement, either because the ciphers were not designed to facilitate
the integration of countermeasures, or because the best existing countermeasures
add signiﬁcant performance penalties to the unprotected implementations of the
ciphers. Therefore, there is a need for more eﬃcient countermeasures, especially DPA
countermeasures like masking. Any improvement of the existing masking schemes
brings us closer to the ultimate goal of a secure IoT.
9.1.1 Boolean Masking
Conceptually, Boolean masking of a block cipher is done by replacing each unpro-
tected operation by its masked counterpart. The most common operations used by
lightweight block ciphers are logical operations (NOT, AND, OR, XOR), rotations,
and modular addition/subtraction. Masked NOT is equivalent to the negation of a
single share, while masked XOR and rotations can be realized by simply applying
the operation to each pair of shares independently.
To our knowledge, the best known expression for ﬁrst-order masking of bitwise
AND is based on the Trichina AND gate [358]. The same expression of the masked
AND was latter used by Coron et al. in their algorithm for masked addition on
Boolean shares [85]. The sequence of operations used to compute AND on Boolean
shares (i.e. SecAnd) is provably secure thanks to a random value that is mixed with the
input shares. While the expression of masked AND initially proposed by Trichina can
be easily found in the literature, there is almost no reference to a similar expression
for masked OR. Hence, one might try to derive such an expression by applying De
Morgan’s laws to the masked AND expression. The resulting expression requires
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Secure operation Cost Randoms
SecNot 1 0
SecXor 2 0
SecShift 4 1
SecShiftFill 6 1
SecAnd 8 1
SecOr 8 1
SecAdd 28 · n+ 4 2
SecSub 41 · n+ 4 2
Table 9.1: The cost (in number of elementary operations) and the number of randoms
of diﬀerent secure operations; n = max
(
⌈log2(k − 1)⌉, 1
)
, where k is the size of the
shares in bits.
eleven elementary operations and a random value. However, Baek and Noh [25]
gave a better expression for a masked OR gate that requires only six elementary
operations and no random value. They also described how to compute an AND gate
using eight elementary operations and no random value. Their AND gate can be
seen as a version of the Trichina AND gate in which the random value is replaced by
one of the input shares. The best known algorithm for secure addition on Boolean
shares is based on the Kogge-Stone adder [85]. This algorithm is provably secure
because it uses provably secure operations and all its intermediates are uniformly
distributed.
In this chapter, we consider the Trichina AND gate [358] to be the reference
expression for performing a bitwise AND on Boolean shares. We consider the OR
gate proposed by Baek and Noh [25] with an injected random value as the reference
expression for bitwise OR. We selected these two expressions because they are
provably secure and hence they facilitate security proofs for more complex algorithms
such as secure addition on Boolean shares [85].
We divide the secure operations on Boolean shares into three classes according
to their computational cost. The ﬁrst class includes all secure operations with
a cost of at most six instructions (e.g. SecXor, SecShift). Then, the second class
contains operations that can be masked using up to a dozen instructions (e.g. SecAnd,
SecOr). Finally, the third class is represented by operations that need more than 12
instructions. Secure algorithms for modular addition/subtraction on Boolean shares
(SecAdd, SecSub) belong to this latter class since they rely on secure operations from
the ﬁrst two classes.
A detailed description of SecXor, SecShift, SecAnd, and SecAdd can be found
in [85, 367]. SecShiftFill shifts a sensitive value represented by Boolean shares n bits
to the left and sets the n − 1 least signiﬁcant bits to 1. We brieﬂy describe the
algorithms for secure addition (SecAdd) and subtraction (SecSub) on Boolean shares
in Section 9.3.
In this chapter, we study the eﬃciency of Boolean masking for embedded IoT
182 Optimal First-Order Boolean Masking
devices. Although our work is not limited to a speciﬁc microprocessor architec-
ture, we evaluate our implementations on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 since these
microcontrollers are widely used for IoT applications [284].
9.1.2 Contributions
Firstly, we present an algorithm for eﬃcient search of Boolean masking expressions
(Section 9.2). Thanks to several algorithmic optimizations, the search is very fast. As
a second contribution, we propose concrete expressions for Boolean masking of the
AND and OR operations (Section 9.2.7). We describe an expression of bitwise AND on
Boolean shares using fewer operations than the best known expression in the literature.
At the same time, our expression for secure AND does not require any randomness.
Thirdly, we improve the Kogge-Stone algorithm for addition/subtraction on Boolean
shares [85] by using our masking expressions and by processing the shares in a clever
way that does not require any randomness (Section 9.3.1). When implemented on an
ARM Cortex-M3 processor (Section 9.4.1), the addition/subtraction of 32-bit values
using the new algorithm is between 18% and 25% faster than similar implementations
using the original algorithm [85]. Finally, we use our expressions for Boolean masking
of AND and OR to develop ﬁrst-order masked implementations of three lightweight
block ciphers, namely Simon, Speck, and RECTANGLE (Section 9.4.2). By
comparing the performance ﬁgures of the masked and unmasked implementations
of the three ciphers, we learn which design strategies facilitate eﬃcient masked
implementations.
9.2 Search Algorithm
9.2.1 Description
Our search algorithm (Algorithm 6) uses a breadth-ﬁrst approach to determine the
optimal masked representations of a given Boolean function. Its inputs are the number
of shares, the target function that has to be masked, a set of sensitive functions
that leak some information about the sensitive values, and a set of operations that
can be used to build new expressions. The search algorithm returns a set of pairs,
where each pair describes how to compute the shares of the target function in a way
that does not leak. For instance, we used the following input parameters to search
ﬁrst-order masked expressions of bitwise AND:
• Number of shares: n = 2. Hence, the two input sensitive variables x and y
are split into two shares each such that x = x1 ⊕ x2 and y = y1 ⊕ y2.
• Target function: t(x1, x2, y1, y2) = (x1 ⊕ x2) ∧ (y1 ⊕ y2). The output of the
search algorithm is a set of pairs (z1, z2) such that z1 ⊕ z2 = t(x1, x2, y1, y2).
• Sensitive functions: S = {s0, s1, s0∧s1,¬s0∧s1, s0∧¬s1,¬s0∧¬s1}, where
s0 = x1 ⊕ x2 and s1 = y1 ⊕ y2. Each sensitive function s ∈ S leaks some
information about the values that have to be masked.
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• Operations: O = {¬,⊕,∧,∨}. The algorithm builds expressions using opera-
tors from the set O.
The search algorithm explores sequences of expressions (or terms) until some
terms of a sequence can be used to compute the target function. The term of a
sequence which requires the highest number of operations determines the cost of
that sequence. The search starts with an empty sequence, which is extended using
the input shares and operators into sequences of cost 1. In subsequent steps, all
sequences of cost k (k ≥ 1) are extended into sequences of cost k + 1. A sequence is
extended using its previous terms, the input shares, and the input set of operators.
An expression is identiﬁed by its truth table, which is stored as a stream of bits
for eﬃciency reasons. The main role of a sequence is to avoid computing several
times the repeating terms of an expression. Hence, the search algorithm is faster,
but the memory requirement increases. The search space is greatly reduced by three
cut-oﬀ conditions:
• Leakage test. A sequence is extended only if the new expression e to be
added to that sequence does not leak information about the input sensitive
functions s ∈ S. In other words, the following relation must hold to consider
the extended sequence:
HW(s ∧ e)
HW(e)
=
HW(s ∧ ¬e)
HW(¬e)
,
where HW(f) denotes the Hamming weight of the truth table of function f .
In addition to this leakage test, which is a fast initial ﬁlter, the leakage of the
expressions returned by the search algorithm is assessed using Welch’s t-test.
• Ignoring the order of operations. If two or more sequences are equal (i.e.
they compute the same intermediate expressions), the algorithm explores only
the sequence that is reached ﬁrst.
• Exploiting the symmetries of shares. The input and output shares of a
symmetric operation (e.g. AND) can be swapped without aﬀecting the result.
This property allows the search algorithm to explore just one representative
sequence for all equivalent sequences.
9.2.2 Optimality
We stress that the algorithm is designed to ﬁnd optimal expressions. Any optimal
expression can be computed using at least one non-leaking sequence of operations.
The search algorithm explores all possible sequences, except for those that are
discarded by the cut-oﬀ conditions. The ﬁrst cut-oﬀ condition reduces the search to
non-leaking sequences, while the other two conditions limit the exploration to a single
representative per equivalence class of sequences. This representative has minimum
cost thanks to the breadth-ﬁrst nature of the algorithm. Hence, the algorithm returns
pairs of optimal expressions that can be used to securely compute the target function.
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Algorithm 6 Searching for optimal expression
Input:
number of input shares: n ⊲ Input shares: xi and yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
target function: t : F2n2 → F2
set of sensitive functions: S = {si}, si : F2n2 → F2
set of operations: O = {oi}, oi : F22 → F2
Output:
set of n functions Z = {zi}, zi : F2n2 → F2 such that z1 ⊕ z2 ⊕ . . .⊕ zn = t
1: opt_cost← −1
2: seq0 ← ∅
3: cost← 0
4: while cost 6= opt_cost do
5: seqcost ← ∅
6: cost← cost+ 1
7: for all seq ∈ seqcost−1 do
8: seq′ ← Extend(S, seq)
9: seqcost ← seqcost ∪ seq
′
10: if ValidExpression(t, seq′) then
11: opt_cost← cost
12: yield seq′
13: end if
14: end for
15: end while
16: function Extend(S, seq)
17: for all a, b ∈ seq ∪ {x1, x2, . . . , xn, y1, y2, . . . yn} do
18: for all o ∈ O do
19: seq′ ← o(a, b)
20: if Explore(S, seq′) then ⊲ Check the cut-oﬀ conditions
21: yield seq′
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
25: end function
26: function ValidExpression(t, seq)
27: for all z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ seq do
28: if t == z1 ⊕ z2 ⊕ . . .⊕ zn then
29: return (z1, z2, . . . , zn)
30: end if
31: end for
32: end function
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9.2.3 Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)
We distinguish between two classes of IoT devices depending on the operations
supported by the instruction set architecture (ISA): basic and enhanced devices.
Most IoT devices have instructions only for the following bitwise logical operations:
NOT, AND, OR, and XOR. We call these architectures basic ISAs. In addition to
these operations, the enhanced ISAs have dedicated instructions for other bitwise
logical operations, such as AND NOT or OR NOT. For example, the instruction set
of ARM Cortex-M3 includes the bic (AND NOT) and orn (OR NOT) instructions
that perform two basic bitwise logical operations in a single clock cycle instead of
two clock cycles. Most microcontrollers execute all logical instructions in a single
clock cycle.
9.2.4 Leakage Model
The power consumption of most microcontrollers is proportional to the number of bits
that are set in the processed sensitive value [223]. Therefore, the Hamming weight
power model is a reliable method for modeling the leakage of a sensitive variable. In
addition to the bit-level leakage veriﬁcation performed by the search algorithm, we
performed a t-test leakage assessment [148] for each valid expression returned by the
algorithm to conﬁrm the absence of any leakage. We used ﬁxed-vs.-random t-test
evaluations and two leakage models: Hamming weight and Hamming distance.
9.2.5 Extension to Higher-Order Masking
Our algorithm can naturally be extended to search expressions for higher-order
masking. However, further optimizations are required to ensure that the algorithm
scales well for a higher number of shares. The main limiting factor of our algorithm
is the amount memory required to store the valid sequence of expressions, although
both computational and memory complexity increase with the number of shares (i.e.
masking order).
9.2.6 Other Improvements
Our search algorithm might beneﬁt from the approach proposed by Groß [152] to
tackle a similar problem. Namely, instead of searching for an optimal sequence of
instructions, one can try all combinations of truth tables that give a target function
and then convert them to a circuit using a tool such as Logic Friday [217].
9.2.7 Results
The optimal expressions for masked SecOr use 6 instructions on both platforms,
while the optimal expressions for SecAnd have a cost of 7 on a basic device and 6
on ARM. The expressions for SecOr and SecAnd using basic instructions are unique
up to symmetries of the shares, whereas for ARM there are 48 diﬀerent optimal
expressions for SecAnd and 50 diﬀerent optimal expressions for SecOr. The unique
optimal expressions for a basic architecture are actually included in the optimal
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Source Operation Expression Rand
Cost
Basic ARM
reference
SecAnd
z1 = r 1 8 8
z2 = z1 ⊕ (x1 ∧ y1)⊕ (x1 ∧ y2) ⊕
(x2 ∧ y1)⊕ (x2 ∧ y2)
SecOr
z1 = r 1 8 8
z2 = z1 ⊕ (x1 ∨ y1)⊕ (x1 ∧ y2) ⊕
(x2 ∨ y2)⊕ (x2 ∧ y1)
our
SecAnd
z1 = (x1 ∧ y1)⊕ (x1 ∨ ¬y2) 0 7 6
z2 = (x2 ∧ y1)⊕ (x2 ∨ ¬y2)
SecOr
z1 = (x1 ∧ y1)⊕ (x1 ∨ y2) 0 6 6
z2 = (x2 ∨ y1)⊕ (x2 ∧ y2)
Table 9.2: Expressions, number of randoms (“Rand”) and number of operations
(“Cost”) for diﬀerent secure operations. Basic cost gives the number of elementary
operations, while the ARM cost gives the number of instructions. Expressions in
parentheses have priority and operations are executed from left to right.
expressions for the ARM architecture, which makes them universal. A comparison of
these two expressions with the reference expressions is given in Table 9.2. Our results
show that the expression of the masked OR gate proposed by Baek and Noh [25] is
optimal. On the other hand, our expression for bitwise AND uses less instructions
than the masked AND gate of Baek and Noh [25] and the Trichina AND gate [358].
Besides using less operations than the reference expressions, our optimal expressions
do not require a random value. Thanks to these two properties, our expressions have
a signiﬁcant performance advantage over the reference ones.
9.3 Applications
9.3.1 Modular Addition and Subtraction
Coron et al. [85] proposed a logarithmic-time algorithm for modular addition on
Boolean shares based on the Kogge-Stone adder. Their algorithm for modular
addition uses the following three secure operations: SecAnd, SecXor, and SecShift.
The expression of SecAnd uses 8 elementary operations, the one of SecXor needs 2
elementary operations, while SecShift can be performed using 4 elementary operations.
Algorithms for all these operations are presented in [85, 367]. Although not described
in the original paper [85], the algorithm for modular subtraction can be obtained from
the algorithm for modular addition on Boolean shares by making several changes.
Namely, the SecShift operations from lines 7 and 15 of [85, Algorithm 6] have to be
replaced by SecShiftFill (secure operation for shift to the left by n bits followed by
OR of 2n − 1). Similarly, SecXor operations from lines 9 and 17 of [85, Algorithm 6]
must be replaced by SecOr. These changes aﬀect the performance of the modular
subtraction algorithm since operations with a lower cost are replaced by operations
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with a higher cost.
One can improve the algorithms for modular addition/subtraction based on
the Kogge-Stone adder by simply replacing the original expressions for SecAnd and
SecOr with our optimal expressions. Yet, the algorithm can be improved further by
replacing the expression of the SecShift operation, which requires a random variable,
by a more eﬃcient expression that does not require any randomness. Hence, the
new versions of the algorithm do not require any randomness at all. The improved
algorithm for addition on Boolean shares is described in Algorithm 7, while the
analogous algorithm for subtraction is presented in Algorithm 8. It is important to
note that lines 3, 10, and 12 of Algorithm 7 are required to prevent composition
of operations that otherwise will leak. Similarly, lines 4, 10, 12, 14, and 19 of
Algorithm 8 avoid composing operations that leak.
Algorithm 7 Improved Kogge-Stone masked addition
Input: x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}
k such that x = x1 ⊕ x2 and y = y1 ⊕ y2
Output: z1, z2 such that z = z1 ⊕ z2 = (x+ y) mod 2k
1: p1, p2 ← SecXor(x1, x2, y1, y2)
2: g1, g2 ← SecAnd(x1, x2, y1, y2)
3: g1 ← (g1 ⊕ x2)⊕ g2 ⊲ g2 = x2
4: n← max
(
⌈log2(k − 1)⌉, 1
)
5: for i := 1 to n− 1 do
6: h1, h2 ← SecShift(g1, g2, 2
i−1)
7: u1, u2 ← SecAnd(p1, p2, h1, h2)
8: g1, g2 ← SecXor(g1, g2, u1, u2)
9: h1, h2 ← SecShift(p1, p2, 2
i−1)
10: h1 ← (h1 ⊕ x2)⊕ h2 ⊲ h2 = x2
11: p1, p2 ← SecAnd(p1, p2, h1, h2)
12: p1 ← (p1 ⊕ y2)⊕ p2 ⊲ p2 = y2
13: end for
14: h1, h2 ← SecShift(g1, g2, 2
n−1)
15: u1, u2 ← SecAnd(p1, p2, h1, h2)
16: g1, g2 ← SecXor(g1, g2, u1, u2)
17: z1, z2 ← SecXor(y1, y2, x1, x2)
18: z1 ←
(
z1 ⊕ (g1 ≪ 1)
)
⊕ (x2 ≪ 1) ⊲ z2 = y2
9.3.1.1 Masking Cost
A comparison between the cost of the secure expressions used by the original version
of the algorithm and the new expressions used by the improved version of the
algorithm is provided in Table 9.3. Based on these values, one can compute the total
cost of these algorithms for diﬀerent architectures and make an estimation of their
performance for diﬀerent values of the operand size k.
The original version of the algorithm for modular addition on Boolean shares
requires 2 SecShift operations, 2 SecAnd operations, 1 SecXor operation and 2 other
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Algorithm 8 Improved Kogge-Stone masked subtraction
Input: x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}
k such that x = x1 ⊕ x2 and y = y1 ⊕ y2
Output: z1, z2 such that z = z1 ⊕ z2 = (x− y) mod 2k
1: y1, y2 ← SecNot(y1, y2)
2: p1, p2 ← SecXor(y1, y2, x1, x2)
3: g1, g2 ← SecAnd(x1, x2, y1, y2)
4: g1 ← (g1 ⊕ x2)⊕ g2 ⊲ g2 = x2
5: n← max
(
⌈log2(k − 1)⌉, 1
)
6: for i := 1 to n− 1 do
7: h1, h2 ← SecShiftFill(g1, g2, 2
i−1)
8: u1, u2 ← SecAnd(p1, p2, h1, h2)
9: g1, g2 ← SecOr(g1, g2, u1, u2)
10: g1 ← (g1 ⊕ x2)⊕ g2 ⊲ g2 = x2
11: h1, h2 ← SecShift(p1, p2, 2
i−1)
12: h1 ← (h1 ⊕ x2)⊕ h2 ⊲ h2 = x2
13: p1, p2 ← SecAnd(p1, p2, h1, h2)
14: p1 ← (p1 ⊕ y2)⊕ p2 ⊲ p2 = y2
15: end for
16: h1, h2 ← SecShiftFill(g1, g2, 2
n−1)
17: u1, u2 ← SecAnd(p1, p2, h1, h2)
18: g1, g2 ← SecOr(g1, g2, u1, u2)
19: g1 ← (g1 ⊕ x2)⊕ g2 ⊲ g2 = x2
20: z1, z2 ← SecXor(y1, y2, x1, x2)
21: z1 ←
(
z1 ⊕
(
(g1 ≪ 1) ∨ 1
))
⊕ (x2 ≪ 1) ⊲ z2 = y2
elementary operations in the main loop, hence 28 · (log2 k− 1) elementary operations.
Outside the main loop, it requires 1 SecShift operation, 2 SecAnd operations, 3
SecXor operations, and 4 other elementary operations. Therefore, the total cost is
28 · log2 k + 4 for both basic and enhanced architectures.
The cost of the improved algorithm for addition on Boolean shares can be
computed similarly. The main loop consists of 2 SecShit operations, 2 SecAnd
operations, 1 SecXor operation, and 4 elementary operations. The rest of the
algorithm uses 1 SecShift operation, 2 SecAnd operations, 3 SecXor operations, and
6 elementary operations. In other words, the cost of the improved algorithm for
modular addition on Boolean shares is 22 · log2 k + 4 on ARM and 22 · log2 k + 6 on
basic architectures.
In the same way, one can compute the cost of the original and improved algorithms
for modular subtraction on Boolean shares. All these values are summarized in
Table 9.4 alongside the gain of the improved algorithms over the original ones
for common values of the operand size k. We see that the improved algorithms
outperform the original algorithms on both platforms by at least 6 · log2 k elementary
operations, where k is the operand size.
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Platform Source
Cost
SecNot SecXor SecAnd SecOr SecShift SecShiftFill
Basic
reference 1 2 8 8 4 6
our 1 2 7 6 2 4
Improvement 0 0 1 2 2 2
ARM
reference 1 2 8 8 4 6
our 1 2 6 6 2 4
Improvement 0 0 2 2 2 2
Table 9.3: Comparison of the number of instructions required to perform diﬀerent
secure operations.
9.3.1.2 Leakage Assessment
We evaluated the secure operations presented in this section, including the two
improved algorithms for addition and subtraction on Boolean shares, against ﬁrst-
order attacks using Welch’s t-test [148]. Welch’s t-test is a fast and robust way to
verify the soundness of a masking scheme [103, 308]. To determine if there is any
leakage in our ﬁrst-order implementations, we used a simple tool similar to the ones
described in [233, 271, 291]. Firstly, we validated the correctness of our tool by
performing evaluations against a set of masking schemes known to be either secure
or broken. Then, we carefully applied the t-test to avoid false negatives [333]. All
our secure implementations passed a set of ﬁxed-vs.-random evaluations with up
to 106 traces using both Hamming weight and Hamming distance models for the
simulated leakage.
9.3.2 Other Applications
The optimal expressions for secure computation of AND and OR can be used to
mask more complex structures such as S-boxes. They can also be used to eﬃciently
mask ciphers that use only logical bitwise operations such as Simon [38], as well as
bit-sliced designs such as Noekeon [97], RECTANGLE [391], or RoadRunneR [35].
In Section 9.4, we evaluate how these expressions can be applied to unprotected im-
plementations of several lightweight block ciphers and we determine the performance
penalty of the resulting ﬁrst-order protected implementations.
9.4 Implementations
In this section we describe our eﬃcient implementations of several ﬁrst-order secure
algorithms and block ciphers. All our implementations are written in assembly
language for a Cortex-M3 processor for two reasons. Firstly, we wanted to avoid
accidental leakages introduced by the transformations made by the GCC compiler
which is not optimized for masked implementations, but only for eﬃciency [28].
On the other hand, when coding in assembly language, the implementer has full
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Operation Platform Expressions Rand
Operand size
k 8 16 32 64
SecAdd
Basic
reference 2 28 · log2 k + 4 88 116 144 172
our 0 22 · log2 k + 6 72 94 116 138
Improvement 2 6 · log2 k − 2 16 22 28 34
ARM
reference 2 28 · log2 k + 4 88 116 144 172
our 0 22 · log2 k + 4 70 92 114 136
Improvement 2 6 · log2 k 18 24 30 36
SecSub
Basic
reference 2 38 · log2 k + 4 118 156 194 232
our 0 32 · log2 k + 6 102 134 166 198
Improvement 2 6 · log2 k − 2 16 22 28 34
ARM
reference 2 38 · log2 k + 4 118 156 194 232
our 0 30 · log2 k + 6 96 126 156 186
Improvement 2 8 · log2 k − 2 22 30 38 46
Table 9.4: Cost and random numbers (“Rand”) required for Kogge-Stone addition/sub-
traction on Boolean shares for diﬀerent values of the operand size k. Basic cost
gives the number of elementary operations, while the ARM cost gives the number of
instructions.
control of the register allocation and the sequence of instructions executed by the
microcontroller. Hence, she can avoid combining instructions and registers in a way
that leaks [28, 271]. Secondly, we wanted to get a clear picture of the performance
ﬁgures of our implementations in order to conduct a fair comparison of the ﬁrst-order
implementations. Hence, the eﬀort spent by a programmer on a more demanding
assembly implementation is paid oﬀ in the end by a better (i.e. more secure and
eﬃcient) implementation.
In line with previous work, we do not include the cost of random number
generation for the implementations that need randomness since the cost of random
number generation is diﬀerent from one device to the other and we want a device-
independent comparison.
9.4.1 Masked Addition
We implemented the original algorithms for addition and subtraction on Boolean
shares as well as the improved algorithms presented in this chapter. For each
algorithm we wrote a straightforward implementation and an implementation that
unrolls the main loop of the Kogge-Stone adder. The execution time and code size
of our implementations are given in Table 9.5.
The improved algorithms are between 18% and 25% faster than the original
algorithms. At the same time, the code size of the improved algorithms is between
22% and 37% smaller than the code size of the original ones. Unlike the original
algorithms, which require two random values, the improved algorithms do not require
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Impl. Expressions Rand
Time (cycles) Code size (bytes)
Addition Subtraction Addition Subtraction
rolled
reference 2 336 452 380 492
our 0 252 372 252 380
Improvement 2 84 80 128 112
% 25% 17.69% 33.68% 22.76%
unrolled
reference 2 274 359 764 1048
our 0 205 281 584 816
Improvement 2 69 78 180 232
% 25.18% 21.72% 23.56% 22.13%
Table 9.5: Execution time and code size for secure addition and subtraction on
Boolean shares using the Kogge-Stone adder.
any random value. The generation of a 32-bit random number takes between 37
cycles for a XorShift RNG [225] and 85 cycles for the built-in TRNG [16]. Hence,
the improved algorithms for addition and subtraction on Boolean shares outperform
the original algorithms in all categories: execution time, code size, and required
randomness.
9.4.2 Lightweight Block Ciphers
We selected the top-3 block ciphers that use a 64-bit block from the performance
evaluation conducted using the FELICS benchmarking framework [105] and we
protected them against ﬁrst-order attacks using the best known algorithms for secure
operations on Boolean shares as well as the ones introduced in this chapter. Besides
their very lightweight software implementations, these three ciphers (Speck, Simon,
and RECTANGLE) have diﬀerent design strategies. Hence, they facilitate an analysis
of the relationship between their design strategies and the performance ﬁgures of
their masked implementations.
9.4.2.1 Speck
Speck [38] is an ARX-based family of lightweight block ciphers designed for per-
formance in software. Nevertheless, all ciphers of this family perform very well in
hardware also. Speck-64/128 refers to the version of Speck characterized by a
64-bit block, a 128-bit key, and 27 rounds. The round function of Speck-64/128
uses only bitwise XOR, addition modulo 232, and rotations:
Rk(x, y) =
((
(x≫ 8)⊞ y
)
⊕ k, (y≪ 3)⊕
(
(x≫ 8)⊞ y
)
⊕ k
)
,
where x and y are the two 32-bit branches of a Feistel network.
While the unprotected implementation of Speck requires only four registers
in order to process the cipher’s state, the protected implementations need all 13
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Impl./Expr. Rand
Time (cycles) Code size (bytes) Penalty factor
Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec
unprotected 0 318 530 44 52 1 1
rolled KSA/reference 2 8994 12018 428 564 28.28 22.67
rolled KSA/our 0 6583 9342 308 452 20.70 17.62
Improvement 2 2411 2676 120 112
% 26.80% 22.26% 28.03% 19.85%
unrolled KSA/reference 2 6890 9430 808 1108 21.66 17.79
unrolled KSA/our 0 5334 7305 612 844 16.77 13.78
Improvement 2 1556 2125 196 264
% 22.58% 22.53% 24.25% 23.82%
Table 9.6: Execution time, code size and performance penalty factor for diﬀerent
secure implementations of Speck-64/128. For each set of expressions (best known,
our) we wrote two implementations that correspond to the two implementation
strategies of the Kogge-Stone adder (KSA): rolled/unrolled KSA.
general-purpose registers of the Cortex-M3 microcontroller. Moreover, the rolled
implementations have to save the content of a register on the stack at the beginning
of the secure addition/subtraction. The initial value of this register is recovered at
the end of the addition/subtraction operation. A pair of stack operations (i.e. push
and pop) adds 4 cycles to the total execution time of the algorithm.
The implementations of Speck based on the improved algorithms for modular
addition and subtraction on Boolean shares are faster and use less code space than
the implementations of Speck based on the original versions of the same algorithms
as can be seen in Table 9.6. The gain of the improved algorithms over the reference
ones is at least 28% for both rolled and unrolled implementations. On the other
hand, the improvement in code size varies between 20% and 28%.
9.4.2.2 Simon
Simon [38] is a family of lightweight block ciphers designed primarily for optimal
performance in hardware, but its instances perform very good in software as well.
The round function of Simon uses only bitwise XOR, bitwise AND, and rotations:
Rk(x, y) =
(
y ⊕ f(x)⊕ k, x
)
,
where f(x) = (x≪ 1) ∧ (x≪ 8) ⊕ (x≪ 2). Simon-64/128 is the instance of
Simon that processes a 64-bit block using a 128-bit key in 44 rounds.
The two protected implementations of Simon are very eﬃcient since the opera-
tions used by the cipher can be masked with a little impact on the execution time
and code size. The most costly operation is secure bitwise AND which, depending
on its expression, can be evaluated using 6 or 8 instructions. The other secure
operations require only 2 instructions each. The unprotected implementation of
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Impl./Expr. Rand
Time (cycles) Code size (bytes) Penalty factor
Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec
unprotected 0 1068 1113 60 64 1 1
reference 1 1956 1904 160 164 1.83 1.71
our 0 1888 1670 140 144 1.76 1.50
Improvement 1 68 234 20 20
% 3.47% 12.28% 12.5% 12.19%
Table 9.7: Execution time, code size and performance penalty factor for diﬀerent
secure implementations of Simon-64/128.
Simon needs only four registers. The ﬁrst-order protected implementation based on
the reference expression of AND requires ten registers, while the one based on our
optimal expression of AND takes nine registers.
The gain in execution time of the implementation based on the improved expres-
sion of AND over the implementation based on the reference expression of AND
is modest for encryption (i.e. 3%) but signiﬁcant for decryption (i.e. 12%). The
improvement in code size is about 12%. The results of these implementations are
presented in Table 9.7.
9.4.2.3 RECTANGLE
RECTANGLE [391] is a block cipher designed to facilitate lightweight and fast
implementations, both in hardware and software, using bit slicing. RECTANGLE
processes a 64-bit block in 25 rounds and supports keys of 80 and 128 bits. We refer
to the 128-bit version of RECTANGLE as RECTANGLE-64/128. The cipher’s state
is represented as a matrix of 4× 16 bits. Each round of RECTANGLE uses three
transformations: AddRoundKey (bitwise XOR), SubColumn (application of a 4-bit
S-box to the state columns), and ShiftRow (rotations of the state rows by 1, 12 and
13 bits). The S-box of RECTANGLE can be described using a sequence of 12 basic
logical instructions and hence the SubColumn transformation can be implemented in
a bit-sliced fashion.
The unprotected implementation of RECTANGLE requires seven registers for
encryption and eight for decryption. The protected implementations use all available
registers of the microcontroller and several pairs of stack operations (i.e. push and
pop). The protected implementation based on the reference expressions uses ﬁve pairs
of stack operations, while the one based on our optimal expressions uses only three
pairs for encryption and four pairs for decryption. The stack operations are necessary
because the protected implementations have to keep track of more intermediate
variables than they can ﬁt into the registers of the ARM microcontroller.
The performance ﬁgures given in Table 9.8 show that the encryption based on
our expressions is 15% faster than encryption based on the reference expressions.
On the other hand, decryption takes roughly the same time for both reference and
improved expressions. The improvement in code size is modest for both encryption
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Impl./Expr. Rand
Time (cycles) Code size (bytes) Penalty factor
Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec
unprotected 0 945 994 200 160 1 1
reference 1 3470 3326 640 460 3.67 3.46
our 0 2937 3315 620 436 3.10 3.33
Improvement 1 533 11 20 24
% 15.36% 1.10% 3.12% 5.21%
Table 9.8: Execution time, code size and performance penalty factor for diﬀerent
secure implementations of RECTANGLE-64/128.
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Figure 9.1: The result of the t-test applied to our implementation of Speck.
(i.e. 3%) and decryption (i.e. 5%).
9.4.2.4 Leakage Assessment
The tool we used to assess the security of our implementations against ﬁrst-order
attacks is inspired from similar tools such as ELMO [233], ASCOLD [271], and the
one described in [291]. The simulated leakages are computed as follows. For each
register ri we store its previous value r
j−1
i and its current value r
j
i . At each step j
we dump two leakages HW(rji ) and HD(r
j−1
i , r
j
i ) = HW(r
j−1
i ⊕ r
j
i ), where HW(r) is
the Hamming weight of r.
The result of the t-test applied to 106 simulated traces from our ﬁrst-order pro-
tected implementation of Speck is exemplarily shown in Figure 9.1. Similar results
for Simon and RECTANGLE are given in Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.3, respectively. All
results are based on implementations that use our expressions for secure computation
of AND and OR on Boolean shares. We can see that the value of the t-statistic
is inside the ±4.5 interval for each point in time, which implies that the protected
implementations are secure against ﬁrst-order attacks.
9.4.2.5 Comparison
When comparing the performance results of the unprotected implementations of
the three ciphers (see Figure 9.4), one can see that Speck is the fastest, followed
by RECTANGLE and Simon; each of them takes about three times more cycles
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Figure 9.2: The result of the t-test applied to our implementation of Simon.
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Figure 9.3: The result of the t-test applied to our implementation of RECTANGLE.
than Speck. On the other hand, when comparing ﬁrst-order protected implementa-
tions, the implementations of Simon and RECTANGLE take the lead, while the
implementation of Speck is the last one. The performance degradation of the ﬁrst-
order protected implementation of Speck stems from the high overhead associated
with masking modular addition (see Table 9.5). The protected implementation of
RECTANGLE is roughly three times slower than its unprotected implementation.
Finally, the protected implementation of Simon is less than twice slower than its
unprotected implementation.
From this analysis, we learn that lightweight block ciphers that are very fast in
unprotected software implementations (e.g. Speck), might not be the most suitable
ones for ﬁrst-order masking in software. A second key remark is that a cipher that
uses only bitwise operations can have an eﬃcient ﬁrst-order masked implementation
only if it has a small number of intermediate variables.
9.4.2.6 Discussion
Our implementations explored how far one can push the optimization level in Boolean
masking of various algorithms and ciphers. However, we lost the beneﬁt of being
able to provide strong security proofs for our implementations. But, one can simply
insert a random value in our expressions for masked AND and OR to obtain provably
secure expressions similar to the reference expressions.
Our ﬁrst-order implementations did not require fresh random values, but there
are situations where the composition of two expressions leaks. In such situations,
one can inject a fresh random value to preserve the security of the masking scheme.
Another option is to use our search algorithm to ﬁnd an expression that computes
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Figure 9.4: Performance comparison of unprotected and ﬁrst-order protected imple-
mentations of Speck, Simon, and RECTANGLE.
the composed operations in a secure way.
9.5 Summary
We described an eﬃcient algorithm for searching of optimal Boolean masking ex-
pressions. Then, we proposed optimal expressions for the ﬁrst-order masking of
bitwise AND and OR. They require less elementary operations and no random values
compared to the reference expressions in the literature. Based on these optimal
expressions, we presented an improved version of the algorithm for modular addition
on Boolean shares proposed by Coron et al. [85]. We implemented the original and
improved algorithms for modular addition/subtraction of 32-bit values on an ARM
Cortex-M3. Our results show that the improved algorithm is between 18% and 25%
faster than the original algorithm of Coron et al. [85]. Finally, we used our optimal
Boolean masking expressions to write ﬁrst-order protected implementations of three
lightweight block ciphers, namely Simon, Speck, and RECTANGLE. The evaluation
of these implementations revealed that ciphers with simple structure, based solely on
bitwise logical operations and rotations, facilitate eﬃcient software implementations
of ﬁrst-order masking.
The work presented in this chapter can be improved in several ways. First, we
need to get a better understanding of what operations can be securely composed
in order to prevent sequences of operations that leak sensitive values. Second,
the security of the proposed implementations against ﬁrst-order attacks should be
validated using traces measured from an actual device instead of simulated leakages.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
In this thesis, we studied eﬃcient and secure implementations of lightweight symmet-
ric cryptographic primitives for resource-constrained devices that are widely used in
the IoT. In this context, our results provide a better understanding of how to design,
implement, and protect lightweight symmetric cryptographic algorithms for software
applications on various microcontrollers.
A major part of this work was devoted to eﬃcient software implementations. At its
core sits the FELICS benchmarking framework, which addresses the need for fair and
consistent evaluation of software implementations of lightweight symmetric algorithms
in a transparent way. Namely, all implementations use the same programming
interface and are placed in the public domain together with the benchmarking
framework. FELICS extracts accurate values for three metrics (code size, RAM
consumption, and execution time) from three diﬀerent microcontrollers (8-bit AVR,
16-bit MSP, and 32-bit ARM) in various usage scenarios speciﬁc to the IoT. Since
its initial release, the framework has become a reference point for assessing the
eﬃciency of software implementations of lightweight cryptographic algorithms. The
endorsement of the community is a clear conﬁrmation that the project achieved its
initial design goals. We used FELICS to evaluate how suitable implementations of
19 lightweight block ciphers are for resource-constrained applications on the three
aforementioned platforms. The performance ﬁgures revealed that designs based
on simple operations (addition/AND, rotation, and XOR) yield the most eﬃcient
implementations. The top performers are Chaskey, Speck, Simon, RECTANGLE,
LEA, and Sparx. The implementations of these ciphers have small code and RAM
requirements, while being very fast on all three platforms. FELICS facilitated
informed decision-making based on software eﬃciency in the design phase of the
Sparx family of lightweight block ciphers. As a result, Sparx is very fast in
software and provably secure against simple diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis.
The benchmarking results of Sparx place it among the most eﬃcient lightweight
block ciphers evaluated using FELICS. Thanks to its ﬂexible structure, the execution
time of Sparx reaches the top 3 on MSP and the top 5 on AVR. Moreover, its
implementations broke the previous minimum RAM consumption records on AVR
and MSP. Finally, we employed FELICS to determine the cost of the main building
blocks used in lightweight symmetric algorithms. The results of this comprehensive
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study are directly applicable to the design process of new symmetric ciphers intended
for eﬃcient software implementations. The best building blocks use simple operations
on 32-bit values such as bitwise logical operations, modular addition/subtraction,
and rotations by carefully chosen amounts.
In the second part of this thesis, we evaluated the security of lightweight crypto-
graphic implementations from the viewpoint of an attacker. Our proactive approach
was geared towards security against side-channel attacks that exploit the power con-
sumption or the electromagnetic emanations of devices that execute a cryptographic
algorithm. We analyzed the eﬃciency of diﬀerent selection functions commonly
used in correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks to identify the best operations
an adversary should target to mount an eﬀective attack. Our results show that
lightweight block ciphers can be divided into two classes according to their resilience
against CPA attacks. The ﬁrst class contains ciphers that are implemented using
lookup tables, while the second class comprises designs whose operations (modu-
lar addition/subtraction, bitwise logical operations) generally leak less than table
lookups. Then, we showed that unprotected implementations of the AES, such as
those found in many open-source cryptographic libraries, are vulnerable to side-
channel attacks even when the attacker has limited control of the input, which is the
case in network communication protocols. For this attack scenario, we introduced
an attack algorithm that can recover the master key using an optimal number of
CPA attacks. We broke unprotected implementations of the AES based on the S-box
and T-table strategies by controlling a single byte of the input with less than 1600
electromagnetic traces acquired from a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 processor. Knowledge
of the implementation strategy does not signiﬁcantly improve the attack outcome,
nor does it reduce the attack complexity. Finally, we presented a side-channel
vulnerability analysis of the Thread networking stack. We identiﬁed an attack vector
that combines network-speciﬁc mechanisms with diﬀerential electromagnetic analysis
(DEMA) to get full access into a Thread network. The full attack did not succeed
against a TI CC2538 system on chip that runs OpenThread, a certiﬁed open-source
implementation of the stack, due to a fortunate packet fragmentation that is un-
related to security. The possibility to request the master key having the derived
key(s) is questionable security-wise as it subverts the essence of key derivation using
HMAC. We demonstrated that mounting a side-channel attack in the context of a
modern IoT network protocol is not trivial. Being perhaps too expensive for settings
like smart homes, such attacks may pose a relatively higher threat to the commercial
setting. However, the security problems we identiﬁed give a useful lesson to designers
of IoT systems.
The third part of this thesis covered the defensive side of security against side-
channel attacks. We proposed an algorithm for eﬃcient search of masked Boolean
expressions that use an optimal number of elementary operations. In the case of
ﬁrst-order Boolean masking, the optimal expression of bitwise AND can be performed
using less operations than the best known expression and does not require fresh
random values. On the other hand, the best know expression for bitwise OR is
optimal. The protected implementations of Speck, Simon, and RECTANGLE
revealed that ciphers that have a simple structure, based solely on bitwise logical
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operations and rotations, facilitate eﬃcient software implementations of ﬁrst-order
masking.
10.1 Impact
Two of our research projects already have impact in the research community or in
industry.
First, the FELICS benchmarking framework is well known in the research commu-
nity. Many people contributed optimized implementations and the evaluation results
are becoming a common reference in the literature. Moreover, NIST is interested
in using FELICS for a fair comparison of candidates submitted to their portfolio of
lightweight algorithms recommended for the IoT.
Second, our vulnerability analysis of the Thread networking stack determined the
Thread group to elaborate a set of recommendations for implementers in order to
enhance the security of Thread products. In light of our results, designers of future
protocols for the IoT should carefully consider the threat of side-channel attacks
from the early inception.
10.2 Future Directions
Improving FELICS. FELICS can be improved in several ways. For example, the
framework can be extended to support more target devices, especially ultra-low-power
microcontrollers. At the same time, energy consumption of actual devices should
be measured in order to get a clear picture of the energy requirements of various
primitives. Such data is currently missing from the evaluation framework. Moreover,
energy requirement can not be reliably estimated since it is diﬃcult to model the
power consumption of actual devices. Approximations based on execution time
are prone to errors because not all instructions have the same energy requirements.
Usually memory instructions take more energy than register-only instructions. Based
on energy ﬁgures measured from actual devices, one can determine which devices
and ciphers are more suitable for a given use case. These two improvements of
FELICS are very relevant for applications of cryptography on devices that run only
on harvested energy.
Another way of improving FELICS is to add an interface for benchmarking
implementations protected against side-channel attacks. We showed that side-channel
countermeasures such as Boolean masking inﬂuence the performance ﬁgures of
protected software implementations of lightweight ciphers diﬀerently when compared
to unprotected implementations. In other words, some ciphers favour eﬃcient masked
implementations more than others. Hence, this improvement of FELICS is useful for
real-world applications of lightweight symmetric cryptography considering the need
for side-channel countermeasures that stems from the IoT threat model.
FELICS supports only symmetric cryptography, but there is also a need for fair
comparative results obtained from implementations of public key algorithms; and
200 Conclusion
yet there is no tool to satisfy this need. Therefore, FELICS can be extended to
benchmark post-quantum public key cryptography for example.
Side-Channel Attacks. In this work, we focused on side-channel attacks that
exploit the power consumption or the electromagnetic emissions of a target device.
Yet, there are many other interesting side-channel attack techniques such as timing
attacks, cache attacks, and fault attacks that can be applied against embedded
systems that perform lightweight cryptographic algorithms.
Energy-Efficient and Secure Communication Protocols. Most of the current
communication standards for the IoT use the AES to secure and authenticate
communication between end nodes. This is not ideal for several reasons. First, the
AES is less suitable for very constrained devices such as those that run on harvested
energy than many lightweight block ciphers. Second, the cost of protecting the
AES against side-channel attacks is much higher than the cost of protecting most
lightweight block ciphers due to its large S-box.
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A Assembly Code for Basic 8-bit Rotations
MCU AVR MSP ARM
Data a a a
≪ 1 1. lsl a
2. adc a, R1
1. rla.b a
2. adc.b a
1. bfi a, #8, #7
2. ror a, a, #7
≪ 4 1. swap a – –
≫ 1 1. bst a, 0
2. ror a
3. bld a, 7
1. bit #1, a
2. rrc.b a
1. bfi a, #8, #1
2. ror a, a, #1
≫ 4 1. swap a – –
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B Assembly Code for Basic 16-bit Rotations
MCU AVR MSP ARM
Data a, b a a
≪ 1 1. lsl b
2. rol a
3. adc b, R1
1. rla a
2. adc a
≪ 4 1. swap b
2. swap a
3. mov c, b
4. eor c, a
5. andi c, 0x0F
6. eor b, c
7. eor a, c
– –
≪ 8 1. eor a, b
2. eor b, a
3. eor a, b
1. swpb a 1. rev16 a, a
≫ 1 1. bst b, 0
2. ror a
3. ror b
4. bld a, 7
1. bit #1, a
2. rrc a
1. bfi a, #16, #1
2. ror a, a, #1
≫ 4 1. swap b
2. swap a
3. mov c, b
4. eor c, a
5. andi c, 0xF0
6. eor b, c
7. eor a, c
– –
≫ 8 1. eor a, b
2. eor b, a
3. eor a, b
1. swpb a 1. rev16 a, a
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C Assembly Code for Basic 32-bit Rotations
MCU AVR MSP ARM
Data a, b, c, d a, b a
≪ 1 1. lsl d
2. rol c
3. rol b
4. rol a
5. adc d, R1
1. rla b
2. rlc a
3. adc b
1. ror a, a, #31
≪ 5 1. push R1
2. ldi e, 32
3. mov f , c
4. mov g, a
5. mul d, e
6. movw d, R1
7. mul b, e
8. movw b, R1
9. mul f , e
10. eor c, R1
11. eor b, R1
12. mul g, e
13. eor a, R1
14. eor d, R1
15. pop R1
– –
≪ 8 1. mov e, d
2. mov d, a
3. mov a, b
4. mov b, c
5. mov c, e
1. swpb a
2. swpb b
3. mov.b a, c
4. xor.b b, c
5. xor c, a
6. xor c, b
1. ror a, a, #24
≪ 16 1. movw f , d
2. movw d, b
3. movw b, f
1. xor b, a
2. xor a, b
3. xor b, a
1. ror a, a, #16
≫ 1 1. bst d, 0
2. ror a
3. ror b
4. ror c
5. ror d
6. bld a, 7
1. bit #1, b
2. rrc a
3. rrc b
1. ror a, a, #1
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≫ 4 1. swap d
2. swap c
3. swap b
4. swap a
5. mov f , d
6. andi f , 0xF0
7. andi d, 0x0F
8. mov e, c
9. andi e, 0xF0
10. eor d, e
11. andi c, 0x0F
12. mov e, b
13. andi e, 0xF0
14. eor c, e
15. andi b, 0x0F
16. mov e, a
17. andi e, 0xF0
18. eor b, e
19. andi a, 0x0F
20. eor a, f
– –
≫ 8 1. mov e, b
2. mov b, a
3. mov a, d
4. mov d, c
5. mov c, e
1. mov.b b, c
2. xor.b a, c
3. swpb b
4. swpb a
5. swpb c
6. xor c, b
7. xor c, a
1. ror a, a, #8
≫ 16 1. movw f , d
2. movw d, b
3. movw b, f
1. xor b, a
2. xor a, b
3. xor b, a
1. ror a, a, #16
